The People v. . Spring Val. Hydraulic Gold Co.

92 N.Y. 383, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 156
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 8, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 92 N.Y. 383 (The People v. . Spring Val. Hydraulic Gold Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The People v. . Spring Val. Hydraulic Gold Co., 92 N.Y. 383, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 156 (N.Y. 1883).

Opinion

Andrews, J.

The defendant, a corporation incorporated and organized on the 12th day of February, 1880, under the laws of this State, on the 16th day of 27ovember, 1880, by its treasurer, made a report in writing to the comptroller, under oath, setting forth the capital of the corporation paid in, and that no dividend had been declared during the year ending with the 1st day of 27ovember. On the same day. the secretary and treasurer, after having been duly sworn, estimated and appraised the capital stock of the corporation at $800,-000, which was declared to be its actual value in cash, not less than the average price which the said stock sold for during the year ending 27ovember 1, 1880, and forwarded to the comp *386 troller a certificate of such estimate and appraisal, together with a copy of the oath by them signed, duly attested by the officer before whom it was taken. This action is brought in the name of the people to recover of the. defendant a tax at the rate of one and a half mills on each dollar of the valuation of its corporate stock, so made by its secretary and treasurer, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $1,200, which is alleged in the complaint to have become due and payable to the State from the defendant on or before the 15th day of January, 1881, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 542 of the Laws of 1880.

It is conceded that the defendant is a corporation liable to taxation under the third section of the act. It is claimed, however, by the counsel for the defendant that by the true construction of the act no tax became payable thereunder by the defendant until January, 1882, and this is the only question presented on this appeal.

The act in question is entitled “ An act to provide for raising taxes for the use of the State, upon certain corporations, joint stock companies and associations.” It inaugurates a new system for the taxation of a certain specified class of corporations for general and State pm’poses, but as construed, leaves them subject to taxation for local purposes under the pre-existing law. (People, ex rel. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574.) The general scheme of the act is to impose a tax on corporations paying dividends exceeding six per cent per annum on the basis of dividends declared during the year preceding the imposition of the tax. But when no dividends have been declared, or have been less than six per cent on the par value of the capital stock during such annual period, the tax is based on the cash value of the capital stock, 1¡o be ascertained as provided in the act.

To carry out the system it was ■ necessary to provide a method of ascertaining the amount of dividends declared by the corporations liable to taxation under the act, and where no dividends had been _ declared, or were less than six per cent per annum, the value of the capital stock, and it was *387 manifestly important that this information should be communicated to the State officers. The first section, therefore, which commences with the word “ hereafter,” makes it the duty of corporations liable to taxation under the third section, “ annually on or before the 15th day of November,” to make a report to the comptroller, stating the amount of capital paid in, the date, amount and rate per centum of each and every dividend declared “ during the year ending with the first day of said month.” And in the case of non-dividend paying corporations, and of corporations whose dividends declared “ during the year ending as aforesaid,” were less than six per cent on the par value of the capital stock, it provides that “ the treasurer or secretary thereof * * * shall between the 1st and 15th days of November in each year in which no dividend has been made or declared as aforesaid * * * estimate and appraise the capital stock of such company upon which no dividend has been made or declared at its actual value, not less, however, than the average price which said stock sold for during said year.” The third section imposes the liability to taxation, and declares that the corporations specified “ shall be subject tó and pay a tax into the treasury of the State annually,” to be computed either on the dividends or on the value of the capital stock as the case may be, in the one case the tax to be at the rate of one-quarter mill on the capital stock for each one per centum of dividend, and in the other a half mill on each dollar of valuation.

It is contended that the act does not contemplate that corporations shall make a report under the first section, until the year succeeding that in which it was passed, to-wit: November, 1881, and that no tax was required to be paid under the provisions of the third section, until after that time. This contention rests mainly upon the supposed implication arising from the word “ annually ” in the first and third sections, and from the requirement that the report to be made under the first section is to state the dividends declared during the year prior thereto, or in case of non-dividend corporations, that the capital stock shall be valued at “not less than the average price which said stock sold for during the year.” *388 It is said that the act having been passed in June, 1880, a report made in November, 1880, is not an annual report, and that the requirement that the report shall state the dividends declared during the year before the report is made, and that when a valuation of the capital stock is to be made, it is to be at a sum not less than the average price for which the stock sold during the same period, indicates that it was the intention of the legislature to allow corporations at least a year after the passage of the act to ascertain the value of their franchise before subjecting them to taxation under the new system. The intention of the legislature in passing a statute, and its true meaning is to be collected from its language, applied to the subject-matter, and in view of the general scope and purpose of the enactment, and the construction of a particular clause or section of a statute, if obscure or doubtful, is to be determined by a consideration of all its parts. . A clause or section which, considered separately, may be obscure, or justify one construction, may be made clear by reference to other clauses or sections, or may be subordinated to- another and paramount intention derived from other parts of the statute. It is to be observed that the time when the first report is to be made is not stated in terms in the first section, nor does the third section fix the time for the payment of the tax imposed thereby. The time of payment is, however, specifically prescribed in the fourth section, which makes it the duty of the corporation upon which a tax is imposed by the preceding sections, to transmit the amount of said tax to the treasury of the State within fifteen days from the first day of January in each and every yean'? This language is explicit and can be satisfied only by a payment in each January after the passage of the act. In no other way can there be a compliance with the direction that the tax shall be paid within fifteen days from the first day of January in “ each and every year.” By the construction claimed by the defendant no tax would be payable until January, 1882, nineteen months after the passage of the act, and this would not be a payment “ annually,” as provided in the third section.

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Bluebook (online)
92 N.Y. 383, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-people-v-spring-val-hydraulic-gold-co-ny-1883.