The Ravenscourt

103 F. 668, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149
CourtDistrict Court, D. Washington
DecidedAugust 10, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 103 F. 668 (The Ravenscourt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Ravenscourt, 103 F. 668, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149 (washd 1900).

Opinion

HANFORD, District Judge.

In the first of these cases the owners of the American ship Columbia claim damages for injuries to their ship, sustained in a collision with the Ravenscourt, while the two colliding vessels were being towed out by the steam tug Tyee, and their suit is in rem against both the Ravenscourt and the tug. Their libel charges that a contract for towing the Columbia singly was violated by the captain of the tugboat in attempting to tow two vessels. As to this first disputed question in the case, I find from the evidence that the terms of the agreement for the towage of the Columbia [670]*670were not reduced to writing, and the only contract between the parties arises by implication from the previous dealings between the captain of the ship and the tugboat company, the knowledge of each party as to the different vessels, the rates of towage, the rules and regulations of the tugboat company, the customs on Puget Sound relating to the towage of vessels, a short conversation between Capt. Nelson, master of the 'Columbia, and Capt. Libby, manager of the tugboat company, the conduct of Capt. Nelson in voluntarily permitting his ship to be towed in company with the Ravenscourt, and in giving to the captain of the Tyee a written order for the payment of the price of the towage services, and the acts of the master of the tug in taking the-two vessels in the harbor of Tacoma, and proceeding with them towards the sea. The conversation between Nelson and Libby was too vague and indefinite to constitute a contract. According to a preponderance of the evidence, Capt. Nelson sought Capt. Libby, and requested to have a tug tow his ship to sea the folloiving day if she finished loading in time. He stated that he expected to be ready by noon, but could not be certain that a sufficient quantity of coal to complete her cargo could be obtained in time. Libby informed him-that the Tyee was being held to tow the Ravenscourt the next day. Nelson asserted that the Ravenscourt would not be ready, and to that Libby responded that, if the Ravenscourt were not ready, the Tyee would go to sea with the Columbia if she were ready, and he would send for another tug to take the Ravenscourt; but, in case both vessels were ready to be towed, as expected, the Tyee would take them both. The next day after this conversation both vessels were ready to go to sea, and the captain of the Tyee received orders from Capt. Libby to tow them both, and he informed Capt. Nelson what his orders were before taking the Columbia from her moorings. Capt. Nelson expressed dissatisfaction, but nevertheless signed and gave to Capt. Bailey a draft or order for the payment of the towage money, and voluntarily took on board the Tyee’s hawser, and made it fast to the Columbia’s foremast. The Tyee had ample power to tow two vessels of the size and class of the Columbia and Ravenscourt in Puget Sound, and it has been a common practice for tugboats to tow two ór more vessels together. 'Capt. Nelson, knowing that the Ravens-court had a prior claim to the service of the Tyee, was put to his election to be towed at that time in company with the Ravenscourt, or to wait until another tug could be obtained; and by accepting the service that was offered he voluntarily encountered the additional hazard obviously involved in the towage of his vessel in company with another ship. From the facts and circumstances there arises by necessary implication an agreement by the terms of which the Columbia was to be towed in company with the Ravenscourt. The vessels were towed by separate hawsers, the Columbia’s towline being about 120 fathoms in length, and the Ravenscourt was towed by a hawser 180 fathoms in length, so that the two ships could not possibly have come in collision with each other while both towlines were intact and the tug was under way. The Columbia’s towline, however, was broken, and the collision occurred while she was adrift; and the second ground of complaint against the steam tug is that the hawser [671]*671furnished by the tug, and with which she was towing the Columbia, “by reason of its defectiveness” parted, and left the Columbia adrift and helpless, immediately in the course of the Ravenscourt. Except the fact that the towline did break, there is an entire failure to prove any fault on the part of the tugboat company in furnishing a defective hawser. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the hawser was comparatively new, having been in use for a period of time not exceeding one-fourth the ordinary lifetime of such a hawser when subjected to usage common with Puget Sound tugboats. It had been subjected to a most thorough test, and found sufficient to sustain a strain many times greater than the strain it would have to bear in towing the Columbia in the waters of Puget Sound in ordinary weather if the Columbia were properly steered, and it was carefully and thoroughly inspected by the first mate and a quartermaster on board the Tyee at the time of being passed out to the Columbia, so that if it were cut or chafed or unduly worn in any place the defect should have been discovered; but no defect was observed or known.

The next charge in the Columbia’s libel is that the Ravenscourt was steered badly, and that immediately before the collision, by reason of negligence and bad steering on board the Ravenscourt, that vessel veered from her true course so as to cross the wake of the tug, and bring her hawser afoul of the Columbia’s rudder, so interfering with the navigation of the Columbia that she could not be steered properly; and the libel charges that, if the master of the tug had been attentive to his duties, he should have known that the Ravenscourt was out of her course, and should have prevented the bad steering on her part. This part of the libel charges both the tug and the Ravenscourt with a fault in permitting the Ravenscourt to vefcr from her course, which fault was the direct cause of the disaster. This particular ground of complaint must be considered in connection with the counter charge contained in the libel filed by the owner of the Ravenscourt. The owner of the Ravenscourt has made no complaint against the tug, her master, or her owner. His suit is in rem against the Columbia, and in his libel he charges that the accident rvas due entirely to bad steering on the paid of the Columbia.' The main controversy in the case, therefore, is with reference to the particular movements of the colliding vessels immediately before the collision. The general facts as to which all witnesses agree substantially are that the tug started with the vessels in tow from Tacoma Harbor, at 3 o’clock p. m. on the 22d day of January of this year, the Columbia being towed by a line leading from the stern of the Tyee through a chock on the starboard side; of her bow to her foremast, the length of the line between the stern of the Tyee and the bow of the Columbia being a little more than 100 fathoms. The Ravenscourt was towed by a line 180 fathoms in length, all of which was paid out, leading from the stern of the Tyee to a chock on the port bow of the Ravenscourt, and made fast to her towing bills forward of the foremast. The towlines being so arranged, the vessels, when steered to follow the tug, would have kept a safe distance from each other. The Columbia, being on the port side, would have kept the tug in view over the starboard side of her bow with the Ravenscourt astern, and off her starboard quarter; and the Ravens-[672]*672court, being on the starboard side of the Columbia, with her towline leading through the port chock, should have kept the tüg in view over her port bow. The vessels proceeded without any occurrence worthy of notice until after 6 o’clock p. m. they had proceeded nearly 25 miles, and were off Alki Point.

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Related

The Britannia
148 F. 495 (E.D. Virginia, 1906)
The Columbia
109 F. 660 (Ninth Circuit, 1901)

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Bluebook (online)
103 F. 668, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-ravenscourt-washd-1900.