The Perth Amboy

48 F.2d 640, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1247, 1931 A.M.C. 971
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedApril 9, 1931
DocketNos. 253, 310
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 48 F.2d 640 (The Perth Amboy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Perth Amboy, 48 F.2d 640, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1247, 1931 A.M.C. 971 (D. Mass. 1931).

Opinion

BREWSTER, District Judge.

On December 24,1929, the barge Rockhaven, carrying a cargo of copper concentrates and crude ore, was stranded while being towed through Arthur Kill by the steam tug Perth Amboy. Libels, to recover resultant damages, have been brought by the owner of the barge and by the owner of the cargo against the Perth Amboy. The two causes were tried together.

Statement of Facts.

The barge Roekhaven, carrying about 1,-330 long tons of copper concentrates and crude ore, was bound on a voyage from Maine to Chrome, N. J., which lies near the southerly end of Arthur Kill, west of Staten Island. The barge was 188.9 feet long and had a draft at the time of the stranding of 14 feet. She had no motive power. The steam tug Perth Amboy is 138 feet long, and her wheelhouse was about 20 feet abaft her stem.

On the evening of December 24, 1929, at Poor House Anchorage, East River, N. Y., the barge Roekhaven was made fast in the usual way alongside of the tug on the latter’s port side. The bow of the barge was about 59 feet forward of the bow of the tug and 79 feet forward of the wheelhouse. Around 8 o’clock in the evening, the tug with her tow left Poor House flats and proceeded down through the channel in Arthur Kill, which lies between the New Jersey shore and Staten Island. They proceeded down the westerly side of Prall’s Island through what is known as the Northwest Reach. As the channel rounds Tremley Point on the New Jersey shore, its course changes, first near the southerly end of Prall’s Island, and about 1,000 feet below at the northerly entrance of the Southwest Reach, so called, it again changes to SW%S. The Southwest Reach begins about 1500 feet northeasterly of the plant of the American Cyanamid Company, impleaded in these proceedings, and the channel runs in a straight line as it passes the Cyanamid Company’s works.

At a point on the easterly side of the Kill and opposite the plant of the American Cyanamid Company, there is a charted and well-known shoal known as the “11-foot roek.” The_ chart also shows that northerly of this rock and narrowing the channel at this point there is shallow water of only 14 feet depth at mean low tide. The average depth of the channel through the Kill is approximately 27 feet. Just above the narrow portion of the channel, on the Staten Island side of the Southwest Reach, was a red buoy which not only served to mark the easterly bank of the channel, but to warn mariners of the 11-foot shoal and the shallow waters lying northerly of the rocks.

The night was clear and cold, with light, westerly, or northwesterly winds. The tide was ebb, and the current favored the tow. As the captain of the tug navigated his tow around Tremley Point, proceeding at a rate of 7 knots an hour through the water, he encountered a cloud of vapors and smoke.

The captain testified that, when he ran into the smoke, he reduced his speed to half speed, but was unable to say at what rate he continued on down the channel. Others on the tug and barge failed to notice any appreciable reduction in speed after the smoke was reached.

According to the evidence of the captain of the barge, the tow had proceeded “just a little way” after encountering smoke when the barge hit the easterly bank of the channel. . The location of the stranded barge was about 100 feet from the red buoy which then appeared off the starboard quarter. At this point, according to the chart, the area of shallow water projects into the channel just above the 11-foot shoal. The tide was unusually low at about 10:30 o’clock p. m. when the barge stranded, and soundings showed a depth of only 12 to 13 feet. That the level of the water at the time of the stranding would be below mean low water was predicted by government tide tables. After the barge struck, she began to fill in the forward compartment, and it was impossible to float her even at high tide. She was not taken off until the next day. That the barge ran upon a well-known shoal cannot be doubted.

The captain of the tug was unable to [642]*642state definitely what course he followed in rounding Tremley Point. The best he can give is that he was within the limits of the channel. Prom all the evidence I find that he was not shaping his course down the westerly, or starboard, side of the channel. On the contrary, the location of the stranded barge admits of only one conclusion, and that is that the tug had adopted a course in rounding Tremley Point which brought the tow over to the extreme easterly edge of the channel at a point where the charted depth of the water at mean low water was only 14 feet, which was precisely the draft of the barge, and where, on the day in question, the water being below mean low level, was of insufficient depth to enable the barge to pass without striking the bank:

Navigators had been cautioned by the United States Army engineers to use the New Jersey side of the dredged canal when passing Tremley Point because “numerous rocky shoals lie in the easterly or Staten Island side of this stretch of channel commencing opposite the mouth of the Rahway River and extending upstream.”

The captain of the tug testified that when he first encountered the smoke he was some distance from the red buoy, and that he immediately sent one of the crew to look for lights along the shore while he himself looked for the red buoy. He had run past the buoy because, when he first saw it, it w,as some 35 feet away on the port side and very near amidships on the barge. He then swung his tug to the westward. • At this time he must have been well over on the port side of the channel, because, notwithstanding his attempt to turn the barge to the starboard side of the channel, the barge struck the easterly bank.

The witnesses indicated on the chart the point where the tow first entered the smoke as about 1,200 feet northerly of the plant of the Cyanamid Company. It is difficult to reconcile this evidence with the government weather reports, which showed that on the night in question the wind was light and coming from the northwesterly diréetion, and the testimony of witnesses that the wind was westerly. A westerly wind might have carried the smoke from the Cyanamid plant across the channel at or near the buoy. The buoy was between 800 and 900 feet below the indicated point, and it is extremely unlikely that smoke drifted as far up the stream as is claimed by the witnesses. The conclusion follows that the tow was nearer the buoy before any smoke interfered with the visibility. This fact, together with the position of the stranded barge as it lay immediately after she struck, would clearly indicate that the master had, even before he reached the smoke, so navigated his tow as to bring the barge over to the extreme easterly side of the channel.

In December, 1929, the Cyanamid Company was principally engaged in making fertilizer. Whatever smoke drifted across the channel must have come from nine fertilizer driers, each of which had a stack approximately 40 feet from the ground. Between these drier stacks and the Kill were a number of other buildings of the company, the lowest of which was 50 feet high and one 80 feet high. Strictly speaking, it was not smoke, but steam vapor, which came from the driers, but which, in cold weather, would condense sufficiently to form a cloud of more or less density. This vapor was diluted with fresh air, and, in the nature of things, could not at any time have been of sufficient density to seriously interfere with navigation on the channel.

There was a conflict in the evidence as to the extent to which this cloud of vapor cut down visibility.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
48 F.2d 640, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1247, 1931 A.M.C. 971, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-perth-amboy-mad-1931.