The State of Texas v. Bryan Javier Ramirez Alejo
Opinion
Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION No. 04-22-00875-CR
The STATE of Texas, Appellant
v.
Bryan Javier RAMIREZ ALEJO, Appellee
From the County Court, Kinney County, Texas Trial Court No. 13760CR Honorable Dennis Powell, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting en banc 1: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 10, 2025
REVERSED AND RENDERED
The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s request for habeas
relief. On July 17, 2024, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and ordered the case
dismissed with prejudice. On October 9, 2024, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in
1 Justice Lori Massey Brissette is not participating. 04-22-00875-CR
Ex parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v.
Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). Subsequently, we acted on our own
motion to reconsider this appeal en banc in light of Aparicio. Id. On August 12, 2025, we issued
an opinion and judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and remanding for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion. We now sua sponte withdraw our August 12, 2025
opinion and judgment in this case, in order to render judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3 (appellate
court should render judgment trial court should have rendered, except when remand is necessary
for further proceedings or for another trial in the interests of justice); see also State v. Lopez-
Miranda, No. 04-23-00153-CR, 2024 WL 3954213, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 28, 2024,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing and rendering judgment dismissing
habeas application and reinstating information). For the following reasons, we reverse the trial
court’s order, render judgment denying Appellee’s application for pretrial habeas relief, and
reinstate the information charging Appellee with the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass.
BACKGROUND
Appellee, Bryan Javier Ramirez Alejo, was arrested and charged with misdemeanor
criminal trespass as a part of Operation Lone Star (“OLS”). Appellee subsequently filed a pretrial
application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State engaged in selective prosecution by
choosing to prosecute men for criminal trespass but not to prosecute similarly situated women for
the same offense, in violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas
constitutions. The trial court granted Appellee’s habeas application and ordered the case
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dismissed. 2 The State appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State argues that Appellee’s selective-prosecution claim is not cognizable
in a pretrial habeas proceeding and that the trial court erred by granting the application for writ of
habeas corpus.
A. Standard of Review
Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas
corpus for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). “However, when,
the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal standards, we review
the trial court's ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling
“if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to
the case.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing State v. Ross,
32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “That rule holds true even if the trial court gave the
wrong reason for its ruling.” Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d
539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
B. Cognizability
The State, in its brief, argues that a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus based on
a claim of selective prosecution is not cognizable on appeal. Appellee, however, disputes this
2 The trial court clerk filed Appellee’s habeas application as a document in the same cause number as the underlying criminal proceeding, but “a habeas proceeding is a separate proceeding from a criminal prosecution.” Ex parte Sheffield, 685 S.W.3d 86, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); see Ex parte Carter, 849 S.W.2d 410, 411 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, pet. ref’d). As a result, Appellee's habeas application should have been “docketed separately from the substantive cause and given a different cause number.” Carter, 849 S.W.2d at 411 n.2. Nevertheless, it is clear from the trial court’s order that it granted Appellee’s request for habeas relief in the habeas proceeding—in which Appellee had requested that the trial court dismiss the underlying criminal case with prejudice—and, in doing so, effectively dismissed the criminal charges in the underlying criminal case.
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argument.
From our review, the facts and arguments in this case are substantively the same as those
in Ex parte Aparicio, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Appellee’s claim
of selective arrest and prosecution was cognizable under the facts of that case. 707 S.W.3d at 202.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellee’s claim is cognizable.
C. Selective Prosecution
To establish a prima facie case of “selective prosecution or selective enforcement, the
claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The prosecutorial policy had a
discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d
at 204 (citations omitted). The second prong requires the claimant “definitively show that an
otherwise facially neutral law is being administered in bad faith—that it was ‘directed so
exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that
equal protection of the law was denied.” Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996)). In other words, the claimant must show by
“‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that the OLS mindset administering the facially neutral criminal
trespass law was ‘so unequal and oppressive’ against him because he is male.” Id. at 210 (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
The evidence here is substantively the same as the evidence presented in Aparicio. Id. at
189. We therefore conclude, based on our review of the entire record and after considering the
parties’ arguments, that the evidence is insufficient to show that the State of Texas’ policy was
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 204.
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CONCLUSION
Because Appellee failed to establish the second prong of his selective prosecution claim,
the trial court erred in granting his application for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, we reverse
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