The State of Tennessee, on Behalf of the Tennessee Department of Public Health v. Joseph A. Califano and Arthur P. Owens in Their Official Capacities

631 F.2d 89, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13277
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedOctober 8, 1980
Docket78-1419, 78-1501
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 631 F.2d 89 (The State of Tennessee, on Behalf of the Tennessee Department of Public Health v. Joseph A. Califano and Arthur P. Owens in Their Official Capacities) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The State of Tennessee, on Behalf of the Tennessee Department of Public Health v. Joseph A. Califano and Arthur P. Owens in Their Official Capacities, 631 F.2d 89, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13277 (6th Cir. 1980).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The State of Tennessee, as a former provider of health care services under the Medicare Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395, et seq., is seeking review of separate decisions of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee and the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissing plaintiff’s cases.

Appellant challenges the legality of the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.415(d)(3) which allows the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, under certain circumstances, to recapture accelerated depreciation claimed by a Medicare provider in determining the provider’s rate of reimbursement from Medicare services. Specifically, appellant seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f) under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act of the decisions of the Provider Reimbursement Review Board which held that the Middle Tennessee Chest Disease Hospital and the Tennessee Chest Disease Hospital, both owned and operated by the State of Tennessee, were not entitled to $47,000 to $43,000, respectively, in Medicare reimbursement received due to the use of an accelerated method of depreciation.

In their well-reasoned memoranda the District Courts both found that 20 C.F.R. § 405.415(d)(3) is a reasonable exercise of the discretion granted the Secretary in 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u). The Secretary determined that the use of accelerated methods of depreciation was resulting in excessive payments or “windfalls” to certain providers. This determination was a reasonable measure and as such is authorized by the Act. Further, the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have used similar reasoning to reach the conclusion th-át the regulation is authorized by statute and is constitutional. Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1977); Springdale Convalescent Center v. Mathews, 545 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1977); and Hazelwood Chronic and Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Weinberger, 543 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 430 U.S. 952, 97 S.Ct. 1595, 51 L.Ed.2d 801 (1977).

We believe these decisions adequately address the issues raised in this appeal and need not be repeated here. The decisions of the District Courts are affirmed.

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631 F.2d 89, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 13277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-state-of-tennessee-on-behalf-of-the-tennessee-department-of-public-ca6-1980.