The People v. Rendas

9 N.E.2d 237, 366 Ill. 385
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedJune 11, 1937
DocketNo. 24012. Judgment reversed.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 9 N.E.2d 237 (The People v. Rendas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The People v. Rendas, 9 N.E.2d 237, 366 Ill. 385 (Ill. 1937).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Orr

delivered the opinion of the court:

A building occupied by a restaurant in Cicero, with its contents, was completely destroyed by fire on October 29, 1933. Nearly two years later, George Rendas, Stevens Stamatakis, (usually called Stamos,) Nick Gianacakos, George Besas and John Prevenas were jointly indicted by a grand jury in Cook county on a charge of burning the building. Besas and Prevenas were not tried, for reasons hereinafter shown. On a joint trial of the remaining three before a jury in the criminal court of Cook county, Gianacakos was acquitted but Rendas and Stamos were, on the same evidence, found guilty, and were sentenced to the penitentiary. A reversal of their judgments of conviction is sought by this writ of error.

Gianacakos, a Greek merchant of considerable wealth, was one of the owners of the building destroyed, although legal title thereto was held, under a trust agreement, by the Northern Trust Company. The property was free of mortgage or other debt, and the insurance carried on the building was not excessive. Rendas leased the ground floor and basement for a restaurant conducted by himself and his mother-in-law. Their investment in fixtures, furniture and equipment represented $30,000 and was protected by an insurance coverage of only $7000. The restaurant equipment, fixtures and furniture were free of lien and fully paid for, and only a few small debts for current accounts were outstanding at the time of the fire. The cause of the fire was reported as “unknown” by the Cicero fire marshal soon after its occurrence, no suggestions of its incendiary origin were then made and, after the usual investigation by the insurance companies carrying the risks, adjustments and payments were made to the insured in due course. It was upon the stories told by Besas and Prevenas, two questionable characters from Minneapolis who volunteered their services for pay, through a disbarred attorney, that an indictment was later voted and the conviction secured. At the trial, they were granted a severance and used as principal witnesses for the People. After their arrest, these two were released on bonds and each received a weekly payment of $25 from January x, 1935, up to the time of trial, and in addition were promised twenty per cent of any amount recovered by the insurance companies from Rendas and Gianacakos. These weekly payments and the agreement to share on a contingent basis in the proposed recovery, were made to them by the American Board of Underwriters in recompense for their testimony and efforts in securing the conviction of Gianacakos and Rendas.

Although a conspiracy was not charged in any one of the four counts in the indictment, it was nevertheless the theory of the People, judged by the proof and argument presented, that Rendas and Gianacakos, desirous of collecting insurance money, had entered into an unlawful undertaking in the nature of a conspiracy with Stamos, Besas and Prevenas, whereby the last three named were to burn the building and restaurant contents for pay. On the other hand, the defendants contended that no such undertaking was ever entered into and that Besas and Prevenas had simply taken advantage of the occurrence of the fire to threaten and blackmail them. The principal error assigned by defendants is that the evidence produced by the People did not establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This entails our consideration of the testimony of the principal witnesses.

Prevenas testified for the People that he rode with Stamos from Minneapolis to Chicago in the latter’s car on October 25, and there met Besas at the McQueen Hotel. He said he met Rendas that same evening but did not talk about burning the place. On the next day, October 26, he said that he again went to the Rendas restaurant with Stamos and Besas and saw these two talking to Rendas and Gianacakos, but did not hear any of their conversation. On the next day, the 27th, Prevenas said that they again drove to the restaurant in the afternoon but he and Stamos remained in the car, while Besas went in and later returned with $110. Much conversation alleged to have taken place between Prevenas and others out of the presence of defendants, was erroneously admitted by the trial court, over objections repeatedly made by defendants’ attorneys. The quantity and character of this irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony would, alone, afford sufficient ground for reversal, if more important reasons did not exist. Prevenas admitted that he helped gather the materials used in starting the fire and helped Stamos put the inflamable material in the basement and ignite the fire. But his testimony is singularly silent as to any conversation with either Rendas or Gianacakos, or with others in their presence, concerning the planning or execution of the fire. If his irrelevant and hearsay testimony, to which objections were made, had been kept out of the record, Prevenas would have testified to nothing of an incriminating character up to the morning of October 29, 1933, when the fire occurred. At the time of the firing, Prevenas said he saw Rendas give Besas $90, which Besas brought over to Stamos and Prevenas; that upon protest over the insufficiency of this sum, Besas went back to Rendas to get more money. Prevenas followed him, did not engage in or hear any conversation between Besas and Rendas, but saw Rendas receive something, which Gianacakos took out of his pocket, and hand it over to Besas. This he said “was a roll of money about $100.” He said they split the money three ways; that he got $60, Besas $65 and Stamos $65,'and that all three left Chicago that same afternoon. Prevenas was then allowed to testify, over repeated objections, to alleged meetings and conversations with Rendas on later dates. He said he met Rendas in Minneapolis about December 20, 1933, and had a conversation with him on the street; that Rendas then gave him $150 and promised to pay more when he collected his insurance. He further testified that he again saw Rendas in the fall of 1934 at the Harrison Cafe, in Chicago; that Besas was with him; that Rendas did not give him anything at that time, but a week later, at the Northwestern depot, he and Besas again asked Rendas for money and Rendas allegedly replied: “Stamos collected $1200 and you fellows got $700. I won’t pay any more. I can’t pay any more, either me or Gianacakos.” On objections, the court struck out the reference as to Gianacakos. On the same evening Prevenas said he and Besas met Rendas and received $100 each from him. On cross-examination Prevenas admitted that although he was married, he had been living in open adultery with a “girl friend” in Minneapolis for about six or seven years; that his business was cooking and waiting on tables at different places as an extra, for which he received about “ten bucks” a week; that he was acquainted with Chisholm, a Minneapolis attorney who had been disbarred, and talked with him about this case in the fall of 1934, soon after he returned from Chicago to Minneapolis; that Chisholm had written to the insurance company, as a result of which an interview was secured with an insurance company representative named Brown. He testified that he could not read but that Chisholm, and another attorney named Simpson, secured a written offer to pay him “$25.00 a week, and twenty per cent out of what amount they collect back,” and that he had been receiving these $25 weekly payments regularly.

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Bluebook (online)
9 N.E.2d 237, 366 Ill. 385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-people-v-rendas-ill-1937.