The Return Company, Inc., Owner of the M/v Return v. Charleston Marine Corporation

Fourth Circuit

The Return Company, Inc., Owner of the M/v Return v. Charleston Marine Corporation

228 F.2d 910, 1956 A.M.C. 392

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 12, 1956

Docket7113_1

StatusPublished

This text of 228 F.2d 910 (The Return Company, Inc., Owner of the M/v Return v. Charleston Marine Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

The Return Company, Inc., Owner of the M/v Return v. Charleston Marine Corporation, 228 F.2d 910, 1956 A.M.C. 392 (4th Cir. 1956).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a decree entered on a libel against a vessel for repairs and wharfage. The only question presented is whether there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to set aside and reopen a default and permit the owner and claimant of the vessel to assert a counterclaim against libellant. There is no dispute as to the facts, which were fully found by the court below, and which clearly show that the owner was in default in failing to answer after the expiration of the period agreed upon by counsel following a fruitless attempt at settlement. The court exonerated counsel of neglect in this matter but found that the owner itself was guilty of negligence in failing to follow the advice of New York counsel and furnish to local counsel at Charleston, S. C. information upon which to base an answer. The court further found that the affidavit filed by counsel as a basis for setting aside and reopening the default did not sufficiently establish the existence of a meritorious defense. It is well settled that whether the default should be set aside was a matter resting in the sound discretion of the District Judge, and there is nothing before us upon which we would be justified in holding that he has abused his discretion in this matter.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a decree entered on a libel against a vessel for repairs and wharfage. The only question presented is whether there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to set aside and reopen a default and permit the owner and claimant of the vessel to assert a counterclaim against libellant. There is no dispute as to the facts, which were fully found by the court below, and which clearly show that the owner was in default in failing to answer after the expiration of the period agreed upon by counsel following a fruitless attempt at settlement. The court exonerated counsel of neglect in this matter but found that the owner itself was guilty of negligence in failing to follow the advice of New York counsel and furnish to local counsel at Charleston, S. C. information upon which to base an answer. The court further found that the affidavit filed by counsel as a basis for setting aside and reopening the default did not sufficiently establish the existence of a meritorious defense. It is well settled that whether the default should be set aside was a matter resting in the sound discretion of the District Judge, and there is nothing before us upon which we would be justified in holding that he has abused his discretion in this matter.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

228 F.2d 910, 1956 A.M.C. 392, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-return-company-inc-owner-of-the-mv-return-v-charleston-marine-ca4-1956.