THE STATE OF FLORIDA v. JALYN A. DELANCY

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: May 10, 2023
• Docket: 23-0367
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed May 10, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-0367 Lower Tribunal No. F22-6696 ________________

The State of Florida, Petitioner,

vs.

Jalyn A. Delancy, Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner.

The Law Offices of Scott Miller, P.A., and Scott R. Miller, for respondent.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM. The State of Florida petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition to

prevent the trial court from compelling mediation. Because the trial court did

not have authority to command the parties into mediation against their will,

we grant the petition.

Respondent Jalyn Delancy was charged with one count of fleeing and

eluding, two counts of causing personal or property damage from driving

under the influence, and one count of driving under the influence. The trial

court sua sponte entered an order mandating that both parties participate in

mediation, with the end goal of resolving the case via a plea bargain. The

trial court referred the case to mediation before a retired judge, who offered

to serve pro bono. The trial court also expressed its desire for the facilitated

plea bargaining to be completed within 45 days.

The issue before us is whether compelling the State to participate in a

plea-bargaining process against its wishes is an improper intrusion into the

executive branch. A writ of prohibition is the applicable remedy for instances

when a trial court interferes with the State’s prosecutorial discretion, because

“[u]nder Florida’s constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an

executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in

deciding whether and how to prosecute.” See State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2,

3 (Fla. 1986); see also Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“The powers of the state 2 government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.

No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining

to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”);

Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982) (“The state attorney has

complete discretion in making the decision to charge and prosecute.”).

A United States District Court in Utah addressed a similar issue and

concluded that “courts are precluded by rule and the doctrine of Separation

of Powers from ordering the United States and a criminal defendant to

engage in plea negotiations to settle a pending prosecution.” See United

States v. Ridley’s Fam. Markets, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1358 (D. Utah

2021). The court further concluded that compelling “the United States and a

criminal defendant to sit down with or without a private mediator and discuss

whether they can ‘work something out’ would be an improper intrusion of the

Article III branch of government into the exclusive prerogative of the Article

II branch of government to enforce the law.” Id.; see also People v. Justice,

524 P.3d 1178, 1186 (Colo. 2023) (“In sum, compulsory mediation is a

square peg, and squeeze it as a trial court might, it does not fit in the round

hole of criminal litigation. The district court, though well-intentioned, erred in

ordering mediation in this criminal case.”).

3 We agree with the District Court in Ridley’s and hold that compelling

the State to participate in a plea-bargaining process against its stated

objections constitutes an improper intrusion into the executive branch. See

also Justice, 524 P.3d at 1180 (“No two ways about it—mediation is one of

the most effective tools for conflict resolution in American jurisprudence. But

may a state trial court in Colorado properly order mediation in a criminal

case? In a word, no.”). Accordingly, we grant the petition but withhold formal

issuance of the writ of prohibition as we are confident the trial court will

adhere to the decision of this Court.

Petition granted.