The People v. Samual Nektalov

CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 16, 2024
Docket50
StatusPublished

This text of The People v. Samual Nektalov (The People v. Samual Nektalov) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The People v. Samual Nektalov, (N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

State of New York OPINION Court of Appeals This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

No. 50 The People &c., Respondent, v. Samual Nektalov, Appellant.

Rachel L. Pecker, for appellant. Joseph M. DiPietro, for respondent. Center for Appellate Litigation, amicus curiae.

SINGAS, J.:

Defendant claims that the prosecution failed to meet its burden in establishing that

law enforcement had probable cause to stop the vehicle in which he was a passenger. We

agree.

-1- -2- No. 50

I.

In 2018, NYPD Detective Gregory Fortunato and his partner observed a car with

“excessively tinted windows” traveling on a public road. Detective Fortunato pulled the

car over and, upon approaching, observed marijuana in plain view. 1 The officers arrested

and searched defendant, recovering two bags containing cocaine from him. Defendant

moved to suppress the drugs, arguing, among other things, that the officers lacked probable

cause to stop the vehicle on the basis of a traffic violation.

At the suppression hearing, Detective Fortunato testified that he pulled the vehicle

over because he observed that it was traveling with “excessively tinted windows,” but

failed to elaborate further. Criminal Court denied defendant’s suppression motion, finding,

as relevant here, that “Detective Fortunato properly stopped the vehicle in which defendant

was a passenger because the car apparently violated [Vehicle and Traffic Law] § 375 (12-

a) (b) (2) for having excessively tinted windows.”

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the

seventh degree. The Appellate Term affirmed, with one Justice dissenting (78 Misc 3d 1

[App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]). The court held that Detective

Fortunato’s testimony sufficiently established “that the detective had probable cause to

lawfully stop the vehicle due to an apparent violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375

1 At the time of the stop, possession of “marihuana in a public place” and which was “open to public view” was prohibited (see former Penal Law § 221.10 [1]). -2- -3- No. 50

(12-a) (b) (2)” (id. at 6 [internal quotation marks omitted]). A Judge of this Court granted

defendant leave to appeal (39 NY3d 1156 [2023]).

II.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) generally provides that “[n]o person shall

operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway, road[,] or street” with windows which

have a light transmittance of less than 70%. An automobile stop may be lawfully

effectuated where law enforcement has “probable cause that a driver has committed” a

traffic violation (see People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 [2020]). The relevant question

for a suppression court in determining whether law enforcement had probable cause is

whether “the officer who stopped the car reasonably believed the windows to be over-tinted

in violation of” the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see People v Estrella, 10 NY3d 945, 946

[2008]; People v Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 238 [1986]).

When a defendant challenges “the sufficiency of the factual predicate for the stop,”

it is the People’s burden “to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the

stop was lawful” (People v Balkman, 35 NY3d 556, 559 [2020]). “Summary statements

that the police had arrived at a conclusion that sufficient cause existed will not do” (People

v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130, 135 [1980]). Rather, the prosecution must establish “the basis for

[the] belief” that law enforcement possessed the requisite suspicion in the form of “facts,

not assurances” (id. at 135-136). While review of probable cause determinations typically

presents a mixed question of law and fact, “when an issue arises as to the standard by which

probable cause is measured—the minimum showing necessary to establish probable

-3- -4- No. 50

cause—a question of law is presented for review” (People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594, 601

[1980]). Such question is presented here.

The full extent of Detective Fortunato’s testimony regarding the tinted windows was

that the windows were “excessively tinted.” Window tints are not categorically

impermissible under New York law; they are only prohibited for specified windows to the

extent that they allow less than 70% light transmittance (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375

[12-a] [b]). Detective Fortunato’s testimony that the tint was “excessive” is, thus,

effectively a legal conclusion that the tint violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Yet, the

People failed to elicit any factual basis for this conclusion. The detective did not testify,

for example, that the windows were so dark that he could not see into the vehicle (see

People v Biggs, 208 AD3d 1343 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Brown, 169 AD3d 1258 [3d

Dept 2019]; People v Collins, 105 AD3d 1378 [4th Dept 2013]) or that he had training and

experience in identifying illegally tinted windows or conducting this type of stop (see

People v Jones, 90 NY2d 835, 837 [1997]; People v Bacquie, 154 AD3d 648, 649 [2d Dept

2017]). Nor did the detective testify that he measured the tint after stopping the vehicle

and the results confirmed that the tint level violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which

could have provided objective, corroborative evidence of the reasonableness of his

conclusion (see Estrella, 10 NY3d at 946; People v Swift, 185 AD3d 1442, 1443 [4th Dept

2020]). Without more, the record is bereft of evidence of its basis to support the detective’s

conclusory belief that the tinted windows violated the law. Consequently, Criminal Court

should have granted defendant’s motion to suppress. Given our holding, we do not reach

defendant’s remaining arguments.

-4- -5- No. 50

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Term should be reversed and the accusatory

instrument dismissed.

Order reversed and accusatory instrument dismissed. Opinion by Judge Singas. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur.

Decided May 16, 2024

-5-

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Related

People v. Estrella
893 N.E.2d 134 (New York Court of Appeals, 2008)
People v. Bacquie
2017 NY Slip Op 6924 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
People v. Swift
2020 NY Slip Op 4066 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
People v. Bouton
405 N.E.2d 699 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. McRay
416 N.E.2d 1015 (New York Court of Appeals, 1980)
People v. Hicks
500 N.E.2d 861 (New York Court of Appeals, 1986)
People v. Nektalov (Samual)
183 N.Y.S.3d 686 (Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York, 2022)

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