ADVANCE
SHEET HEADNOTE
The
supreme granted certiorari to determine whether the removal
of all members of the public, including members of the
defendant's family, from the physical courtroom during
her jury trial violated her Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial even though the proceedings remained accessible to the
public virtually.
Following
the principles set forth in Rios v. People, 2025 CO
46, ___ P.3d ___, also announced today, the supreme court
concludes that the availability of free, contemporaneous
virtual access alone does not satisfy a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial. Here, the trial
court's decision to remove all spectators from the
courtroom and to fully close the courtroom for the remainder
of the trial based on misconduct by some of the spectators
was a nontrivial closure that violated Bialas's Sixth
Amendment right because the closure was not justified
2
under the factors set forth in Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). Accordingly, the supreme court
affirms the judgment of the court of appeals.
3
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 21CA1645
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Meredith K. Rose, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
4
CHIEF
JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, and JUSTICE GABRIEL joined.
JUSTICE HART, joined by JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, and JUSTICE SAMOUR
dissented.
5
OPINION
BERKENKOTTER, JUSTICE
¶1
We granted certiorari to review the decision of a division of
the court of appeals, concluding that the trial court
violated Michelle Re Nae Bialas's Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial. People v. Bialas, 2023 COA 50,
¶ 6, 535 P.3d 999, 1002. The trial court erred, the
division decided, when it removed all members of the public,
including members of Bialas's family, from the physical
courtroom during her jury trial, even though the proceedings
remained accessible to the public virtually on Webex and via
video and audio streaming in an auxiliary courtroom.
Id. The division reversed Bialas's conviction
and remanded her case for a new trial after it determined
that a nontrivial partial courtroom closure occurred and that
the closure was not justified under the factors articulated
by the Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 48 (1984). Bialas, ¶¶ 20, 27-28, 535
P.3d at 1004-05.
¶2
We now conclude, for the reasons we explain in Rios v.
People, 2025 CO 46, ___ P.3d ___, which we announce
today, that the availability of free, contemporaneous virtual
access alone does not satisfy a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. We additionally
conclude that the trial court's decision to remove all
spectators from the courtroom and to fully close the
courtroom based on misconduct by some of the spectators was a
nontrivial closure that violated Bialas's Sixth Amendment
right. And because the closure here was
6
not justified under the factors set forth in Waller,
we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶3
In 2017, a jury convicted Bialas of multiple charges related
to an assault on her ex-boyfriend, James Bynum. After a
division of the court of appeals reversed the conviction,
People v. Bialas, No. 17CA1841 (Dec. 17, 2020), the
prosecution retried Bialas. The second trial commenced in
July 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic. During a pretrial
conference, the court explained that because of social
distancing requirements, the jurors would be dispersed
throughout the courtroom, reducing the space available for
potential spectators to one row at the back of the gallery.
The court added that anyone who could not find a seat in the
courtroom could watch the trial virtually on Webex or via
video and audio streaming in an auxiliary
courtroom.[1] Certain members of Bialas's and
Bynum's families attended the trial in person in the
physical courtroom.
7
¶4
On the third day of trial, during defense counsel's
direct examination of Bialas, the court held a bench
conference. Because the court was unable to mute the
microphones it normally used for such conferences, it held
the bench conference with the attorneys outside of the
courtroom. When the judge, attorneys, and court reporter
returned, a juror passed the court a note that stated,
"[T]he spectators behind me were discussing the history
of this case and we could hear them." The court asked
everyone other than the trial participants to leave the
courtroom and explained to the members of the public that
they could watch the rest of the trial virtually in the
auxiliary courtroom.
¶5
After clearing the room, the court brought the jurors who
were within earshot of the spectators back to the courtroom
and questioned them regarding what they had heard. Two of the
jurors indicated that they heard the alleged victim's
family comment about a previous trial. One juror said they
heard someone say that there had been a previous trial and
the word "guilty." That juror added that
"there was some indication as to the bias of this trial
being[,] you know[,] being in favor of the defendant."
Another juror indicated that the juror could hear the
spectators "snicker [at] whatever the defense attorney
would say."
8
¶6
After the jurors were questioned, neither party requested a
mistrial, although defense counsel asked that Bialas's
family be allowed to return to the courtroom since the jurors
had indicated that it was members of Bynum's family, not
Bialas's, who had made the comments. The district court
denied defense counsel's request to allow Bialas's
family to remain, stating:
All spectators will be banned from the courtroom for the rest
of the day and they can be across the hall and watch the
proceedings via Web[e]x just like anybody else, but I'm
not going to now inquire from each one of the spectators who
is at fault. It is my province to govern what [is] happening
here in the courtroom and something has happened which is not
proper . . . and I'm not going to sit around and try and
determine who is at fault for making comments or not. The
best, easiest, and uniform [rule] is that there will be no
further spectators for the rest of the trial in the
courtroom.
¶7
Defense counsel objected, claiming that the exclusion of the
public violated Bialas's right to a public trial. The
court overruled the objection, and the trial proceeded.
Bialas's family and Bynum's family watched the
remainder of the trial virtually from the auxiliary
courtroom. The jury subsequently convicted Bialas of second
degree assault and violation of a protection order.
¶8
A division of the court of appeals reversed Bialas's
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
Bialas, ¶ 28, 535 P.3d at 1005. First, the
division concluded that the removal of members of the two
families from the courtroom constituted a partial closure
despite the availability of a live video and audio stream of
the proceeding. Id. at ¶ 15, 535 P.3d at 1003.
It further held that the
9
closure was nontrivial because the closure lasted for part of
Bialas's testimony and the entirety of both closing
arguments, which undercut the assurance of a fair trial.
Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20, 535 P.3d at 1003-04.
Additionally, the division reasoned that the closure was
intentional, and it caused Bialas's family to move to the
auxiliary courtroom. Id. at ¶ 19, 535 P.3d at
1004. Relying on People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, 464
P.3d 735, the division noted the importance placed upon
"the presence of a defendant's family . . . in
ensuring a fair trial." Id. at ¶ 12, 535
P.3d at 1003 (omission in original) (quoting Jones,
¶ 41, 464 P.3d at 744). Thus, it found that by removing
Bialas's family during her testimony, they no longer
served as a reminder to the judge, prosecutor, and jury
regarding their responsibility to treat Bialas fairly,
undercutting the assurance of a public trial. Id. at
¶¶ 18-19, 535 P.3d at 1003-04.
¶9
Last, the division applied the Waller factors and
concluded that the closure was not justified and thus
violated Bialas's right to a public trial. Id.
at ¶¶ 21-27, 535 P.3d at 1004-05. Specifically, the
division determined that (1) because Bialas's family had
not made the improper comments, there was no overriding
interest in removing them; (2) the closure was broader than
necessary because it was based on the misbehavior of a few
spectators; (3) allowing Bialas's family to remain was a
reasonable alternative to complete removal of the public; and
(4) the court did not make sufficient findings in support of
the closure. Id. at ¶¶ 22-25, 535 P.3d
1004-05. at
10
Thus, the division held that the partial closure was
unconstitutional and, as such, was structural error.
Id. at ¶ 27, 535 P.3d at 1005. Accordingly, it
reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for
a new trial. Id. at ¶ 28, 535 P.3d at 1005.
¶10
The People petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari,
which we granted.[2]
II.
Analysis
¶11
We begin by setting out the appropriate standard of review.
We then describe the applicable law regarding a
defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. Next,
we address whether a courtroom closure occurred when the
trial court excluded Bialas's family and Bynum's
family and closed the physical courtroom to all other
spectators but provided virtual access to the trial. After
concluding that a courtroom closure occurred, we apply the
triviality standard set forth in People v. Lujan,
2020 CO 26, 461 P.3d 494, to determine whether the closure
violated Bialas's right to a public trial. We go on to
conclude that the courtroom
11
closure was nontrivial and not justified under
Waller. Finally, because the closure violated
Bialas's right to a public trial, we affirm the judgment
of the court of appeals.
A.
Standard of Review
¶12
Our review of a trial court's decision to close the
courtroom involves a mixed question of fact and law.
Rios, ¶ 17. We defer to the trial court's
factual findings absent an abuse of discretion, but we review
its legal conclusions de novo. Id.
B.
Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial
¶13
Both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions guarantee criminal
defendants the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amends.
VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. In Rios,
we explained the importance of the right to a public trial
and the purposes it serves. ¶¶ 19-20. One such
purpose is to ensure the presence of interested spectators
"for the benefit of the accused." Waller,
467 U.S. at 46 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)). The presence of such spectators
serves, among other things, to keep an accused's
"triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
and to the importance of their functions." Id.
(quoting Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 380). This, in
turn, provides a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution. In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
12
¶14
However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the purpose of
the right to a public trial extends beyond the accused.
"[I]n the broadest terms, public access to criminal
trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a
check upon the judicial process-an essential component in our
structure of self-government." Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). For example,
the right to a public trial maintains public faith and
confidence in the justice system by allowing the public to
see that the accused is fairly dealt with, ensuring that
judges and prosecutors discharge their duties responsibly,
encouraging witnesses to come forward, and discouraging
perjury. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. The right also
"vindicate[s] the concerns of the victims and the
community in knowing that offenders are being brought to
account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and
openly selected." Press-Enter. Co. v. Super.
Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).
¶15
With these purposes in mind, we turn to the facts of this
case.
C.
Whether a Closure Occurred
¶16
The People argue that the removal of Bialas's family from
the physical courtroom did not constitute a closure because
the public had free and contemporaneous access to observe the
proceedings virtually. For the reasons we explain in our
opinion in Rios, announced today, we disagree.
13
¶17
In Rios, we considered whether virtual access to
observe courtroom proceedings alone could satisfy a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.
¶ 25. To answer the question, we examined the purposes
the right serves, including spectators' role in keeping
the jury "keenly alive" to the importance of its
function and to a sense of its responsibility. Id.
at ¶ 27. We looked as well to its role in ensuring that
judges and prosecutors carry out their duties responsibly,
encouraging witnesses to come forward, and discouraging
perjury. Id.
¶18
Ultimately, we concluded that "the Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial is best understood as a trial that
is open to the public, meaning that the public has a
reasonable opportunity to be physically present to
observe the proceedings." Id. at ¶ 28.
That is to say, virtual access alone does not meet a
defendant's public trial right. Id. at ¶
36. We reach this conclusion for three reasons. First, this
understanding hews most closely to the purposes of the right
to a public trial. This connection is particularly striking
as it pertains to the public's role in keeping the jury
"keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility"
and to the importance of their function by virtue of the
public's presence. Waller, 467 U.S. at
46 (quoting Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 380). As we
noted in Rios, screens in a courtroom, no matter
their number or the nature of their display, are an
inadequate substitute for the physical presence of real
spectators in the gallery and the powerful reminder that
those spectators provide to jurors regarding the gravity of
their role. ¶ 29. Plus, this
14
virtual technology is typically not configured to allow
jurors to see spectators due to the risk of disruption and
potential mistrial.
¶19
Second, this reading comports with the ordinary understanding
of the term "public," which is defined as
"exposed to general view: open." Public,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ public
[https://perma.cc/9KAV-94U6]. The term "presence"
is defined as "the fact or condition of being
present." Presence, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/presence
[https://perma.cc/ 3KKL-LJ59]. The term "present"
is defined as "constituting the one actually involved,
at hand, or being considered." Present,
Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/present
[https://perma.cc/7VRZ-JQ9H]. As we explained in
Rios, when read in tandem, these definitions support
the understanding that a public trial involves the
opportunity for spectators to be physically present
to observe the proceedings. ¶ 30.
¶20
Third, and finally, the Framers saw great value in the
benefits associated with a public trial. Waller, 467
U.S. at 49 n.9. The Framers, of course, could not have
imagined a public trial that involved spectators who were not
somehow physically present. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980); see also
United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634, 642 (2019)
("[T]he constitution's guarantees cannot mean less
today than they did the day they were
15
adopted."). And the Framers could not have imagined the
bandwidth and connectivity issues that district courts around
the state face from time to time. More importantly, changes
in technology do not lessen constitutional protections. Thus,
we reject the People's argument that the Sixth Amendment
does not require the public to have access to a physical
courtroom so long as it has the free and contemporaneous
opportunity to virtually observe proceedings.[3]
¶21
Because virtual access alone is not sufficient to meet a
defendant's public trial right, we conclude that a
closure occurred when the court excluded the Bialases and all
other members of the public from the physical courtroom for
the remainder of her trial.
¶22
We emphasize that it was not the court's initial order,
which significantly limited the seating capacity in the
courtroom due to the COVID-19 pandemic that forms the basis
for our conclusion in this regard. The court's order left
seats for spectators in the back of the gallery. This limit
was based on the public health
16
restrictions that required the jurors to spread out across
the gallery and necessarily confined the public seating
available in the courtroom. As we explained in Rios,
that is not a closure. ¶ 33. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, courtroom capacity was often limited by
public health orders concerning permissible uses of indoor
spaces. The inability of some members of the public
to be physically present because of space limitations is not
a closure. These limitations may exist due to health-related
restrictions, as with the COVID-19 pandemic, or simply
because-as with some high profile cases-there are more
interested members of the public than there are available
seats.
¶23
And, as we additionally observed in Rios, when a
court offers hybrid proceedings-i.e., the courtroom remains
open but there is only limited seating capacity, and the
court offers access over a virtual platform-that is not a
closure either, as long as the courtroom remains open.
Id. at ¶ 36. In that instance, the virtual
access options are merely additional means of viewing the
proceeding that are not constitutionally required.
¶24
However, if a court totally excludes the public from the
physical courtroom, that is a closure subject to a
Waller analysis. Relatedly, if a court ejects a
particular person or group of persons from the courtroom,
that is also a closure subject to a Waller analysis.
People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 18, 519 P.3d
353, 359.
17
¶25
Both types of closures were implicated here. The trial court
ejected Bialas's and Bynum's families from the
courtroom. It also closed the courtroom to all other
spectators. Thus, there was a closure.
¶26
Our analysis, however, does not stop there. To implicate a
defendant's right to a public trial, the courtroom
closure must be nontrivial. Lujan, ¶ 23, 461
P.3d at 499.
D.
Whether the Closure Was Trivial
¶27
The closure of a physical courtroom can violate a
defendant's constitutional right to a public trial.
Jones, ¶ 27, 464 P.3d at 741. But "the
Sixth Amendment is not necessarily violated 'every time
the public is excluded from the courtroom.'"
Lujan, ¶ 16, 461 P.3d at 498 (quoting
Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir.
1996)). "[S]ome closures are simply so trivial that they
do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."
Id. To determine whether a closure is trivial, we
consider (1) the duration of the closure, (2) the substance
of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, (3)
whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court
or placed on the record, (4) whether the closure was
intentional, and (5) whether the closure was total or
partial. Id. at ¶ 19, 461 P.3d at 498-99. This
list of factors is nonexhaustive, and no single factor is
dispositive. Id., 461 P.3d at 499. Further, under
this standard, "we look to the closure at issue and
consider
18
whether it implicated the protections and values of the
public trial right." Id. at ¶ 28, 461 P.3d
at 500.
¶28
Applying this standard, we conclude that the closure here was
nontrivial under the totality of the circumstances. In
Lujan, this court concluded that the trial
court's decision to close the courtroom to reread a
limiting instruction to the jury "that it had previously
read in open court" was trivial because it lasted
"only a matter of minutes." ¶ 29, 461 P.3d at
500. However, here, the closure lasted for the rest of
Bialas's testimony and all of the closing arguments.
¶29
Moreover, the closure was intentional. "[I]ntentional
closures during more significant, and less fleeting,
testimony are generally considered not trivial because of
their potential to affect the fairness of the
proceedings." Jones, ¶ 40, 464 P.3d at
744. For example, in People v. Hassen, 2015 CO 49,
¶ 16, 351 P.3d 418, 422, we concluded that a closure
during two witnesses' testimony, which spanned
twenty-seven pages of the transcript, was not trivial. Here,
Bialas's testimony spanned twenty-seven pages, and the
closing arguments spanned another thirty-four. Additionally,
in Jones, we concluded that a closure lasting almost
an entire afternoon during the ten-day trial was not brief,
and therefore, nontrivial. ¶ 42, 464 P.3d at 744. The
closure in this case included more than half a day in a
four-day trial, further indicating that the closure was
nontrivial.
19
¶30
On these facts, we conclude that the total exclusion of the
public and the expulsion of Bialas's family from the
courtroom for more than half a day were both nontrivial
closures.
E.
Whether the Closure Was Constitutional
¶31
We next apply the four Waller factors to determine
whether this nontrivial closure violated Bialas's
constitutional right to a public trial.
¶32
In Waller, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part
test for trial courts to determine whether a courtroom
closure complies with the Sixth Amendment. 467 U.S. at 48.
The test requires that (1) "the party seeking to close
the [proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is
likely to be prejudiced," (2) "the closure must be
no broader than necessary to protect that interest," (3)
"the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives
to closing the proceeding," and (4) "it must make
findings adequate to support the closure." Id.
¶33
We now turn to consider these factors, beginning with whether
there was an overriding interest in closing the
trial.[4] Id. Although trial judges have
discretion to control their courtrooms by removing
distracting spectators,
20
see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970), and
the court's concern here regarding the improper conduct
was well-founded, there is no evidence in the record that the
threat of disruption in this case came from Bialas's
family. Rather, all signs indicated that the problematic
comments were made by the victim's family. Moreover,
neither party sought to remove Bialas's family after the
jurors indicated that they had not made the inappropriate
comments. Thus, while the trial court's concern was
understandable given the potential for a mistrial, there was
no reason to exclude Bialas's family or to close the
entire courtroom. The first Waller factor,
accordingly, was not met.
¶34
Next, we consider the second and third Waller
factors: whether the closure was no broader than necessary
and whether the court considered any reasonable alternatives
to closing the proceeding. 467 U.S. at 48. Here, the trial
court could have made findings and properly removed the
victim's family to prevent further disruption of the
trial, to protect the jury from ex parte communications, and
to prevent a (second) mistrial, but it did not do so.
Instead, it imposed a "uniform rule," declining to
"take sides as to who it is or what spectators get
special preference over other spectators." But in
applying a blanket rule, the court not only excluded the
Bynums from the courtroom, it also excluded Bialas's
family members and all other potential spectators from the
opportunity to observe the proceedings in person. Perhaps the
court viewed the available virtual public
21
access as a reasonable alternative, but if so, it did not
explain this on the record. And even so, as we have
explained, virtual public access alone does not satisfy a
defendant's right to a public trial. Because the court
did not limit the scope of the closure or consider whether
there were reasonable alternatives to entirely closing the
courtroom, we conclude that the second and third
Waller factors were not met. ¶35 Last, we turn
to the fourth Waller factor-whether the court made
findings adequate to support the closure. Id. We
conclude that it did not. "[W]e gauge 'compliance by
substance, not form.'" Rios, ¶ 52
(quoting Turner, ¶ 35, 519 P.3d at 362). Here,
the court did not follow Waller in substance or
form. Its findings were limited to its comment that it was
not going to decide who caused the disruption. Therefore, we
conclude that the fourth Waller factor was not
satisfied.
¶36
Because the exclusion of Bialas's family and the entire
public from the physical courtroom constituted a nontrivial
closure that did not satisfy any of the Waller
requirements, we conclude that the closure violated
Bialas's right to a public trial.
III.
Conclusion
¶37
Here, the exclusion of the public constituted a nontrivial
closure that was not justified under the factors set forth in
Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. Because Bialas's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial was violated, we affirm the
judgment of the court of appeals.
22
JUSTICE HART, joined by JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, and JUSTICE
SAMOUR, dissenting.
¶38
For the reasons I set out in more detail in my concurring
opinion in Rios v. People, 2025 CO 46, ___ P.3d ___,
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "the
availability of free, contemporaneous virtual access
alone does not satisfy a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial." Maj. op. ¶ 2.
¶39
In Rios, the majority concluded that application of the
factors articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Waller
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), to justify a
courtroom closure warranted what it perceived as a closure of
the proceedings. Rios, ¶ 53. Thus, although I
disagreed with the majority that the proceedings were in fact
closed, I concurred in the judgment. Rios, ¶ 68
(Hart, J., concurring).
¶40
Here, however, the majority concludes that the
"closure" of the proceedings was not justified
because the physical courtroom was closed to the public
without sufficient justification. Maj. op. ¶ 35.
¶41
In my view, a trial has not been closed when (1) critical
proceedings are open to contemporaneous public scrutiny
(in-person or virtual), and (2) the participants in the
process (jurors, lawyers, witnesses, and judges) are aware
that those critical proceedings are subject to
contemporaneous public scrutiny. When those criteria are met,
a defendant's Sixth Amendment public trial right is
protected. Because that was the case here, I respectfully
dissent.
---------
Notes:
[1] Webex is a video conferencing platform
that allows a spectator to see and hear what is happening in
a physical courtroom in real time virtually via a computer or
phone. Depending on the placement of the camera or cameras
providing the live feed, spectators may be able to see the
entire courtroom or only a small part of it. In addition to
allowing for virtual courtroom observation, Webex can also be
configured with two-way video and audio to allow virtual
courtroom participation. It is not ordinarily configured this
way during jury trials given the very real risk of disruption
and the potential for mistrials. This means that jurors
cannot see when there are virtual spectators. Livestreaming
is a term used to describe the real-time broadcasting of
video and audio content over the internet. Livestreaming
allows a spectator to remotely watch a court proceeding in
real time. The video and audio are, however, not two-way.
That is, the people in the courtroom, including the jurors
and the judge, cannot see that they are being
watched.
[2] We granted certiorari to review the
following issues:
1. Whether moving the defendant's family from the
physical courtroom to a livestream viewing room constituted a
closure under the Sixth Amendment when the defendant agreed
that the viewing room was an appropriate accommodation for
the public.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in determining
that a courtroom closure was nontrivial when the persons
"excluded" maintained access to the proceedings
through real-time video and audio livestreaming.
[3] As we observed in Rios,
virtual courtroom technology like the platforms utilized here
can be a great convenience to litigants, lawyers, the court,
and the public. ¶ 26. This technology can also advance
the important goal of increasing access to justice. We are
mindful that this technology can also present challenges-from
bandwidth issues that undermine reliable connectivity, to
disruptions intentionally caused by individuals attempting to
disturb digital court proceedings. The question before us,
though, is not whether this technology is useful, but rather
whether its use alone is sufficient to meet a defendant's
public trial right.
[4] Many jurisdictions have considered
whether the "overriding interest" standard is
necessary in partial closure cases or whether a lesser
standard-"substantial reason" -is more appropriate.
See Jones, ¶¶ 24-26, 464 P.3d at 741
(collecting cases and explaining the competing views on this
issue). This is an issue we need not resolve today.