IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-22-00369-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v.
SAUL LEE SUAREZ, Appellee
From the 361st District Court Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 17-05032-CRF-361
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Saul Lee Suarez is charged by indictment with the first-degree felony offense of
murder. After a pre-trial hearing, the trial court granted Suarez’s motion to suppress.
The State opposed the motion to suppress in the trial court and now brings this appeal.
Background
Officers with the City of Bryan Police Department responded to reports of a
shooting at a local park. Once on the scene, a deceased individual was found in a pickup
truck. Witnesses described what officers concluded was an exchange of gunfire between the deceased and another individual. Later, an individual, who was a relative of Anthony
Lopez, called the police to inform them that he had received a call from Lopez wherein
Lopez said he had been shot. By a cell phone ping, officers were able to locate Lopez’s
cell phone at a local apartment complex. Upon the officer’s arrival at the apartment, they
located Lopez in Suarez’s bedroom, detained him, and confirmed he had been shot.
Lopez was then transported to a hospital for treatment. Afterwards, officers conducted
a protective sweep and secured the apartment. The apartment, in which Suarez and four
family members lived, was leased by Suarez’s mother, Sylvia Sanchez. Detective Davis
of the Bryan Police Department arrived on the scene later than the initial officer’s
response and took the lead in the investigation while not sure of who was officially in
charge. Detective Davis ultimately obtained consent to search the apartment, including
Suarez’s room, from Sylvia. Suarez filed a motion to suppress in the trial court seeking
suppression of all evidence or things seized from his bedroom, along with testimony by
law enforcement concerning such evidence. Suarez does not appear to challenge the
initial entry into the apartment to locate Lopez or the protective sweep conducted by the
officers. After a hearing, the trial court granted Suarez’s motion to suppress.
Issue
In one issue, the State contends that it proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that Sylvia had actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of Suarez’s bedroom,
and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in granting Suarez’s motion to suppress.
State v. Suarez Page 2 AUTHORITY
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a
bifurcated standard of review. State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight given to their testimony and may accept or reject any or
all of any witness’s testimony. Stiles v. State, 927 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996,
no pet.). We give almost complete deference to the trial court’s determination of historical
facts. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 8. An appellate court must examine the record in the light
most favorable to the ruling and uphold the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they
are supported by the record. Id. “The appellate court then proceeds to a de novo
determination of the legal significance of the facts as found by the trial court—including
the determination of whether a specific search or seizure was reasonable.” Id. We are
obligated to uphold the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if that ruling was
supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.
Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Consent searches are an established exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution.
Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d
504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). When the State relies on consent to justify a search, it
State v. Suarez Page 3 must prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. 1 State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d
782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The federal constitution requires the state to prove the
validity of the consent by a preponderance of the evidence and the Texas Constitution
requires the state to prove the validity of the consent by clear and convincing evidence.
Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Consent to search is not to be lightly inferred. Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 509
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985). A third party may consent to a search if the third party has actual
authority over the place or thing to be searched. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). “The third party may, in his own right, give valid consent when he
and the absent, non-consenting person share common authority over the premises or
property.” Id. Common authority is determined by the third party’s use of the property,
rather than his legal property interest. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
The authority which justifies the third-party consent . . . rests . . . on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co- inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.
Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242
(1974)).
1Suarez did not challenge the voluntariness of Sylvia’s consent in the trial court and makes no such claim on appeal.
State v. Suarez Page 4 If the third party does not have actual authority, consent may be validly obtained
from an individual with apparent authority over the premises. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756.
If “an officer reasonably, though erroneously, believes that a third party purporting to
provide consent has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched, apparent
authority exists and the purported consent from the third party can serve to make the
search reasonable.” Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
The objective standard for evaluating apparent authority is whether the facts
available to the officer at the moment permit a person of reasonable caution to believe
that the consenting party had authority over the premises. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756.
“[R]easonableness hinges on ‘widely shared social expectations’ and ‘commonly held
understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect
each other's interest.’” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756–57 (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006)).
Whether a third party had actual authority to consent to a search of another’s
property and whether an officer was reasonable in finding that a third party had apparent
authority to consent are mixed questions of law and fact which reviewing courts should
examine de novo.” Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 559–60.
DISCUSSION
The issue the trial court was confronted with was deciding whether the State had
proven that Sylvia had actual authority or apparent authority to consent to the search of
State v. Suarez Page 5 Suarez’s bedroom.
In his testimony during the suppression hearing, Detective Davis revealed the
information he had gathered on the scene before and up to the time he requested consent
to search from Sylvia. Davis indicated that upon his arrival at the apartment, which was
identified prior to his arrival, there was already a substantial Bryan police response.
Suarez was already under arrest on a class C misdemeanor and had been taken outside
and detained near the front entry to the apartment. Davis knew that Lopez was found in
“Suarez’s mother’s apartment,” that Lopez had been shot, was detained, and did not have
a weapon on him when taken into custody. Because Lopez had been in the apartment,
Davis was interested in finding evidence that could have been left by Lopez. Davis made
contact with Sylvia inside the apartment; Suarez, Sylvia’s niece and nephew, and Sylvia’s
mother were also in the apartment at the time. Sylvia allowed the police to enter the
apartment. Sylvia informed Lieutenant Johnson in Davis’s presence that there were two
bedrooms in the back, one that belonged to her niece and one to her son. Davis indicated
he did not know which son, but he did not make any further inquiry with Sylvia to
resolve his question. Sylvia also informed Davis that Suarez had a backdoor to the
outside. Davis spoke with Sylvia about the need for the police to conduct a search and
asked for her consent to search. Davis also asked Sylvia “I’m assuming you’re the adult
and this is your home,” which she responded to in the affirmative. Davis accepted
Sylvia’s representations that it was her apartment, and she was the adult. Davis added
State v. Suarez Page 6 that he did not have anything indicating that Sylvia did not have the authority to consent
to search part of the apartment and that Davis was not told that he would need to ask
Suarez for consent to search his bedroom. Davis obtained written consent to search the
apartment from Sylvia.
Sylvia testified the living room was her room and where she slept. Suarez’s room
was the master bedroom, and Sylvia’s niece had the other bedroom. None of the
occupants shared Suarez’s bedroom nor were the other occupants free to come and go
into Suarez’s bedroom without Suarez’s permission. Because Suarez was eighteen, the
room was his “privacy”, and Sylvia was not allowed to go in Suarez’s room without his
permission. Sylvia respected Suarez’s privacy as did the other occupants. Suarez’s room
had a lock on the door, the door was normally closed, and he kept his room locked.
Suarez had primary control over his bedroom because he was an adult who made his
own decisions. Sylvia indicated that Suarez’s privacy was important to him. Sylvia
acknowledged she signed the lease and paid the rent for the apartment.
The trial court’s findings of fact found that the Bryan police officers knew at the
time consent was given by Sylvia that Suarez was eighteen years old and an adult, that
the bedroom from which the items were ultimately seized was Suarez’s bedroom, and
that Sylvia slept in the living room. Further, that when detective Davis requested consent
from Sylvia, he did so in the presence of Detective Candido Amaya. That despite
knowing Suarez was eighteen years old and that the back bedroom was Suarez’s
State v. Suarez Page 7 bedroom Detective Amaya failed to inform Detective Davis that Sylvia was not the only
adult and that the back bedroom belonged to Suarez. The trial court further found that
Detective Davis, when obtaining consent from Sylvia, asked her, “I’m assuming you’re
the adult and this is your home” and that Davis relied solely on the fact that Sylvia was
the adult and the homeowner when he obtained consent from her. Further, a protective
sweep of the apartment had been performed by officers prior to the search. The trial court
also found that Suarez was present and available for the purposes of asking his consent,
and no officer requested his consent to search.
As a preliminary issue, the State contends that the bodycam video admitted during
the suppression hearing proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Sylvia had
actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of Suarez’s bedroom, and that we
should review de novo this “indisputable visual evidence” rather than give deference to
the trial court’s findings of fact. The State relies on Carmouche v. State as authority for its
argument. 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, only in narrow
circumstances when video evidence provides indisputable visual evidence contradicting
witness testimony and does not pivot on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor
should we decline to give “almost total deference” to the trial court’s findings. See id.
The deferential standard of review in Guzman applies to a trial court’s determination of
historical facts even when that determination is based on a videotape recording admitted
into evidence at a suppression hearing. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim.
State v. Suarez Page 8 App. 2006); see Guzman v. State, 10 S.W.3d at 327, 332–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). With
one exception, the State does not argue that the bodycam video contradicts testimony
from the suppression hearing, only that it provides indisputable visual evidence that
should cause us to review the issue of authority to consent de novo. The only contradiction
referenced by the State in its brief is the difference in Sylvia’s suppression hearing
testimony and the bodycam video regarding whether she knew the mother of the murder
victim. The trial court made no finding regarding whether Sylvia knew the victim’s
mother or not. Therefore, we will not abandon our general rule that appellate courts
should give almost total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations unless the
video recording indisputably contradicts the trial court’s findings. State v. Houghton, 384
S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). After our examination of the
record, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we uphold the trial court’s
findings of fact because they are supported by the record. See Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 8.
Our analysis now turns to a de novo determination of the legal significance of the
facts as found by the trial court which includes the determination of whether a specific
search or seizure was reasonable. See id. Whether it is reasonable for an officer to rely on
consent is a question to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. See
Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 560.
“Actual authority is determined from all of the relevant evidence developed and
is not limited to the facts available to the officers at the time of the search.” Hebert v. State,
State v. Suarez Page 9 No. 14-05-00383-CR, 2006 WL 3797379, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 28,
2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) see United States v. Kelley, 981
F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir. 1993) see also Figueroa v. State, 250 S.W.3d 490, 508 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2008, pet. ref’d). The State must prove “mutual use of the property by persons
generally having joint access or control for most purposes.” United States v. Gonzales, 121
F.3d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171).
The trial court concluded that Sylvia did not have common authority or mutual
use of Suarez’s bedroom. The trial court also concluded that Suarez had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bedroom, had legal standing to contest the search of his
bedroom, and had legal standing to contest the consent given by Sylvia.
Here, the State has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence, much less
by clear and convincing evidence, that Sylvia possessed actual authority over Suarez’s
room sufficient to consent to its search. The trial court found the testimony of Suarez’s
mother regarding access and control of Suarez’s bedroom to be truthful and credible. The
trial court found the testimony of Detective Davis to be incomplete and unpersuasive.
Based on Sylvia’s testimony, the trial court was free to believe that Sylvia had limited
access, if any, to Suarez’s bedroom, that Suarez’s bedroom was not subject to mutual use
by Suarez and Sylvia, and that Sylvia did not have joint access or control over Suarez’s
bedroom “for most purposes.” See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7. Sylvia’s testimony
provided evidence that enabled the trial court to overcome the presumption that Sylvia,
State v. Suarez Page 10 as a parent, had common authority over her son’s bedroom. See Hubert , 312 S.W.3d at
563. Viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding Sylvia’s actual authority to
consent to the search of Suarez’s bedroom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the State failed to
prove that Suarez’s mother had actual authority to consent to the search.
Next, we will determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment
consent was requested from Sylvia would permit a person of reasonable caution to
believe that Sylvia had authority over the premises. See Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756; Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1990). We employ
this objective standard in evaluating apparent authority to consent to a search. See Id.
The “determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises.”
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal quotes omitted). If not, then warrantless entry without
further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188–89.
Davis was present in the living room when another officer asked Sylvia about the
“kids” bedrooms and Sylvia replied one bedroom was her nieces’ and one bedroom was
her son’s. Davis was also present when another officer had an exchange with Sylvia that
clarified Suarez was her son. Davis asked numerous questions about when Lopez arrived
at the apartment, what entry Lopez used, who was at the apartment with Lopez, and
State v. Suarez Page 11 when Sylvia arrived; all primarily focused on Lopez. Davis then explained the need to
search the apartment and asked Sylvia for consent to search, to which Sylvia replied
“yeah.” At the moment Davis asked Sylvia for consent to search the apartment, Davis
had not asked Sylvia any questions that would solicit facts that could assist in
determining whether Sylvia had authority over the premises. It was not until after Sylvia
replied “yeah” and while Davis was in the process filling out the consent to search form
that Davis said to Sylvia “I’m assuming you’re the adult and this is your home,” to which
Sylvia replied “yes.” Davis testified that he took Sylvia’s affirmative response at face
value. Davis also acknowledged during his testimony at the suppression hearing that he
believed Sylvia could give consent based upon her affirmative response to his
assumption, but again at the time Davis requested consent to search he had not stated to
Sylvia “I’m assuming you’re the adult and this is your home,” nor had Sylvia responded
to the statement. Law enforcement officers are not allowed to proceed without inquiry
into ambiguous circumstances or to always accept at face value the consenting party’s
apparent assumption or claim of authority to allow the contemplated search. Riordan v.
State, 905 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.)
Davis testified that he assumed Sylvia was the head matriarch of the scene and
after receiving consent, he believed they then had “carte blanche authority to go
wherever.” Davis’s beliefs are not what control our review, it is an objective
determination of whether the facts available to Davis at the moment he requested consent
State v. Suarez Page 12 would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793,
2801, 111 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1990)
We recognize that the reasonableness of apparent authority depends on “widely
shared social expectations,” such as the expectation that family members share access,
control, and use of their home and the items in it. See Gonzalez v. State, 608 S.W.3d 98, 105
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). We also recognize there is no burden on the
police to eliminate the possibility of atypical arrangements, in the absence of reason to
doubt that the regular scheme was in place. See Miller v. State, 208 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d). It was obvious there were multiple generations—Sylvia’s
mother, Sylvia’s niece and nephew, and Suarez—all occupying the apartment, some with
their own bedroom. Under these circumstances, there was an ambiguity in the situation
that should have given Davis pause to doubt Sylvia’s authority over each bedroom in the
apartment. Davis’s assumption that Sylvia was the matriarch and his belief that the
officers had carte blanche authority were objectively unreasonable. Further, Davis’s
belief that Sylvia said, “it was her and her kids that lived there” is in conflict with the fact
that Sylvia’s niece, nephew, and mother resided in the apartment. The burden is not met
if law enforcement officers, when faced with an ambiguous situation, proceed without
making further inquiry. See Whisenhunt v. State, 122 S.W.3d 295, 299 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). “If officers do not learn enough and if the
State v. Suarez Page 13 circumstances fail to clarify whether the property is subject to common authority by the
consent-giver, then the warrantless search is unlawful.” Id.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the officers were not
reasonable in believing that Sylvia had apparent authority to consent to the search of
Suarez’s bedroom. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Suarez’s
motion to suppress. We overrule the State’s sole issue.
MATT JOHNSON Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray*, Justice Johnson, and Justice Davis 2 *(Chief Justice Gray dissents.) Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed August 29, 2024 Do not publish [CR25]
2The Honorable Rex Davis, Senior Justice (Retired) of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
State v. Suarez Page 14