ACCEPTED 15-25-00117-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/27/2025 10:31 AM Case No. 15-25-00117-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK _____________________________________________________________ FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS for the Fifteenth District of Texas 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM _____________________________________________________________ CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
Patrick Cox, for himself and as an agent for AOC Ranches, LLC, Team Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR Enterprises, LLC and VPizza Restaurant, 001, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Texas, Office of the Attorney General,
Appellee. _______________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 419th Judicial District Court Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-19-000436 ______________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF ______________________________________________________________
Reese W. Baker State Bar No. 01587700 Baker & Associates 950 Echo Lane, Suite 300 Houston, Texas 77024 Telephone: (713) 869-9200 reese.baker@sbcglobal.net
Attorney for Appellant Preamble
Comes now Patrick Cox, Cross-Appellant herein, who respectfully makes
and files this, his Appellant’s Brief.
In this Brief Patrick Cox will be referred to himself as “Cox.” The State of
Texas, by and through the Office of the Attorney General, will be referred to as
“the State.”
The Clerk’s Record will be cited as “CR [page].” Although divided into
volumes, the Clerk’s Record is consecutively numbered, so the volume number
will not be noted.
The Reporter’s Record from the June 11, 2025 hearing will be cited as “RR
[page].”
Documents found in the Appendix to the Appellant’s Brief are hyperlinked
to references herein. Identity of Parties and Counsel
Cox hereby submits a list of parties and counsel interested in this case,
pursuant to Tex. R. App. Pro. 38.1(a):
Cross-Appellees and their Appellate Cross-Appellant and his Counsel: Counsel:
The State of Texas, Patrick Cox, for himself and as agent Office of the Attorney General for AOC Ranches, LLC, Team Ken Paxton, Attorney General Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR c/o Assistant Attorney General: Enterprises, LLC, and VPizza Ali Thorburn Restaurant 001, LLC State Bar No. 24125064 c/o Reese Baker ali.thorbun@oag.texas.gov State Bar No. 01587700 Office of the Attorney General, Baker & Associates General Litigation Division 950 Echo Lane, Suite 300 P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Houston, Texas 77024 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Telephone: (713) 869-9200 Telephone: (512) 475-4392 reese.baker@sbcglobal.net
3 Table of Contents
Cover Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Preamble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Identity of Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Issue Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Statement Regarding Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Statement of Facts
A. The TaxMasters Judgment, and Its Reversal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B. Enforcement of the Erroneous Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Cox’s Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
D. This Lawsuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
E. Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Arguments and Authorities
4 Issue Presented
Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing Cox’s federal takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. Federal Takings Claims Are Cognizable in State Court . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Cox Adequately Plead a Federal Takings Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C. Dismissal Was Improper Under Texas Pleading Standards . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion and Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Certificate of Compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Index of Authorities
Cases
Texas Supreme Court
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
City of Houston v. Houston Mun. E’ees Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15
Cleveland v. Tufts, 7 S.W. 72 (Tex.1888) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22
McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Miga v. Jensen, 299 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Peticolas v. Carpenter, 53 Tex. 23 (1880). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 18, 23
Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 19, 21, 23
Texas Courts of Appeals
Cox v. State, 448 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App. — Amarillo 2014, pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6 Lyda Swinerton Bldrs., Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 566 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
United States Supreme Court
Bank of U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. 8, 8 L.Ed. 299 (1832) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 144 S.Ct. 938 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19, 21, 23
Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 139 S.Ct. 2162 (2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18, 20, 21
San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Federal Constitution and Statutes
U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Rules of Appellate Procedure
Tex. R. App. Pro. 9.4(i)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Tex. R. App. Pro. 9.5(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Tex. R. App. Pro. 38.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7 Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case: Case against the State for an unconstitutional taking, under Texas and federal law. CR 3-12. The State sought dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. CR 14-524.
Trial Court: The 419th Judicial District Court of Travis County, the Honorable Maya Guerra Gamble, Presiding.
Disposition: The trial court granted in part and denied in part the State’s request for dismissal, dismissing Cox’s federal takings claim, holding that sovereign immunity deprived the court of jurisdiction, but allowing his Texas state law takings claim to proceed. CR 822–23.
Issue Presented
Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing Cox’s federal takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
8 Statement Regarding Oral Argument
Cox does not believe oral argument will materially assist the Court in
deciding this case. The errors complained of are apparent from the face of the
record. The law governing what should have been done is not particularly
complex, and is settled. All of these are factors lending themselves to deciding this
case on the briefs.
9 Statement of Facts
A. The TaxMasters Judgment, and Its Reversal The claims in this case arise because of a judgment previously taken against
Cox and some other entities, in a case styled State of Texas v. TaxMasters,
Inc., TMIRS Enterprises, Ltd., TM GP Services, LLC d/b/a TaxMasters, and
Patrick R. Cox, Individually. CR 5. Among other things, the judgment
imposed personal liability on Cox in the amount of $46,187,434.70. Id.
Cox appealed the judgment taken against him personally, and was
successful: the appellate court reversed the portion of the judgment making Cox
individually liable, finding there was no evidence that Cox was guilty of any
misconduct. Id.; see also Cox v. State, 448 S.W.3d 497, 502-07 (Tex. App. —
Amarillo 2014, pet. denied). The Texas Supreme Court denied review on April 1,
2016, making the reversal final. CR 5.
B. Enforcement of the Erroneous Judgment
However, before the appellate court was able to rule, the State aggressively
enforced the judgment, seeking and receiving the appointment of a receiver over
Cox’s personal assets. CR 6–8. Acting under the State’s authority, the receiver
seized and sold nearly all of Cox’s non-exempt personal property, including
business investments and other valuable assets. CR 525–27.
10 Because the sales were conducted at forced sale, the property yielded far less
than its fair market value. CR 5–6, 525–28. The receiver ultimately recovered
$830,756, of which $560,207 was turned over to the bankruptcy trustee in the
TaxMasters and TMIRS bankruptcies, and only $50,816 was returned to Cox. CR
5–6, 525–28. This amount is dwarfed by the amount the receiver paid himself,
$219,238 out of funds that should have been returned to Cox. CR 6, 9, 37. The
remaining property and value were permanently lost. CR 5–6, 525–28.
C. Cox’s Losses
The forced seizure and liquidation of Cox’s property inflicted significant
financial harm. Beyond the losses attributable to the fire sale liquidation of his
assets, Cox also lost profits, business opportunities, and investments that were
stripped from him before the judgment against him was reversed. CR 7–9, 528–31.
Despite the fact the judgment was reversed and a take nothing judgment
rendered in Cox’s favor, the State has refused to either return the property seized or
to compensate Cox for the value lost. CR 3–9. Importantly, the State’s actions
deprived Cox of all economically viable use of the property (which was taken from
him) without providing compensation.
11 D. This Lawsuit
As the result of his treatment, Cox sued the State, seeking restitution and
relief for the taking of his property. CR 3–13, 525–50. He alleges, among other
claims, that the State’s seizure and permanent deprivation of his property
constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. CR 3–13, 525–31. These facts, taken as true at this stage, allege a
concrete deprivation of property rights directly traceable to the State’s action —
precisely the type of injury that the Takings Clause was designed to redress
E. Proceedings Below
In response to Cox’s suit, the State filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction and
Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting sovereign immunity and other defenses.
CR 14–58. Cox responded to the State’s request for dismissal. CR 525-50. After
briefing and argument, the trial court granted the State’s plea in part and denied it
in part. RR 7–55. As it relates to Cox’s appeal, the trial court dismissed his federal
takings claim for lack of jurisdiction. CR 822–23. This order effectively insulates
the State from accountability under the Takings Clause, even though the pleadings
and evidence demonstrate that Cox’s claims fall squarely within the protections
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
12 Cox timely appealed this dismissal, CR 824-27, and now files his Cross-
Appellant’s Brief.
13 Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237,
240 (Tex. 2020); Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
226 (Tex. 2004). De novo review considers the issue presented anew, with no
deference given to the trial court’s actions. McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse,
LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 282-83 (Tex. 2018). In deciding the matter, the appellate
court exercises its own judgment, redetermining the answer to each legal issue,
Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998), asking whether the result
or conclusion is correct. Lyda Swinerton Bldrs., Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 566 S.W.3d
836, 841 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings,
the court must construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the
pleader’s intent, and accept as true all the factual allegations made. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 226. If the pleading affirmatively negate jurisdiction, dismissal is
proper, but if the pleading merely fails to allege sufficient facts, the plaintiff should
be afforded an opportunity to amend. Id. at 226–27.
Jurisdictional pleas raising sovereign immunity are likewise reviewed de
novo. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009); City of
14 Houston v. Houston Mun. E’ees Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Tex. 2018).
And when constitutional claims are at issue, courts must ensure that sovereign
immunity does not bar suits that the constitution itself makes self-executing, such
as claims for just compensation under the Takings Clause. Steele v. City of
Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980).
15 Summary of the Argument
The trial court erred in granting the State’s plea to the jurisdiction on Cox’s
federal takings claim. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, federal takings claims are
actionable in state court, and Cox’s pleadings and record evidence adequately
allege a compensable taking.
Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Cox has a constitutional right
to pursue compensation for the taking of his property. Federal precedent makes
clear that state courts are competent forums to determine such claims, and state
procedural doctrines cannot be used to extinguish them. A property owner has a
claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government retains his
property without paying for it.
Dismissing Cox’s federal taking claim improperly denied him a forum to
vindicate his constitutional rights, and so the dismissal should be reversed and the
matter remanded. To do otherwise would not only contravene controlling
precedent, but would also undermine the constitutional guarantee that no property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation. That guarantee cannot be
extinguished at the pleading stage by recasting a federal takings claim as
something it is not.
16 Arguments and Authorities
Issue Presented (Restated)
Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and dismissing Cox’s federal takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
A. Federal Takings Claims Are Cognizable in State Court
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S Constitution plainly
provides “no person’s property shall be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that its plain language is self-executing, with no statutory authority required before
such a claim may be pursued. DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 291, 144 S.Ct. 938
(2024); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315–16, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987). When the government
takes private property, the duty to pay compensation arises directly from the
Constitution. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 315–16.
Because the Constitution itself provides the right to recover compensation
for the taking of one’s property, sovereign immunity therefore cannot shield the
State from suit for a federal takings claim. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S.
180, 190-91, 139 S.Ct. 2162 (2019) (“no matter what sort of procedures the
government puts in place to remedy a taking, a property owner has a Fifth
17 Amendment entitlement to compensation as soon as the government takes his
property without paying for it.”). Texas courts likewise recognize that takings
claims are not barred by immunity because the Constitution itself creates the right
and remedy. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007) (recognizing that
immunity will not shield the government from a claim under the takings clause);
accord, Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 791.
In addition to being self-executing, it is also settled that state courts have
both the power and the obligation to hear federal takings claims. San Remo Hotel
v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (confirming that state
courts undoubtedly have the duty to enforce the federal Constitution); see also
Knick, 588 U.S. at 190-91 (making clear that property owners may bring federal
takings claims in either state or federal court); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S.
455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792 (1990) (recognizing that state courts possess concurrent
jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims unless Congress provides otherwise).
Texas courts agree, Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 788 (noting plaintiffs asserted taking
claims under both the state and federal constitutions), and nothing in 42 U.S.C. §
1983 or the Takings Clause itself removes this jurisdiction. See generally 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
18 subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....”).
Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Cox’s federal takings claim rested
on an erroneous view of its subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Cox Adequately Plead a Federal Takings Claim
Because a federal takings claim is cognizable in Texas state court, the next
question is whether Cox’s pleading is sufficient to assert the claim. It is.
In determining jurisdiction, the court must construe Cox’s pleadings
liberally in his favor, accept all factual allegations made therein as true, and look to
the pleader’s intent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. A plea to the jurisdiction
may only be granted if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of
jurisdiction. Id. Dismissing such a claim at the outset improperly short-circuits the
constitutional guarantee. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at
315 (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for both temporary
and permanent takings).
19 In his Amended Complaint, Cox alleges that:
• The State obtained a receiver to seize his personal assets while a judgment
against him was on appeal.
• The receiver, acting under the State’s authority, liquidated nearly all of
Cox’s non-exempt property at forced sale.
• The fair market value of the property exceeded the sale proceeds by millions
of dollars.
• Even after the judgment was reversed as to Cox, the State refused to return
most of the seized property or compensate him for its value; no
compensation has been offered or paid by the State.
CR 3-9; see also CR 525-31
These allegations, taken as true, state a claim that the State intentionally
deprived Cox of his property for public use without just compensation. That is the
essence of a federal taking. See Knick, 588 U.S. at 190-91.
Cox’s pleadings adequately allege that the State, acting through a court-
appointed receiver, seized and permanently deprived him of millions of dollars’
worth of personal property under a judgment later reversed and rendered. CR 3–9,
525–31. These allegations establish a compensable taking under federal law, Id. at
206 (elements of a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment are “the taking of [a
20 property owner’s] property without just compensation by a local government”),
especially given that the pleadings must be construed liberally in Cox’s favor, and
where they contain nothing that would affirmatively negate jurisdiction. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d at 226–27.
Even if heightened pleading requirements applied, Cox’s petition satisfied
them. He identified the property interest at stake, the government action that
affected a taking, and the absence of just compensation. Cox’s pleadings allege the
State’s actions deprived him of beneficial use and value of his property and (given
that this was done through the seizure and sale of the property by the receiver) was
necessarily intentional. These allegations state a valid takings claim, and preclude
dismissal at the jurisdictional stage. Knick, 588 U.S. at 189-90; First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 315–16. When a takings claims is
adequately alleged, dismissal is inappropriate. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v.
Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 799-800 (Tex. 2016).
Because Cox’s pleadings establish a viable constitutional claim, the trial
court had jurisdiction.
C. Dismissal Was Improper Under Texas Pleading Standards
By dismissing at the outset, the trial court short-circuited factual
development that could confirm the scope and impact of the State’s actions — an
21 error that runs contrary to both federal takings jurisprudence and Texas pleading
standards.
Texas law recognizes that successful appellants are entitled to restitution for
property wrongfully taken under a judgment later reversed. Miga v. Jensen, 299
S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2009). This is not new law. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Tufts, 7
S.W. 72, 74 (Tex.1888) (“It is settled that money paid upon a judgment afterward
reversed may be recovered by the party making the payment.”); Peticolas v.
Carpenter, 53 Tex. 23, 29 (1880) (“[w]here a judgment for debt is reversed after it
has been enforced by execution, and the case is finally decided in favor of
defendant, he is certainly entitled to restitution”). Federal law is the same, and has
been settled for even longer. Bank of U.S. v. Bank of Wash., 31 U.S. 8, 17, 8 L.Ed.
299 (1832) (“On the reversal of the judgment, the law raises an obligation in the
party to the record, who has received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to
make restitution to the other party for what he has lost.”).
The pleadings here are sufficient. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d at 799-800 (providing
that when plaintiffs plead a viable takings theory, the plea to jurisdiction must be
denied). At a minimum, Cox alleged facts that, if proven, establish a taking. The
property taken consists of both property Cox owned, and the funds realized from
the receiver’s sale of that property. The receiver paid himself from funds he held
22 after Cox’s property had been sold; the State neither paid the receiver’s fee nor
offered to repay Cox for the fee the receiver paid himself, and the receiver
prevented Cox from recovering other assets of significant value. Liberally
construed, those allegations are more than adequate to survive jurisdictional
dismissal. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Additionally, even if the pleadings
were somehow found to be inadequate or incomplete (something that does not
actually seem to have been the case), the proper course would have been to allow
amendment rather than dismissal. Id.
By dismissing Cox’s federal takings claim on jurisdictional grounds, the trial
court denied him the forum guaranteed by both the U.S. Constitution and
controlling Texas precedent. Cox’s claims arise directly under the Constitution —
sovereign immunity is no bar. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482
U.S. at 315–16; Steele, 603 S.W.2d at 791.
Conclusion and Prayer
Sovereign immunity does not shield the State from liability for
unconstitutional takings. Cox’s pleadings allege a valid federal taking claim,
arising under the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal should
be reversed, and the case remanded so that Cox may pursue the just compensation
guaranteed to him by the U.S. Constitution.
23 Cox prays the Court reverse the trial court’s dismissal of his federal takings
claim, and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits.
Cox prays for such other and further relief, general or special, in law or in
equity, to which he may prove himself to be justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Reese W. Baker Reese W. Baker State Bar No. 01587700 Baker & Associates 950 Echo Lane, Suite 300 Houston, Texas 77024 Telephone: (713) 869-9200 reese.baker@sbcglobal.net
Attorney for Cross-Appellant
Certificate of Compliance
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Pro. 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned hereby certifies that according to the word count function of the computer program used to generate the document, the portions of the Appellant’s Brief subject to the rule contain 2,837 words total, and that the text thereof is in 14 point Times New Roman font, with footnotes in 13 point Times New Roman font.
/s/ Reese W. Baker Reese W. Baker
24 Certificate of Service
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Pro. 9.5(d), the undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Cross-Appellant’s Brief has been served on Ali Thorburn, lead counsel of record for the State, c/o Office of the Attorney General, General Litigation Division, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711- 2548through the Court’s e-filing system, on this, the 27th day of August, 2025.
/s/ Reese W. Baker Reese W. Baker
25 Case No. 09-25-00098-CV _____________________________________________________________
In the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas _____________________________________________________________
Patrick Cox, for himself and as an agent for AOC Ranches, LLC, Team Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR Enterprises, LLC and VPizza Restaurant, 001, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Texas, Office of the Attorney General,
Appellee. _____________________________________________________________
Appellant’s Appendix _____________________________________________________________ Appendix Table of Contents
Document Page Numbers
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Texas’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary Judgment (CR 822-23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-29
Cox’s Amended Complaint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30-40 06/16/2025 03:27:42 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-19-000436
Page 822 07/08/2025 10:41:09
Page 823 3/28/2025 6:33 PM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-19-000436 Nancy Rodriguez Cause No. D-1-GN-19-000436
§ PATRICK COX, FOR HIMSELF AND § AS AGENT FOR AOC § RANCHES, LLC, TEAM § In the District Court of ADVERTISING § SERVICES, INC., CCLHR § ENTERPRISES, LLC and VPIZZA § Travis County, Texas RESTAURANT 001, LLC, § PLAINTIFF § § 419th Judicial District v. § § THE STATE OF TEXAS, § DEFENDANT §
AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PATRICK R. COX, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT, AGAINST THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES, UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF COX’S PROPERTY WITHOUT ADEQUATE COMPENSATION, CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF COX’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, CIVIL CONVERSION AND OTHER CLAIMS
Defendant Patrick R. Cox files this complaint for himself and on behalf of AOC Ranches,
LLC, Team Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR Enterprises, LLC and VPizzaRestaurant 001, LLC
against the State of Texas. This complaint is for restitution of property taken from him and
damages incurred by him and the entities for which he is the agent, and also for the unconstitutional
taking of Cox’s property without adequate compensation, claim for violation of Cox’s right to due
process, civil conversion, and other claims as a result of the judgment against him by the State of
Texas in the case of The State of Texas, Plaintiff v. TaxMasters, Inc., TMIRS Enterprises, Ltd., TM
GP Services, LLC d/b/a TaxMasters, and Patrick R. Cox, individually, Defendants, Cause No. D-
1-GV-10-000486, in the 200th Judicial District of Travis County, Texas, which judgment was
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 1 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 3 reversed on appeal, as more fully described below.
Discovery Level
1. Cox intends to conduct discovery under Level 2 of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
190.3 because this suit is not governed by Rules 190.2 or 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Parties 2. Patrick Cox is an individual who resides at 12335 Kingsride Ln. #390, Houston,
Texas 77024. Cox is the authorized agent for the interests of AOC Ranches, LLC, Team
Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR Enterprises, LLC and VPizza Restaurant 001, LLC.
3. The State of Texas is the defendant. The State of Texas may be served by serving
the Secretary of State of Texas at P.O. Box 12079, Austin, Texas 78711-2079 and also by serving
the Attorney General of the State of Texas, Ken Paxton, at Office of the Attorney General, 300 W.
15th Street, Austin, TX 78701. The attorney representing the State of Texas in the bankruptcy
case of TaxMasters has been J. Casey Roy, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin,
Texas 78711. The attorney representing the State of Texas in the lawsuit in Travis County was
Nanette Marie DiNunzio, Assistant Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711.
Jurisdiction and Venue
4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court. Cox seeks a sum that is within the jurisdictional
limits of this Court. Cox seeks monetary relief over $1,000,000.
5. Venue is proper in this Court.
Background
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 2 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 4 6. On June 5, 2012, this Court entered judgment (the “Judgment”) in the case of The
State of Texas, Plaintiff v. TaxMasters, Inc., TMIRS Enterprises, Ltd., TM GP Services, LLC d/b/a
TaxMasters, and Patrick R. Cox, individually, Defendants, Cause No. D-1-GV-10-000486, in the
200th Judicial District of Travis County, Texas, in favor of the State of Texas (the “State”). The
Judgment included a money judgment against Cox in the amount of $46,187,434.70.
7. Cox timely appealed the Judgment as it applied to him personally. On July 1, 2014,
the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the Judgment to the extent it applied to Cox. On April 1,
2016, the Texas Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for review. There is no further
possibility of appeal.
8. Even though Cox had already filed a timely Notice of Appeal, the State filed an
application for turnover and for appointment of a receiver to enforce the Judgment against Cox.
Between the entry of the Judgment and its reversal as to Cox, this Court appointed a receiver (the
“Receiver”) under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 31.002 to collect on and satisfy the Judgment
from Cox’s personal assets.
9. The Receiver took possession of and sold most of Cox’s non-exempt personal
assets before the appeals court reversed the Judgment. Because the Receiver’s sale of Cox’s
property was at forced sale, the property sold at a fraction of the price it would have brought at a
private sale. Attached as Exhibits A-1 and A-2 is the Receiver’s Inventory and Accounting,
showing the property taken from Cox and the proceeds received therefrom.
10. In total, the Receiver recovered $830,756 of total monies into the receivership
account.
11. Of the $830,756 that the Receiver recovered, $50,816 was returned to Cox. In
addition, $560,207 was distributed to the chapter 7 trustee (the “Trustee”) of TaxMasters, Inc. and
TMIRS Enterprises, Ltd. bankruptcy cases. Cox reached a settlement with the Trustee as to the
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 3 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 5 $560,207.
12. The remaining $219,733 received by the Receiver along with the value of the assets
seized and sold has never been re-paid by the State of Texas to Cox. The $219,238 amount is an
amount that the Receiver distributed to himself for fees and expenses and $496 that he distributed
to TMIRS Enterprises, Ltd.
13. As a direct result of the State’s enforcement of the Judgment, Cox has incurred
substantial costs and attorney fees, including to protect his exempt property from seizure and sale
by the Receiver and to recover the amounts taken from him after the Judgment was reversed.
14. Certain of the property that the Receiver seized from Cox were investments in
businesses. Because of the seizure of that property, Cox lost profits and business opportunities.
15. Cox estimates that, in total, he is owed over $20,000,000 in restitution from the
State. Cox has asked the State to recompense him for this amount, which represents the damages
that he incurred as a result of the State’s enforcement of the Judgment, but the State has refused to
do so.
Causes of Action and Argument & Authorities 16. A court has jurisdiction to correct error and to restore wrongfully taken property to
the possession of the persons from whom it was taken.1 The appeals court found that the Judgment
was in error to the extent it applied to Cox. This Court has jurisdiction to correct the errors from
the district court and restore the property wrongfully taken from Cox or its equivalent in damages.
1 Texas Land & Irrigation Co. v. Sanders, 111 S.W. 648, 648-49 (court has jurisdiction to restore property taken from litigant pursuant to the court’s earlier order, which was found to be without jurisdiction); Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219 (1891)(“Jurisdiction to correct what had been wrongfully done must remain with the court so long as the parties and the case are properly before it, either in the first instance or when remanded to it by an appellate tribunal.”).
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 4 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 6 17. A defendant is entitled to restitution for money and property paid or taken from him
pursuant to a judgment that is later reversed.2 A plaintiff who enforces a judgment that is subject
to appeal does so at the peril of having to respond in damages if the judgment is ultimately
reversed.3 The State of Texas has no exemption from the rights of Cox to seek and obtain
restitution for the value of the property wrongfully taken from him.
18. A successful appellant may have restitution upon his own motion after an
evidentiary hearing establishing with certainty what he has lost.4 The motion may be filed in the
same case without resorting to a new suit.5 The person wronged may also seek restitution in a new
lawsuit in another county.6
19. The amount of restitution owed to the defendant should be such as to place him in
2 Miga v. Jensen, 299 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2009)(“Money paid upon a judgment afterward reversed may be recovered by the party making the payment.”); Cleveland v. Tufts, 7 S.W. 72, 74 (Tex. 1888)(same); Peticolas v. Carpenter, 53 Tex. 23, 29 (1880)(“Where a judgment for debt is reversed after it has been enforced by execution, and the case is finally decided in favor of defendant, he is certainly entitled to restitution.”). 3 Cleveland, 7 S.W. at 75. 4 Outdoor Sys. v. BBE, L.L.C., 105 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. denied); Currie v. Drake, 550 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Northwestern Fuel, 139 U.S. at 220 (“We are of the opinion that the proceeding to enforce the restitution in the cases mentioned is under the control of the court, and that all needed inquiry can be had to guide its judgment in a summary proceeding, upon motion of the parties, the only requisite being that the opposite party shall be heard, so that in directing restitution no further wrong be committed”). 5 Outdoor Sys., 105 S.W.3d at 75; Cleveland, 7 S.W. at 74. 6 A person seeking restitution for wrongful collection actions may seek restitution in a separate lawsuit. Mathis v. DCR Mortg. III Sub I, LLC, 952 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (W.D. Tex. 2013)(“the permissive language in [the case law] does not forbid the benefactor of the reversal from bringing an independent suit to recover, even though doing so is obviously less efficient.”). In Cadleway Props. V. Briner, 1999 Tex.App. Lexis 642 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb 2, 1999, no pet.)(mem.op.), the Dallas Court of Appeals permitted the successful appellants to pursue legal action under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 34.022 in a county other than that of the court that issued the reversed judgment. (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 34.022 permits a person “to recover from the judgment creditor the market value of the person’s property that has been seized through execution of a writ issued by a court if the judgment on which execution is issued is reversed or set aside but the property has been sold at execution.”).
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 5 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 7 the same position that he occupied before the judgment was entered.7 To this end, if the defendant’s
property has been seized and sold, the defendant is entitled to recover the full value of the property
sold, not merely the amount for which the property was sold.8 Property sold at a forced sale will
ordinarily sell for much less than its value.9 The amount of restitution should also include “the
damages and costs paid by [the defendant] together, with interest.”10
20. The State knowingly and willfully chose to enforce the Judgment against Cox,
knowing that Cox still had a right to appeal the Judgment and knowing that Cox had appealed the
Judgment. Although it had the legal ability to enforce the Judgment when it did, it did so at the
peril of having to make Cox whole should the Judgment ultimately be reversed.
21. Because of the State’s enforcement of the Judgment against him, Cox had
substantial money and property taken from him to satisfy an erroneous judgment. Cox only has
recovered a very small amount of the loss at this time. He continues to be owed substantial sums
or property by the State. The State has an obligation to pay damages to Cox so as to place him in
the same position he occupied before the Judgment was entered against him and to make him
whole of the damages that he incurred as a result of the enforcement of the Judgment.
22. Because the Receiver sold Cox’s property at forced sale, the proceeds received by
the Receiver do not reflect the full value of the property Cox lost. Cox is entitled to restitution
from the State for the difference between the value of the property sold and the amount the
Receiver actually received for that property. Cox requests a trial or hearing to put on evidence
7 Cleveland, 7 S.W. at 74. 8 Id. at 75. 9 Id. 10 Id.
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 6 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 8 demonstrating the full value of the property sold.
23. Cox was unable to recover $219,238 of the funds recovered by the Receiver. Cox
is entitled to restitution from the State for this amount and in addition Cox is also entitled to
restitution for the values of the properties taken. Unless he receives restitution from the State for
all the amounts, he will not be placed in the position he occupied before the Judgment was entered
against him.
24. Cox also asserts claims for the unconstitutional taking of Cox’s property without
adequate compensation. Under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution, “[n]o person’s
property shall be taken, damaged, destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate
compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.” The Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution similarly states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation” and the protection is incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
25. The State intentionally performed acts that resulted in the intentional taking of
Cox’s property. Specifically, the State sought and obtained the appointment of a receiver to collect
and sell Cox’s property pursuant to the Reversed Judgment and the receiver did actually collect
and sell Cox’s property. That the property was taken for public use is apparent from the fact that
the State obtained the Reversed Judgment in a lawsuit brought against Cox expressly in the public
interest. The State then directed, or at least permitted, Cox’s property to be given to the Bankruptcy
Trustee, who was to distribute the property back to the State and to consumers harmed by
Taxmasters and TMIRS. Both in initially consenting to the Settlement Agreement and under the
terms of the Settlement Agreement, the State retained significant control over the property taken
from Cox.
26. Cox also asserts claims for the violation of Cox’s due process rights. Under both
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 7 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 9 the Texas and the federal constitution, a state government may deprive a person of property only
after following due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 19; Price v. Junction,
711 F.2d 582, 590 (5th Cir. 1983) (procedural due process rights under the Texas Constitution are
congruent with those in the Federal Constitution). When the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment against Cox, it invalidated the process by which the State took Cox’s property to
satisfy the judgment. The State’s continued refusal to refund the property taken from Cox is,
therefore, unsupported by any valid process.
27. Cox asserts claims for civil conversion. Cox’s property was taken over ten (10)
years ago by the receiver acting for the State of Texas and only a small part has been returned.
28. Cox is entitled to interest from the State on the amounts taken from him.
29. Cox’s costs and attorney fees to protect his exempt assets from seizure and to
recover the values of the properties wrongfully taken from him pursuant to the reversed Judgment
are direct damages resulting from the State’s enforcement of the Judgment. Cox is entitled to
recover this amount as damages and as an amount necessary to place him in the position he
occupied before the Judgment was entered against him. Cox requests a trial or hearing to put on
evidence of these costs and attorney fees.
30. Because of the State’s seizure of his investments, Cox lost substantial profits and
business opportunities. He is entitled to recover this amount as damages resulting from the State’s
enforcement of the Judgment. Cox requests a trial or hearing to put on evidence of these damages.
Conclusion
Because of the State’s knowing and willful decision to enforce the Judgment against Cox
before the results of his appeal were known, Cox lost virtually all of his non-exempt property and
incurred substantial damages and costs. Now that the Judgment against him has been reversed,
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 8 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 10 Cox is entitled to restitution from the State for the property that he lost due to the knowing and
willful wrongful actions of the State and for the damages that he incurred as a result of the State’s
enforcement of the erroneous Judgment.
For the reasons stated above, Cox asks that the Court issue citation for the State of Texas
to appear and answer, and that the Court award him judgment against the State of Texas for the
following: (1) restitution to be paid by the State of Texas to Cox and the entities for which he is
the agent in the amount of his actual damages, interest, court costs, and attorney fees, including
his attorney fees to prosecute this lawsuit; (2) restitution for losses incurred by him and the entities
for which he is the agent, for the unconstitutional taking of Cox’s property without adequate
compensation, (3) restitution for claims for violation of Cox’s right to due process, (4) civil
conversion, (5) other claims as a result of the judgment against him by the State of Texas in the
case and (6) that this Court grant to Cox any other relief to which he is entitled.
Dated: March 28, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Reese W. Baker Reese W. Baker Texas Bar No. 01587700 950 Echo Lane, Suite 200 Houston, Texas 77024 (713) 979-2279 (713) 869-9100 fax Email: courtdocs@bakerassociates.net Attorney for Patrick Cox, individually and as agent for AOC Ranches, LLC, Team Advertising Services, Inc., CCLHR Enterprises, LLC and VPizza Restaurant 001, LC
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 9 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 11 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was served on Ali Thorburn at the Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, General Litigation Division, by email to ali.thorburn@oag.texas.gov on March 28, 2025.
/s/ Reese W. Baker Reese W. Baker
Patrick Cox vs. The State of Texas 10 of 10 Complaint for Restitution
Page 12 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Reese Baker on behalf of Reese Baker Bar No. 1587700 courtdocs@bakerassociates.net Envelope ID: 99043277 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) Filing Description: AMENDED COMPLAINT OF PATRICK R. COX, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT, AGAINST THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES, UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF COX'S PROPERTY WITHOUT ADEQUATE COMPENSATION, CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF COX'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, CIVIL CONVERSION AND OTHER CLAIMS Status as of 3/31/2025 9:31 AM CST
Associated Case Party: PATRICK COX
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Reese Baker 1587700 courtdocs@bakerassociates.net 3/28/2025 6:33:20 PM SENT
Reese WalkerBaker reese.baker@sbcglobal.net 3/28/2025 6:33:20 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: STATE OF TEXAS
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Ali Thorburn ali.thorburn@oag.texas.gov 3/28/2025 6:33:20 PM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Ariana Ines ariana.ines@oag.texas.gov 3/28/2025 6:33:20 PM SENT
07/08/2025 10:41:05
Page 13 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Reese Baker on behalf of Reese Baker Bar No. 1587700 courtdocs@bakerassociates.net Envelope ID: 104904427 Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Cross-Appellant Brief Status as of 8/27/2025 11:32 AM CST
Associated Case Party: Patrick Cox
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Reese Baker 1587700 courtdocs@bakerassociates.net 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM SENT
Associated Case Party: The State of Texas
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Ali Thorburn ali.thorburn@oag.texas.gov 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM SENT
Jacob Beach jacob.beach@oag.texas.gov 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM SENT
Amanda Ruch amanda.ruch@oag.texas.gov 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM SENT
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Ariana Ines ariana.ines@oag.texas.gov 8/27/2025 10:31:24 AM SENT