The Santa Rosa

249 F. 160, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1122
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 20, 1918
DocketNo. 15289
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 249 F. 160 (The Santa Rosa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Santa Rosa, 249 F. 160, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1918).

Opinion

DOOLING, District Judge.

This cage was tried long since. An unusual delay in filing briefs and thereafter my own enforced absence [161]*161from court have delayed a decision up to the present time. Even now the press of other matters does not allow me the time to review the cause with such care and to such extent as its nature and importance demand.0

The proceeding is one brought by Pacific Coast Steamship Company for limitation of any liability arising out of the wreck of the steamer Santa Rosa which occurred in July, 1911 The vessel,left San Francisco with 300 souls on board on July 6, 1911, and about 3 o’clock ■in the following morning struck on a rock or sand bar \y¿ miles inside Point Arguello, and at least 3 miles east of where she should have been. There was no storm, there was nothing wrong with the vessel’s motive power, there appears no reason why she could not have safely steamed her course, except that in a fog she hugged the shore, instead of proceeding, as she could have proceeded with perfect safety, upon a course further out to sea It is one more of those unfortunate accidents, far too common on this coast, and perhaps elsewhere, due to the desire of the steamship companies, and perhaps1 to the passengers, to get there quickly. Experience does not seem to have taught the lesson that it is better to arrive a little late than not to arrive at all.

The fault in this particular case was that in a fog when off Point Sur, where the vessel’s exact position could not be determined by a view of anything on shore, a course was set for Point Arguello, over 117 miles away which, if not interfered with by currents known to exist, would pass that point at a distance of from but 1 mile to U/á miles. Unfortunately the currents setting inshore did take the vessel off her course, so that, instead of passing Point Arguello a mile or a mile and a half to the westward, she struck shore inside the point by about the same distance. ,

[1-3] The law is generous with shipowners in that it provides (Harter Act) that if the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States shall exercise due diligence to make the vessel in all respects seaworthy arid properly inarmed, equipped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner, agent, nor charterer shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors of navigation or in the management of the vessel. This applies to questions arising between the vessel and shippers of cargo on board of her The law further provides (limitation of liability) that the liability of the owner of a vessel for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or received without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in the vessel and her freight then pending. ’ These statutes are, of course, to be. enforced in such spirit and with such liberality as will effect their purpose — the encouragement of shipbuilding and the employment of ships in commerce. But such liberality of enforcement should not be carried to an extent that will deprive cargo owners and passengers of that degree of care on the part of Ihose owning and operating ships which their safety demands and to which they are entitled.

[162]*162It is urged by claimants in the present case that it was grossly negligent on the part of the master of the vessel to set his course for a run of 117 miles on such line as would miss Point Arguello under the most favorable circumstances by not more than 1%’ miles, and to run on this course towards a fog-bound point at the full speed of 14 knots, where, as was well known, there is frequently a current setting on shore which may take a vessel off her course by several miles, and that the owners must have been privy to such negligence, because the logs of their vessel on this run in previous trips would show that-this was the customary route and speed in rounding this point. For this asserted negligence the court is asked to award exemplary damages to claimants During the trial the production of these logs was demanded by claimants, and petitioner promised to produce them. This was not done, so that it may at least be assumed that their production would not have helped petitioner’s case.

I am not a navigator, but it does not seem to me that it is necessary to be such in order to know that danger lies in proximity to the coast in a fog; and the number of vessels that go ashore in the fog on this coast, with nothing the matter with their motive power, and while under full control, affords grave reasons for inquiring whether the risks undertaken by their masters in thus hugging the shore are not undertaken with the knowledge and consent, if not under the express orders, of their owners, either for the purpose of shortening the time of the voyage, or for some other purpose not disclosed or apparent The safety of the thousands of persons who travel by sea up and down the coast requires that the court should not listen with over-eager ears to the excuses offered for the loss of vessels which should never have occurred, or to the general disclaimer of responsibility for wrecks that could have so easily been avoided.

In these proceedings the burden of proof is upon the petitioner to show that the loss occurred without its privity or knowledge. It did not show, nor did it attempt to show, that the course and speed of the Santa Rosa at the time she went ashore were not the usual course and speed of the vessels of their fleet upon this run, alike in foggy and in clear weather Indeed, the failure to produce the logs requested and promised would indicate that they were. If this be so, and if it were negligence on the part of the master to lay a course of that length with currents setting on shore, and leaving such a slight margin of safety as a mile or a mile and a half in that long course, and to run that course as he did in the fog, then such negligence was with the privity and knowledge of petitioner, if it had knowledge that such was the usual course and speed in a fog I cannot find that this was without petitioner’s privity or knowledge. So much for what occurred before the vessel went ashore.

She struck at about 3 o’clock a. m., 'and early in the morning sent word by wireless to petitioner’s San Francisco office. After consultation with the insurance agent and others, the only person connected with this office who could be found at that hour sent word to the master of the vessel, advising him as to what he should do, and continually during the day messages were passing between tire vessel and the office on shore. All this time the vessel was hanging on the rock or [163]*163sand bar with all the passengers on hoard. For a great portion of the day the sea was sufficiently smooth to allow the transfer of the passengers to other vessels then in attendance, though the breakers on the shore would not permit their landing in small boats.

It would serve no purpose to introduce here all the telegrams that indicated to what extent the office on shore undertook to control the action of the master, in the emergency in which he and his vessel were placed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
249 F. 160, 1918 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-santa-rosa-cand-1918.