The Sunbeam

23 F. Cas. 402
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided January 15, 1863·Published

Opinion

BETTS, District Judge.

This vessel was captured September 28, 1862, at sea off New Inlet, North Carolina, by the United States man-of-war State of Georgia, and was brought iuto this port for adjudication. A libel was filed against her October 17 thereafter, and an attachment and monition were issued thereon, returnable on the 4th of November, demanding the condemnation of the vessel , and cargo. Due service was made of the process, and the return was filed in court by the marshal November 4, 1862. On the same day Mr. Archibald, the British consul, resident at this port, intervened officially for the owners of the vessel and cargo, as being British subjects, and claimed the prize as their property. The proctor for Mr. Archibald also interposed, December 30 thereafter, a claim on behalf of Joseph Greenwood, of England, through his attorney in fact, as the owner of eighteen bales of worsted stuff goods captured on board the said ‘ vessel, asserting that they were lawfully shipped as his sole property on a voyage from Liverpool to Matamoras. in Mexico. He also denies in his claim that they were subject to the control of the master of the vessel, and avers that the consignment was in the sole charge of the agent and attorney in fact of the claimant, and further denies that they were lawful prize of war. Although these claims are amplified as pleadings, for the purpose of including other matters, they can only enure to effect a general issue of prize or no prize. On the 27th of December, 1S62, Henry Lafone. also a British subject, resident in England, intervened, by his attorney in fact, with leave to file his claim as of the return day of the process, November 4, 1862, and claimed to be sole owner of the vessel and of the whole of her cargo at the time of ber seizure. The test oath to this claim is subscribed and sworn to by the attorney in fact. The vessel was British built, and was registered at London January 19, 185S. Her shipping articles were dated at the same port August 1, 1862, for a voyage from Liverpool to Halifax, thence, if required, to any ports and places in British North America and the United States, the West Indies, the Bahamas, and Matamoras, and back to a final port of discharge in the United Kingdom, not exceeding twelve months. On the 1st of August, 1862, the vessel cleared from Liverpool for Halifax, with a bill of health, for a voyage to Matamoras, and at Halifax, on the 6th of September, 1SG2. she took a further clearance for Matamoras. The outward manifest of the cargo from Liverpool represented it all as deliverable to order at Matamoras, except one consignment of casks of hardware, deliverable there to named consignees. A very large proportion of the shipment consisted of military supplies, equipments, and materials, and was contraband of war in character, if destined for any rebel port in the southern states, or for the use of the enemy. The vessel sailed from Halifax September 14th, and was captured on the 28th of the same month, about a mile off Cape Pear inlet, North Carolina, early in the morning, heading directly into the port of Wilmington. She was arrested by the United States blockading squadron stationed at that place. The prize did not approach the vessels when first descried from them, or make any signal of a desire to speak them, but endeavored to avoid them, until she was brought to by repeated shots directed by them against her, and so near by as to put her in imminent danger, and once to actually hit her.

The lawfulness of the capture is resisted by the defence by the usual exceptions taken in like suits to the competency of the court to take cognizance of the alleged cause of capture: (1) That no lawful blockade existed. (2) That the claimants had no legal notice of it. (3) That the captured vessel was neutral property, destined to a neutral port, with a lawful cargo on board. And it is finally and most essentially insisted, with urgent earnestness, that the proximity of the vessel to Wilmington, the place of her seizure, was caused by her perilous condition at the time, brought about by stress of weather, and by her necessity therefrom for immediate succor; that she had been compelled to deviate from the voyage she was prosecuting on encountering a violent gale of wind at sea, which disabled her equipments, destroyed her coal and water and provisions, and drove her to seek the nearest and most instant relief in port. The entire evidence shows the vessel to have been arrested close in shore, heading directly into the port of Wilmington, then watched and beleaguered by a strong United States naval force; and, accordingly, the only question demanding consideration in the case is whether the excuse of necessary deviation set up by the defence is credibly supported by the evidence produced in the cause. The legal questions put forward by the claimants have been so repeatedly adjudged by the court during the progress of prize suits through the court during the past year that it will be of no service to repeat the reasons on which those decisions were founded. This case will, accordingly, be determined on the assumption that Wilmington was at the time of this capture under a state of legal and efficient blockade by the United States; that the master and owner of this vessel and cargo had notice and knowledge of such blockade; and that there was nothing in the fitment, ownership, or destination of the vessel or cargo which affords to either any exemption in law from arrest for the cause alleged in the libel. The case then resolves itself into a question of fact alone, — whether the vessel was, when seized, pursuing an honest voyage, according to the representations on her papers, or was really fitted out for trade with the enemy, and was attempting to enter the port of Wilmington. North Carolina, with intent to [404]*404evade the blockade then in force there. This inquiry is to be answered by a just application and appreciation of the facts and circumstances put in evidence before the court on the hearing of the case. The position of the vessel immediately at the mouth of the harbor, at an early hour of the morning (she having run during the night, under steam, close along shore), and her shaping her course for its entrance, are facts stated plainly in the proofs. This situation is sought to be justified by her condition of distress, and by the allegation that she was compelled to make the harbor because of injuries received at sea, and the loss of fuel, water, and provisions in consequence. If that justification is not made out by the proofs, the culpability of the act is most palpable. The burden of proving the existence of the overpowering necessity alleged by the defense is cast by law upon those who set it up.

The first criminating act directly affecting the voyage from Halifax occurred in the deviation the vessel made from the true course of her declared voyage towards Matamoras. The time, place, extent, and cause of the deviation are not given with satisfactory uniformity or clearness by the witnesses who testify to the occurrence, and to many of them the fact that the regular course had been departed from was not known until the capturing vessels came in sight and were pursuing her. Some of her crew, the evening .preceding, when her sails were being furled, supposed that her voyage to Matamoras had been completed by the arrival of the vessel at that port, and were unaware she had turned out of her course until they found she was trying to enter Wilmington. The second mate says that the vessel was sailing, to the time of her capture, towards Matamoras, so far as he knew. Two logs were kept on the ship, — one the ship's log, and the other by the first engineer of the vessel.

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The Sunbeam, 23 F. Cas. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1863).

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