The People v. Sink

30 N.E.2d 40, 374 Ill. 480
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 11, 1940
DocketNo. 25608. Judgment affirmed.
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 30 N.E.2d 40 (The People v. Sink) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The People v. Sink, 30 N.E.2d 40, 374 Ill. 480 (Ill. 1940).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the court:

Jake Sink and Thomas Lavinka were jointly indicted in the circuit court of Vermilion county for the murder of Robert Keys. In a trial by jury they were convicted of manslaughter and the court, after overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, sentenced them to the penitentiary for indeterminate periods. This writ of error is prosecuted to review that judgment.

The deceased, Robert Keys, of the age of sixteen years, resided with his parents in Attica, Indiana, and was a student in the Attica high school. On the evening of May 19, 1939, after attending a school reception in Attica, Keys and Shelley Nathan, a fellow-student, went by automobile to a tavern known as “Pete’s Stables,” in Vermilion county, this State. Other young people of Attica, some of them high school students, were at the tavern when Keys and Nathan arrived and others came later. Upon arrival Keys and Nathan had a drink of whisky. Later they were seated at a table with Arthur Masterson, a fellow-student of Keys, and Masterson’s lady friend. While seated at the table Keys drank a bottle of beer. The defendants and Frank Majors and “Red” Roberts were seated at a table close to Keys and his group. Some of those seated at the defendants’ table were using vulgar and obscene language. Keys asked they desist in the use of such language and called their attention to the presence of the lady at his table. Sink resented Keys action and replied he had purchased his table, that he would attend to it and Keys could attend to his own business. The defendants and their associates' had no previous acquaintance with Keys or his companions. Shortly, after this discussion in reference to the obscene language Keys started dancing. Nothing more was said in reference to the incident while the parties were in the tavern. Later the defendants left the tavern accompanied by Majors and Roberts. The exact lapse of time between when the defendants left and Keys followed is not shown. Before Keys left the tavern he stated to Nathan and Masterson, he was “going out to get some air.”

Defendants offered no evidence as to what occurred in the tavern. Nathan testified that after Keys left the tavern he and Masterson followed; when they reached the door the defendants and Majors and Roberts were standing a short distance outside; that Majors had Keys by the arm and was urging him to go for a walk, that Keys jerked loose two or three times and said: “I don’t want to have anything to do with you bastards;” that Keys did not advance toward the defendants, was standing still with his hands in his pockets and Lavinka hit him on the head with his fist; that-he fell, got up unassisted and while he was standing still, doing nothing, Sink ran in and hit him a blow on the head knocking him down and rendering him unconscious. Masterson testified to the same except he says that when Keys referred to them as bastards Lavinka ran at Keys and said: “You can’t call me that,” and hit him on the head with his fists. Elmo McLain and Bert Sexton arrived at the tavern about the time the first blow was struck and, as to the part they witnessed, corroborated Nathan and Masterson.

Lavinka testified that they stopped 25 to 30 feet outside the tavern, that Majors “was talking to Keys and had hold of him by his arm and wanted him to take a walk. Bob Keys said: ‘No.’ Majors asked him two or three times. Bob said: ‘No’ and pulled away from him and came toward me and said: ‘You dirty bastard’ and I hit him with my left hand on the jaw.” On cross-examination he testified that when he struck, Keys had his fists doubled up, that he came toward him pulling away from Majors, that Keys never raised his hands from his sides but that he, Lavinka, thought he started to. There is no claim that Keys was armed or had any kind of a weapon in his pocket.

Sink testified: “As he [Keys] came out of the place there at ‘Pete’s Stables’ Frank Majors took hold of his arm when he was on the outside and wanted him to go for a walk with him. He turned from Frank Majors, jerked loose and turned to Tom Lavinka and said to Tom Lavinka: ‘You are a dirty bastard.’ Tom hit him with his left hand and he turned to me and said: ‘You are the bastardly son-of-a-bitch.’ I throwed up my left hand and hit him on the chin with a punch about that far — eight or ten inches.” He further testified that he hit him with his fist. After Sink struck Keys the defendants left the scene of the fight and went to their automobile. Sink then turned and said: “I took enough of your insults in there.” Majors and Roberts did not testify. Keys was unconscious after Sink knocked him down and remained so until his death four days later. Keys weighed about 135 pounds. Lavinka was thirty-nine years old and Sink forty-three. Nathan and Masterson were each seventeen years of age.

Defendants contend a conviction for manslaughter can not be sustained for the reason the indictment charged murder by a joint assault and the proof shows that, in striking Keys, each defendant acted separately and independently of the other; that the actions were separated by a distinct interval of time; that a conviction of manslaughter negatives malice and since there was no malice aforethought there could not be a joint common design to commit the offense of which they were found guilty.

The first two counts of the indictment, in substantially the same language, charged the defendants with feloniously, unlawfully, willfully and with their malice aforethought making an assault upon Robert Keys “and then and there with the hands of both of them * * * in and upon the head of the said Robert Keys feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and with their malice aforethought did then and there strike and beat * * * with the hands of both of them the said Robert Keys” inflicting mortal wounds, etc. The counts charged the defendants with acting jointly and committing a single assault.

The defendants stated their respective blows were received by Keys on the chin and jaw, but the evidence of the attending physician and doctors who performed or were present at the post-mortem is that there was an abrasion and discoloration of the skin on the forehead over the left eye and a bruised area at the middle of the left ear. There were only two blows struck and the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that the two injuries described by the doctors were caused by the blows which defendants struck.

It is proper to name two or more persons as joint defendants in the same count of an indictment where all acting as principals committed the same offense. Where an offense has been committed by one or more persons acting as principals, and others, by affirmative act advised, encouraged, aided and abetted its commission, then by force of section 2 of division 2 of the Criminal Code all are liable as principals and may be jointly indicted. (People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40.) One who is present at the time an offense is committed and actually participates in its commission, or being present, does some act in the furtherance of the common design, is deemed to be a principal. People v. Richie, 317 Ill. 551.

It is true an indictment which charges two or more persons with the commission of a joint offense can not be sustained by proof that each committed a separate and distinct offense but that is not the evidence in this case.

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30 N.E.2d 40, 374 Ill. 480, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-people-v-sink-ill-1940.