The Service Master Co.etal v. Phyllis Lynn Campbell

CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
DecidedJune 19, 2001
Docket0370013
StatusUnpublished

This text of The Service Master Co.etal v. Phyllis Lynn Campbell (The Service Master Co.etal v. Phyllis Lynn Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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The Service Master Co.etal v. Phyllis Lynn Campbell, (Va. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Retired Judge Duff*

THE SERVICE MASTER COMPANY and ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0370-01-3 PER CURIAM JUNE 19, 2001 PHYLLIS LYNN (CRUMMETT) CAMPBELL

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(Steven H. Theisen; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), for appellant.

(George L. Townsend; Brian J. McNamara; Chandler, Franklin & O'Bryan, on brief), for appellee.

The Service Master Company and its insurer (hereinafter

referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers'

Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) Phyllis Lynn

(Crummett) Campbell proved that she sustained a compensable

change-in-condition causally related to her May 26, 1995 injury

by accident; and (2) Campbell's change-in-condition application

was governed by the two-year statute of limitations contained in

Code § 65.2-708(A), rather than the one-year statute of

limitations contained in Code § 65.2-501. Upon reviewing the

* Retired Judge Charles H. Duff took part in the consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the

commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27.

On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We

will uphold the commission's factual findings if they are

supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr.

Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).

In ruling that Campbell proved she sustained a compensable

change-in-condition and that she filed a timely application, the

commission found as follows:

The record . . . clearly reflects that [Campbell's] condition has remained painful and a problem for her since the accident in 1995. Nevertheless, [she] was able to successfully manage her pain, and continued to work at full work duties before, during and after her award of permanency in 1998. While [she] testified that her painful condition has not improved over the intervening years, we also note her testimony that her condition became worse in 2000, thereby causing her to seek out first emergency care, and then additional pain management treatment once the pain became unbearable. In the opinion of [her] treating specialist[, Dr. Victor C. Lee], her pain is both disabling and causally related to the compensable accident. We find that these facts reflect a deterioration of [Campbell's] condition since the date she was awarded permanency benefits in 1998, and the two year, "change in condition" statute of limitation applies.

- 2 - We also find that [Campbell] has proven that her change in condition is causally related to her compensable accident. Both Dr. Lee and Dr. [Christopher] Heck have opined that [Campbell's] ongoing problems with her left shoulder are causally related to the compensable accident. We recognize that Dr. [David S.] Witmer treated [Campbell] for a longer period of time. However, he released her from his care in August 1999, and only examined her on one occasion after that date. In his IME report, Dr. Witmer recorded only that [Campbell's] subjective complaints of pain could not be objectively verified from an "orthopedic" standpoint. Nevertheless, he suggested that a psychological or psychiatric approach to treatment might be beneficial, and he did not specifically opine that her condition was not causally related to her accident.

"In determining whether credible evidence exists, the

appellate court does not retry the facts, reweigh the

preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of

the credibility of the witnesses." Wagner Enters., Inc. v.

Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). In its

role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to weigh the

medical evidence. See Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va.

App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989) (holding that

"[q]uestions raised by conflicting medical opinions must be

decided by the commission"). The commission accepted the

opinions of Drs. Lee and Heck, while rejecting Dr. Witmer's

opinions. The medical records and opinions of Drs. Lee and

Heck, coupled with the January 6, 2000 emergency room reports,

establish that Campbell's left shoulder pain had worsened and

- 3 - that she had suffered an "[a]cute exacerbation of chronic

shoulder pain." This evidence constitutes credible evidence to

support the commission's finding that Campbell's left shoulder

condition deteriorated after the 1998 permanency award and

resulted in a compensable change-in-condition.

On October 20, 1998, Campbell was last paid permanent

partial disability benefits related to her May 26, 1995 injury

by accident. The commission ruled that the two-year statute of

limitations contained in Code § 65.2-708(A) applied to

Campbell's March 28, 2000 change-in-condition application,

rather than the one-year statute of limitations contained in

Code § 65.2-501. We affirm that ruling. Credible evidence

supports the commission's decision that Campbell sustained a

compensable change-in-condition after the date she was awarded

permanency benefits. Accordingly, the commission did not err in

finding that the March 28, 2000 change-in-condition application

was timely filed. See Armstrong Furniture v. Elder, 4 Va. App.

238, 244, 356 S.E.2d 614, 617 (1987) (holding that "the two year

limitation period of Code § [65.2-708] applies to filing an

application for additional workers' compensation benefits

pursuant to a change in condition as defined by Code

§ [65.2-101]").

For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.

Affirmed.

- 4 -

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Related

James v. Capitol Steel Construction Co.
382 S.E.2d 487 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
Armstrong Furniture v. Elder
356 S.E.2d 614 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1987)
R. G. Moore Building Corp. v. Mullins
390 S.E.2d 788 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)
Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co.
381 S.E.2d 231 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1989)
Wagner Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks
407 S.E.2d 32 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1991)

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