The State of Texas v. Ezequel Castaneda

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00243-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00243-CR No. 07-24-00244-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT

V.

EZEQUEL CASTANEDA, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 242nd District Court Hale County, Texas Trial Court Nos. B22083-2205 & B22084-2205, Honorable Kregg Hukill, Presiding

April 25, 2025 OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

We have Zoom, Teams, and, no doubt, other programs allowing for individuals to

visually communicate with each other over the internet. Someday, a la inspiration from

various scenes from Star Wars, we may also have technology to broadcast holograms by

which individuals in far reaches of our world appear within the same room. Will such

technology affect the right to confront witnesses found in the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution? That is the very question posed to us. And, that is the very question we cannot answer in these appeals by the State of Texas from orders denying

its motions “to Permit Witness to Testify Via Videoconferencing.”

Statute provides the State of Texas limited authority to appeal in criminal cases.

That authority is specified in article 44.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. State v.

Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The provision of said statute

invoked by the State at bar is found in subsection (a)(5) of the article. It provides that

“the state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case if the order . . . grants

a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, if jeopardy has not

attached . . . and if the prosecuting attorney certifies . . . that the appeal is not taken for

the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial

importance in the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5). While interpreting

those words, our Court of Criminal Appeals observed that “[t]he language of Article

44.01(a)(5) is clear, unambiguous, and does not lead to absurd consequences; thus, . . .

we must follow the plain meaning of the text.” Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d at 350. And, the

plain “statutory language of Article 44.01(a)(5) clearly and unambiguously limits the

State’s right to appeal to orders that grant motions to suppress evidence.” Id. (emphasis

in original) (involving the State’s effort to appeal from an order denying the State’s motion

to reconsider an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress); see also Black v.

State, 362 S.W.3d 626, 635 n. 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (reiterating its previous decision

that “the State lacked the right to appeal the denial of the motion for reconsideration

because the plain language of Article 44.01(a)(5) permits the appeal only of orders that

grant motions to suppress”).

2 The State addressed jurisdiction in its appellate brief. It suggested that same

existed because: 1) “jeopardy has not attached”; 2) “the Hale County Criminal District

Attorney certified . . . the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay”; 3) “the evidence

is of substantial importance in the case”; and 4) the trial court’s order effectively

terminates the prosecution in Appellee’s favor.” These allegations may satisfy other

aspects of article 44.01(a)(5) but omit reference to the first component of the subsection,

i.e., an order that “grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission.”

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5). Nor does the State attempt to explain why

or how we should disregard Cowsert. And, as for its citation to State v. Medrano, 67

S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), the court there did comment that “[t]he legislative

intent, explicitly stated in the Bill Analysis, was to permit the State to appeal any

‘questionable legal rulings excluding what may be legally admissible evidence.’ Period.”

Id. at 900. But, as expressed in Cowsert, “the State fails to note that the Medrano analysis

began from the premise that a motion to suppress is the only type of motion that can be

appealed.” Cowsert, 207 S.W.3d at 351. It further observed that in “Medrano, we also

held that a motion to suppress evidence is one in which the defendant claims that certain

evidence should not be admitted at trial for a constitutional, statutory, evidentiary, or

procedural reason.” Id. (emphasis added). So, our reading of Cowsert in conjunction

with Medrano leads us to conclude that all provisions of article 44.01(a)(5) must be met

before the State may appeal, including that requiring an order “grant[ing] a motion to

suppress.” We have neither such motions nor orders here.

To reiterate, the State sought leave to present witness testimony by video

conference. No one filed a motion to suppress or to otherwise exclude evidence from

3 trial. Furthermore, the trial court “denied” the motions of the State to so present evidence.

It granted no motion to suppress or exclude evidence. Given these circumstances, we

do not have before us an appeal by the State from an order that “grants a motion to

suppress” within the plain meaning of article 44.01(a)(5), as construed in Cowsert.

Saved for another day is the interplay between technology and the Sixth

Amendment. Article 44.01(a)(5) affording the State no avenue of appeal from the orders

denying its own motions for leave to present a witness via a particular technological

format, we dismiss the appeals before us.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Publish.