The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson

58 U.S. 170, 15 L. Ed. 233, 17 How. 170, 1854 U.S. LEXIS 507
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 10, 1855
StatusPublished
Cited by133 cases

This text of 58 U.S. 170 (The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170, 15 L. Ed. 233, 17 How. 170, 1854 U.S. LEXIS 507 (1855).

Opinion

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion-of the court. •

This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

The libel charges, that on the night of the 21st April, 1852, the schooner San Louis, laden with a cargo of stone, was sailing down the coast below the bay of New York, bound for Philadelphia, and while off Squam Beach, on the Jersey shore, the schooner Catharine, coming up the coast, bound for the port of New York, then and there with great force and violence rah into and upon her, breaking through her side; so that she soon filled with water, and sunk. That The Catharine had a fair wind and ample sea-room, while The San Louis was beating against the wind, and was inside of The Catharine, and standing off the shore. That The Catharine had no watch or person on the lookout at the time-of the collision; and that it was occasioned by. the improper and unskilful management of the persons on board"engaged in navigating her. That she luffed, and struck the Sail Louis about midships with head on.

The answer of the respondents, owners of The Catharine, admit' The San Louis was sailing down the coast at the time and place mentioned; and that The Catharine was coming up the same,-bound for the port of New York; but deny that she ran into The San Louis;' but charge that she ran across and afoul of the bows of The Catharine, which occasioned the collision ; that the wind was in a quarter that enabled The San Louis to keep her course full down the coast without keeping off shore; they insist that The Catharine had the usual watch set before and at the time of the collision; and they deny that it was occasioned by reason of the -unskilfulness or mismanagement of those on board of her, but was the result of want of care and mismanagement in navigating Tie San Louis. They deny that *174 The Catharine luffed, as charged in the libel; but charge that The San Louis luffed and came across the bows of The Catharine.

• The district court rendered a decree for the. libellants, and referred the. question of damages. to a commissioner. The decree was affirmed in the circuit court. The proofs before the commissioner to ascertain the amount of the damages, consisted principally of testimony as to the value of The San Louis previous to the collision; and as to her estimated value in her sunken and disabled condition in the water on the beach; the difference constituting the measure of damages allowed. ' She was sold by one of the owners, a few days after the accident, while lying on the beach, for $140 ; and which, upon the weight of the proofs as produced, was -her then estimated worth. Her cargo of stone was afterwards taken out, and the vessel raised and brought to the port of New York and repaired. The expense of raising and repairing her seems not to have been a subject of inquiry.

. The .commissioner reported damages to the. amount of $6,200, which report was confirmed.

1. As to the damages.

. The principle that appears to have governed in the examination of the witness in respect to this branch of the case, as well as the commissioner in arriving at the amount of damages reported to the court, we think, upon consideration, is not maintainable. That principle seems to have been, to ascertain from the opinion of witnesses, experts as they are called, though it is hot clear they were of that character, the value of the vessel in -her sunken and disabled condition as she lay on the beach after the disaster, and to deduct that sum from the sound value before - it occurred, the difference being the measure of the damage; in other words, that the inquiry must be confined to the • condition of the vessel at the time of the collision, and in her then state ; that the owner had a right to abandon her as a total loss, and look to the wrongdoer for compensation, as then estimated. Acting upon this view,- the libellants sold the vessel in her disabled state for what they could get, and claimed, and have received, the sound value, less this amount.

It is .true, that where a vessel has been run down and abandoned, never having been raised and repaired, but left to decay upon, the beach, evidence of the nature and character of that given in this case must necessarily be admissible.. That is, the damage sustained must be ascertained by the testimony of witnesses experienced in matters of this kind, who .are competent to speak as to the practicability of raising and repairing the vessel, and of the expense attendant thereupon, this expense constituting the principal ingredient of the- damage proper to be *175 allowed; but they should be witnesses whose occupations and experience enabled them to express opinions of the feasibility of raising the vessel, and to make estimates of the probable expense of the same; and, also, of the expense of the necessary repairs, upon,which the court might rely with some confidence in making up its judgment. Loose, general opinions on the subject, entitled to very little more respect in the ascertainment of facts than the conjectures of witnesses, are of themselves undeserving of consideration.

But where the vessel.has been raised and repaired, or is undergoing repairs, as in the case of The San Louis, there is no necessity for resorting even to the opinion and estimates of experts, as to the probable expenses, for as to these the reasonable expenses incurred in raising and repairing her are matters of fact that may be ascertained from the parties concerned in the work. The libellants, instead of the. examination of witnesses, as to their opinion of the amount of the damage from an inspection of the vessel as she lay upon the beach, should have • inquired into the actual cost of raising and repairing her, so as to have made her equal to the value before the collision. This would have been the proper mode by which to have arrived at' an indemnity to the extent of the loss sustained, which is the true measure of damages in these cases. 13 How. 101, 110.

We think, therefore, that the rule adopted in ascertaining the measures of damages in this case was erroneous.

The next question in the case is more difficult.

The New Jersey coast below Sandy Hook bears southwesterly and nort1 easterly, along which these vessels were sailing. The wind was southwesterly, with a pretty strong breeze; The San Louis ciosehauled, passing down the coast, and The Catharine'with- the wind free passing' up it, making for the Hook. There had been a fall of rain during the evening, but between eight and nine o’clock, when the collision happened, the weather had partially cleared up.. The night was cloudy, but some stars were visible. The San Louis was sailing at the rate of six knots the hour; and as The Catharine had the wind free, her speed must at least have been equal if not greater.

The master of the schooner Goodspeed, which vessel was in company with The San Louis. from Jersey City, states that a schooner, which it is admitted was The Catharine, passed him a little after eight o’clock, some quarter of a mile to the windward, heading, to the westward of her course to the Hook, which was in shore; that at this time The San Louis was from three quarters to a mile astern of him, a ¡little to windward. The Catharine had á light; the San Louis had not.

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Bluebook (online)
58 U.S. 170, 15 L. Ed. 233, 17 How. 170, 1854 U.S. LEXIS 507, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-schooner-catharine-v-dickinson-scotus-1855.