OPINION IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER C.R.C.P.
242.31(a)
BRYON
M. LARGE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE
SUMMARY
On
April 14, 2026, following a hearing on the sanctions, a
hearing board disbarred Ekaette Patty-Anne Eddings (New York
attorney registration number 4111217) from the practice of
law in Colorado. The disbarment is scheduled to take effect
on May 19, 2026.
In
2023, Eddings accepted a client's immigration case. The
client paid Eddings in advance for the work, but Eddings
deposited most of the advance payment into her personal
account even though she knew she had not earned the money.
During the representation, Eddings failed to keep her client
informed about the status of his matter and only infrequently
responded to his reasonable requests for updates about his
case. When, one year into the representation, the client
learned Eddings had not submitted the documents he had paid
her to prepare and file with immigration authorities, he
demanded she refund his fee. Eddings refunded only a portion
of the fee and converted the rest for her personal use.
Based
on the client's complaint, disciplinary authorities
petitioned to suspend Eddings from the practice of law on an
interim basis. Soon after, Eddings offered to continue the
representation if the client withdrew his complaint. During
her disciplinary proceeding, Eddings did not comply with
discovery rules and orders, which resulted in the imposition
of sanctions against her, including entry of default on five
of the People's claims.
Through
her conduct in the client matter, Eddings violated Colo. RPC
1.4(a)(3) (a lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of the matter); Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4) (a
lawyer must promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information); Colo. RPC 1.15A(a) (a lawyer must hold client
property separate from the lawyer's own property); Colo.
RPC 1.16(d) (a lawyer must protect a client's interests
upon termination of the representation, including by
returning any unearned fees to the client); and Colo. RPC
8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).
2
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This
matter began as an interim suspension proceeding. On April
17, 2025, Jacob M. Vos of the Office of Attorney Regulation
Counsel ("the People") filed an amended petition
for interim suspension. The same day, Presiding Disciplinary
Judge Bryon M. Large ("the PDJ") issued an order to
Ekaette Patty-Anne Eddings ("Respondent"),
directing her to show cause why she should not be suspended
from the practice of law on an interim basis. Respondent did
not respond to the show cause order, and on May 7, 2025, the
Colorado Supreme Court entered an order suspending her from
the practice of law in Colorado on an interim basis.
On May
15, 2025, Vos filed a complaint on the People's behalf
with the PDJ, alleging that Respondent violated ten Colorado
Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent answered on July 2,
2025. The PDJ then held a scheduling conference and set this
matter for a two-day disciplinary hearing to take place in
January 2026.
In
October 2025, Respondent twice sought additional time to
answer the People's combined discovery requests. In each
instance, the People provided a courtesy extension after
Respondent promised to provide her responses by the new
deadline. But Respondent did not answer the People's
discovery despite having additional time to do so, and the
People moved to compel her discovery responses on November 6,
2025. The PDJ ordered an expedited briefing schedule and held
a hearing on the People's motion on November 14, 2025.
Respondent did not respond to the motion to compel, but she
did appear for the hearing, where she argued that she
included all the responsive documents as exhibits when she
answered the People's complaint. Respondent also disputed
Colorado's jurisdiction in the matter, and the PDJ
advised her that her challenge to jurisdiction had to be made
via written motion and, in the meantime, that she was
required to respond to the People's pending discovery
requests. After that motions hearing in November 2025, the
PDJ granted the People's motion to compel and ordered
Respondent to answer the People's discovery by December
5, 2025, which was the date Respondent requested at the
hearing. In addition, the PDJ reset the disciplinary hearing
for March 19-20, 2026.
Respondent
did not answer the discovery requests by the ordered
deadline. On December 8, 2025, she filed two motions. In one,
she challenged Colorado's jurisdiction and moved to
dismiss the complaint. In the other, she requested an
extension of time to file discovery.
Also on
December 8, 2025, Respondent asked the People via email to
resend their discovery requests to her and assured them she
would provide responses within two days. The People promptly
responded with their requests and agreed to a further
deadline extension to December 10, 2025, to submit her
responses; the People advised Respondent that they would seek
sanctions if she did not provide her responses by that time.
Respondent did not do so, and on December 11, 2025, the
People moved for default as a sanction under C.R.C.P. 37(d)
for her failure to answer discovery.
Meanwhile,
on January 9, 2026, the PDJ issued an order requiring
Respondent to file a status report with an update about
discovery no later than January 16, 2026. She did not do so.
3
In a
pair of orders issued on January 20, 2026, the PDJ denied
Respondent's motion challenging jurisdiction and granted
the People's motion for discovery sanctions. Rather than
determine the sanction at that time, however, the PDJ allowed
Respondent an opportunity to show cause by February 3, 2026,
why the PDJ should not impose a severe sanction, including
entering default against her. Respondent did not respond to
the show cause order. On February 4, 2026, she did, however,
respond to a pending motion in which the People sought to
extend deposition and discovery deadlines. In that response,
she represented that she had fully cooperated with the
discovery process and had produced discovery responses on
February 3, 2026. She attributed her delay in part to her
decision to await the outcome of her jurisdiction challenge,
which, she argued, determined whether discovery was needed.
At the
PDJ's request, the People filed a status report on
February 4, 2026, in which they confirmed that Respondent had
produced some discovery responses the prior day. But the
People complained that the responses were incomplete; that
the only documents Respondent produced were those already
attached to her answer; that she improperly invoked a
privilege that her client had already waived; and that she
failed to produce payment records or an accounting of the
client funds the People allege she misappropriated. The
People also asserted that Respondent had still not provided
her initial disclosures in the case. On February 6, 2026,
Respondent responded to the status report by repeating, in
large part, the statements in her submission filed two days
earlier.
On
February 6, 2026, the PDJ issued an order sanctioning
Respondent under C.R.C.P. 37(d). In that order, the PDJ found
that Respondent engaged in a pattern of seeking and obtaining
extensions based on vows to answer discovery only to then
selectively participate in the proceeding; that she relied on
her motion challenging jurisdiction as pretext for failing to
meet established and negotiated discovery deadlines; that her
conduct amounted to a flagrant and bad faith disregard of
discovery obligations; and that her conduct prejudiced the
People, who have no means other than propounding discovery
requests on Respondent to access financial records that would
illuminate how she handled client funds. Because Respondent
did not respond to the show cause order of January 20, 2026,
the PDJ did not have the benefit of her position as to the
appropriate discovery sanction to impose. The PDJ concluded
that the least severe sanction commensurate with
Respondent's culpability and the People's prejudice
was to enter default against her on Claims 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9
and to deem admitted paragraphs 31, 32, 33, and 68 of the
complaint. As to Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, and 10 as well as any
mitigating factors that Respondent could advance under the
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
("ABA Standard'), [1] the PDJ's order
prohibited Respondent from presenting any evidence that she
had not already produced to the People and from eliciting
testimony from witnesses, other than herself, that she had
not yet identified as individuals who may have information
relevant to this matter. Finally, the PDJ concluded that
Respondent had engaged in the bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply
with the PDJ's discovery rules and by flagrantly ignoring
and disobeying the PDJ's orders. The PDJ thus also
entered an instruction directing the Hearing Board to apply
ABA Standard 9.22(e) in its sanctions analysis.
4
On
February 26, 2026, the People moved to dismiss Claims 1,4, 5,
8, and 10 in the interests of justice and judicial economy
based on the evidence available to them and the complaining
witness's unwillingness to appear at the hearing. On
March 3, 2026, the PDJ dismissed those claims and converted
the disciplinary hearing to a hearing on the sanctions for
the claims on which default had entered.
On
March 19, 2026, a Hearing Board comprising the PDJ, lawyer
Mary Kominek Linden, and citizen member Mark McIntyre held a
hearing under C.R.C.P. 242.30. Gregory G. Sapakoff attended
for the People.[2] Respondent failed to appear, even though
the PDJ began the hearing at 9:18 a.m., eighteen minutes
after the appointed start time, to provide Respondent the
additional opportunity to participate.[3] During the
hearing, the Hearing Board received testimony from the
People's investigator, Donna Scherer, and the PDJ
admitted stipulated exhibit S1.
II.
FACTS AND RULE VIOLATIONS ESTABLISHED ON DEFAULT
Respondent
is admitted to the practice of law in New York under
registration number 4111217. Although Respondent does not
hold a Colorado law license, the Colorado Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over her because she practices in Colorado
pursuant to federal law. At the time Respondent filed her
answer in this case, she lived in Highlands Ranch, Colorado,
and used an address in Highlands Ranch as her business
mailing address.
In
February 2023, MacKendy Mondesir hired Respondent for an
immigration case. Respondent agreed to prepare and file an
I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and I-485 Application to
Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status on
Mondesir's behalf.
Mondesir
paid Respondent $3,159.00 in advance for the representation.
Respondent deposited $2,609.00 of Mondesir's funds into
her personal checking account. She did so even though she
knew she had not yet performed services for Mondesir. Indeed,
Respondent did not complete any useful work for Mondesir.
Mondesir regularly called Respondent to ask for updates on
his immigration matter. Respondent rarely returned
Mondesir's voicemails or telephone calls.
In May
2024, Mondesir checked the status of his matter with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and learned that it did
not have anything on file under his name. Upon learning that
Respondent had not filed anything on his behalf, Mondesir
confronted Respondent and requested a refund. Though
Respondent refunded $575.00 to Mondesir, she took the
remainder of his funds for her own personal use. By the end
of December 2024, Respondent's trust account had a
balance of only $1.07. At the same time, her checking account
held only $0.51.
5
On
April 17, 2025, the People filed an amended petition for
interim suspension against Respondent with the Colorado
Supreme Court. In late April 2025, Respondent spoke with
Mondesir and offered to continue representing him in his
immigration matter, but only if he withdrew his request for
investigation with the People.[4] On May 2, 2025, the People
received a document tilted "Complaint Withdrawal"
from Mondesir, which was dated the same day. The document
provided that "I, Mackendy Mondesir hereby WITHDRAW The
Complaint that I signed on . april 14-2025 I have received
promises, I, the undersigned, do not wish to proceed with the
Complaint that I filed against Eddings, Ekaette Patty
because: The issues I raised in my complaint are now
resolved."[5]
Claims
2 and 3 - Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(3) and Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4)
Colo.
RPC 1.4(a)(3) provides that a lawyer must "keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter." Respondent breached this rule by failing to
keep Mondesir informed about the lack of progress in his
matter throughout the representation. Because Respondent
rarely returned Mondesir's communications and failed to
provide information on the status of Mondesir's
immigration matter despite his reasonable requests for
updates, Respondent also violated Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4), which
requires a lawyer to promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information.
Claim
6 - Colo. RPC 1.15A(a)
As
relevant here, under Colo. RPC 1.15A(a), a lawyer must keep
separate the lawyer's property from client property in
the lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation. A lawyer must keep client funds in the
lawyer's possession in compliant trust accounts.
Respondent violated this rule when she failed to hold
Mondesir's funds separate from her own property.
Claim
7 - Colo. RPC 1.16(d)
Among
other requirements, Colo. RPC 1.16(d) mandates that a lawyer,
upon termination of a representation, must take steps to the
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interests, including by refunding the client's unearned
funds paid to the lawyer. When Mondesir's representation
ended, Respondent failed to refund his advanced fees in
violation of this rule.
6
Claim
9 - Colo. RPC 8.4(c)
Colo.
RPC 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. A
lawyer's knowing conversion of client funds violates
Colo. RPC 8.4(c). Knowing conversion occurs when a lawyer
takes money that has been entrusted to the lawyer by another
person, knowing that the money belongs to another person, and
knowing that the lawyer has not been authorized to use the
money.[6]
As
established on entry of default on this claim, Respondent
knew she did not complete any useful work for Mondesir during
the representation. Even so, she knowingly deposited his
funds, which she had not earned, into her personal checking
account and converted the funds to her own personal use. She
knowingly converted all but $575.00 of the funds Mondesir
paid her. She thereby violated Colo. RPC 8.4(c).
III.
SANCTIONS
The ABA
Standards and Colorado Supreme Court caselaw guide
the imposition of sanctions for lawyer
misconduct.[7] When imposing a sanction after finding
lawyer misconduct, the Hearing Board must consider the duty
the lawyer violated, the lawyer's mental state, and the
actual or potential injury the lawyer's misconduct
caused. These three variables yield a presumptive sanction
that the Hearing Board may then adjust based on aggravating
and mitigating factors.
ABA
Standard 3 .0 - Duty, Mental State, and Injury
Duty.
The rule violations established on default show that
Respondent breached duties owed to her client, Mondesir,
including her duty to safeguard his funds, her duty to
reasonably communicate with him about his case, and her duty
to reasonably protect his interests after the representation
ended.
Mental
State. The order entering default established that
Respondent knowingly converted Mondesir's retainer in
violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(c). We also find that Respondent
acted knowingly with respect to the remainder of the claims
established on default. Colo. RPC 1.15(A)(a), because she
knew she was depositing Mondesir's retainer into her
checking account; Colo. RPC 1.16(d), by failing to refund
Mondesir's funds, even though she knew she had not
performed work to earn any of that money; and Colo. RPC
1.4(a)(3) and Colo. RPC 1.4(a)(4), because Respondent's
continued and persistent misconduct during the approximately
thirteenmonth representation convinces us that she acted with
a more culpable state of mind.[8]
7
Irjury.
Based on the facts and rule violations established on
default, we find that Respondent caused Mondesir actual
injury when she converted his money and failed to refund to
him $2,584.00 in unearned fees. While Mondesir's document
withdrawing his complaint stated that the grounds for his
complaint had been resolved, we have no evidence that
Respondent returned any more than $575.00 to him or that she
performed services to earn the remainder of his full
retainer. Indeed, because Respondent's interim suspension
in Colorado effectively precludes her from practicing
immigration law, her offer to Mondesir in late April 2025 to
continue with his case if he withdrew his complaint against
her strikes us as not only egregious but ultimately
hollow.[9]
In
addition, we infer harm to the migrant community and to the
legal profession. When a member of the migrant community, in
an attempt to normalize their legal status, hires an
immigration lawyer to navigate the system, that member
depends on the lawyer's knowledge of immigration
law—a highly specialized and often arcane area of law.
When the lawyer betrays that immigration client's trust
and breaches duties the lawyer owes to the client, the lawyer
undercuts public faith in the lawyer-client relationship and
in lawyers generally. This behavior also harms the migrant
community, which is less likely to trust and work within the
immigration system.
ABA
Standards 4.0-7.0 - Presumptive Sanction
ABA
Standard 4.11 sets disbarment as the presumptive
sanction when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and
causes injury or potential injury to a client.
Respondent's knowing violation of Colo. RPC 1.15A(a)
implicates ABA Standard4 .12, which provides for
suspension when a lawyer knows or should know that the lawyer
is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury
or potential injury to a client. For Respondent's Colo.
RPC 1.4 violations, we look to ABA Standard 4
.42(b), under which suspension is generally appropriate when
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or
potential injury to a client. Also applicable here, ABA
Standard 7.2 states that suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that
is a violation of a duty owed as a professional—here,
when Respondent failed to refund Mondesir's unearned fee
in violation of Colo. RPC 1.16—and causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system.
Because
the ABA Standards recommend that in cases involving
multiple types of lawyer misconduct, the ultimate sanction
should be at least consistent with, and generally greater
than, the sanction for the most serious disciplinary
violation, we find that the presumptive sanction for
Respondent's misconduct is disbarment.[10]
8
ABA
Standard 9.0 - Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Aggravating
circumstances include any considerations that justify an
increase in the degree of the sanction to be imposed, while
mitigating factors warrant a reduction in the severity of the
sanction.[11] As explained below, we apply four
factors in aggravation, two of which warrant substantial
weight. No mitigating factors apply.
Aggravating
Factors
Prior
disciplinary offenses - 922(a): The People ask that we
apply this factor based on Respondent's 2017 suspension
in New York for failure to pay required lawyer registration
fees, which in turn triggered her indefinite suspension from
federal immigration practice.[12] The People concede this factor
should be given only minimal weight, noting that the New York
sanction is equivalent to an administrative, rather than a
disciplinary, suspension in Colorado, and that it does not
involve the type of misconduct at issue in this case. Because
we do not view Respondent's prior administrative
suspension as discipline, we decline to apply this factor.
We do,
however, see in Respondent's failure to pay mandatory
registration fees a prelude to her cavalier approach to
practicing law and lassitude toward maintaining her law
license that she has exhibited in this proceeding.
Multiple
offenses - 922(d): The People ask that we apply this
factor based on the five different rule violations in this
case. We decline to do so, as the rule violations here spring
from a common predicate and arise from a single client
matter. Because this factor is not salient to our decision in
this case, we do not apply it.
Bad
faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding -
9.22(e): We apply this factor, consistent with the
PDJ's instruction in the order dated February 6, 2026,
sanctioning Respondent under C.R.C.P. 37(d). Other facts
further support our application of this factor. Most
concerning, Respondent contacted Mondesir and offered to
continue representing him in his immigration case if he
withdrew his request for investigation. At the hearing on the
sanctions, the People's investigator, Scherer, testified
that the People received Mondesir's letter withdrawing
his complaint on May 2, 2025, just over two weeks after the
People petitioned for Respondent's interim suspension.
Scherer also testified that she spoke with Mondesir's
spouse by telephone in August 2025 to discuss the
Mondesirs' appearance at Respondent's hearing in this
matter. The Mondesirs, who reside out of state, did not want
to testify and were not interested in providing remote
testimony, Scherer said. Considering these facts, we regard
Respondent's quid pro quo offer to Mondesir as evidence
that she sought to scuttle the disciplinary proceeding at its
9
inception. As a direct result of her actions, we must decide
this matter without the benefit of Mondesir's testimony.
In
addition, the record of Respondent's selective
participation in this case convinces us that she sought to
obstruct this proceeding in bad faith. As one example, the
quid pro quo offer to Mondesir occurred during her window to
show cause why she should not be suspended on an interim
basis, which she did not do. As another example, Respondent
did not respond to the PDJ's order to show cause
regarding the discovery sanction, in part, on the pretense
that she was awaiting the PDJ's order concerning
jurisdiction. As yet another example, rather than move to set
aside the order entering default as a sanction, Respondent
submitted an unsworn declaration with her prehearing
materials in which she decries that the entry of default
exonerates the People from their burden to prove their case.
These examples convince us that Respondent acted in bad faith
in this proceeding to stifle the flow of information to
prevent the People from making their case. Consequently, we
are tasked with making findings of fact in a vacuum of
evidence, frustrating our role as adjudicators. Accordingly,
we apply this factor and assign it significant weight.
We do
not, however, factor into our analysis Respondent's
absence at the hearing on the sanctions. We need not
determine whether her failure to appear was an honest mistake
or another obstructive act to conclude that she otherwise
litigated this case in bad faith.
Refusal
to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct - 9.22(g). The
People contend that Respondent has refused to acknowledge any
wrongdoing in this matter. We agree. Respondent's lack of
meaningful participation evinces a dismissive attitude toward
this proceeding, which in turn bespeaks a lack of
accountability for her misconduct. We thus apply this factor
and accord it average weight.
Vulnerability
of victim - 9.22(h). We apply this factor, even though
the People do not advocate for it. We do so recognizing that
immigration clients are generally in a vulnerable position
due to their reliance on lawyers to help them navigate a
complex immigration system. Indeed, we do not hesitate to
conclude that Mondesir's decision to withdraw his request
for investigation evinces his own precarious situation. We
would have given this factor significant weight but for the
Mondesirs' decision not to participate in the proceeding.
Substantial
experience in the practice of law - 9.220 The People ask
that we apply this factor because Respondent obtained her
license to practice law in New York in 2003.[13] We agree.
Factoring in her suspension in New York, Respondent has been
licensed to practice law for more than twenty years. That
depth of legal experience and familiarity with her
professional obligations significantly aggravates her
misconduct in this case.
10
Mitigating
Factors
Respondent
has the burden to prove mitigating factors,[14] but she did
not appear at the hearing on the sanctions to testify and
make herself available to cross-examination concerning any
mitigation she might claim. The statements in her unsworn
declaration do not constitute evidence that can be marshaled
to meet that burden. Thus, we are left without evidence of
circumstances that might mitigate her misconduct. We would
have wished, in particular, to consider her testimony
concerning an absence of a prior disciplinary record, any
personal or emotional problems, and the remoteness of her
prior offenses, as those factors strike us as the most likely
to merit mitigating weight here.[15] For instance, Respondent
suggests in her answer and in her unsworn declaration that
obligations surrounding her father's funeral contributed
to a communication breakdown with Mondesir. But Respondent
did not attend the hearing to testify about this or other
mitigating issues. We therefore cannot apply any factors in
mitigation.
We
hasten to add, however, that even if we were to credit
Respondent with significant mitigation based on these
factors, the effect would not overcome the acute aggravation
in this case or steer us from the presumptive sanction of
disbarment.
Analysis
Under ABA Standards and Caselaw
The
Hearing Board heeds the Colorado Supreme Court's
directive to exercise discretion in imposing a sanction,
recognizing that "individual circumstances make
extremely problematic any meaningful comparison of discipline
ultimately imposed in different cases."[16] As such, the
Hearing Board must determine the appropriate sanction on a
case-by-case basis, looking to the ABA Standards for
guidance in the exercise of that discretion. The ABA
Standards offers a theoretical framework that
provides for "the flexibility to select the appropriate
sanction in [a] particular case" after the Hearing Board
carefully considers the applicable aggravating and mitigating
factors.[17]
Guided
by the ABA Standards framework, we begin with a
presumptive sanction of disbarment under ABA
Standard 4.11. Because disbarment is the most severe
sanction available under Colorado's lawyer disciplinary
regime and the ABA Standards, the clear
preponderance of four aggravating factors and no mitigators
confirm that disbarment is the appropriate sanction for
Respondent's misconduct.
Consistent
with the ABA Standards, Colorado Supreme Court
caselaw calls for disbarment when a lawyer knowingly converts
client property and thus injures the client. Knowing
misappropriation of client funds almost always warrants
disbarment unless extraordinary
11
mitigating factors apply.[18] Disbarment is also consonant
with the outcomes in similar discipline cases.[19] In short,
caselaw confirms that disbarment is the appropriate sanction
for Respondent's misconduct.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Disbarment
is the most severe discipline we can impose. We do so here
because the legal authorities that guide us point to
disbarment as the appropriate sanction for Respondent's
misconduct during her client's matter. Respondent's
defense during this proceeding confirms that measure to be
the correct outcome, as we see in her litigation a mirror to
her legal practice on behalf of clients. Her dismissive
approach to defending her law license causes us concern that
she is similarly cavalier about her clients' legal
problems, as embodied in her nonchalance when representing
Mondesir. Further, her disregard for the functions of the
self-regulating legal profession implicitly subverts the
profession itself.
In
short, Respondent has shown us no reason for pause before
imposing discipline. In doing so, we are reminded that the
practice of law is a profession, not an occupation. The legal
profession is set apart by the rules of professional conduct
and the duties that attach to the privilege of holding a
license to practice law. The rules and duties Respondent
transgressed during her client's representation warrant
her disbarment; her subsequent transgressions during this
disciplinary proceeding demand it.
12
V.
ORDER
The
Hearing Board ORDERS:
1.
EKAETTE PATTY-ANNE EDDINGS, New York
attorney registration number 4111217, is
DISBARRED from the practice of law in
Colorado. The disbarment will take effect upon issuance of an
"Order and Notice of Disbarment."[20]
2.
Respondent MUST promptly comply with
C.R.C.P. 242.32(b)-(e), concerning winding up of affairs,
notice to current clients, duties owed in litigation matters,
and notice to other jurisdictions where she is licensed or
otherwise authorized to practice law.
3.
Within fourteen days of issuance of the "Order and
Notice of Disbarment," Respondent MUST
file an affidavit with the PDJ under C.R.C.P. 242.32(f),
attesting to her compliance with C.R.C.P. 242.32.
4. The
parties MUST file any posthearing motions
no later than Tuesday, April 28, 2026. Any
response thereto MUST be filed within seven
days.
5. The
parties MUST file any application for stay
pending appeal no later than the date on which the
notice of appeal is due. Any response thereto
MUST be filed within seven days.
6.
Respondent MUST pay the costs of this
proceeding. The People MUST submit a
statement of costs no later than Tuesday, April 28,
2026. Any response challenging the reasonableness of
those costs MUST be filed within seven days
thereafter.
MARY
KOMINEK LINDEN HEARING BOARD MEMBER, MARK MCINTYRE HEARING
BOARD MEMBER
---------
Notes:
[1] Found in ABA Annotated Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2d ed. 2019).
[2] Sapakoff entered his appearance for
the People on January 16, 2026.
[3] At approximately 9:47 a.m., after
evidence in the case was closed, the PDJ's clerk notified
the PDJ that Respondent had just telephoned the clerk and
told him she mistakenly thought the hearing would begin at
11:00 a.m. On April 7, 2026, the PDJ denied under C.R.C.P.
60(b)(1) Respondent's motion to reopen the hearing, which
she filed after she failed to appear.
[4] At the hearing on the sanctions, the
People's investigator, Scherer, testified that Mondesir
submitted a request for investigation with the People
regarding Respondent's representation of Mondesir and his
spouse.
[5] Compl. ¶ 33 ([sic] throughout).
During her testimony, Scherer clarified that Mondesir signed
his affidavit supporting his request for investigation on
April 14, 2025, but that he submitted the request for
investigation on an earlier date.
[6] In re Kleinsmlth, 2017 CO
101, ¶ 14 (citing People v Varallo, 913 P.2d 1,
10-11 (Colo. 1996)).
[7] See In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43,
46-47 (Colo. 2003).
[8] See People v. Silvola, 915
P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo. 1996) (deeming a lawyer's repeated
misconduct over an extended period to be willful).
[9] See 8 C.F.R. §§
1003.103(a)(1), (4) (providing that the Board of Immigration
Appeals must immediately suspend from federal immigration
practice any lawyer whom a state high court has suspended on
an interim basis pending a final resolution of the underlying
disciplinary matter).
[10] ABA Annotated Standards
Preface at xx.
[11] See ABA Standards
9.21 and 9.31.
[12] See Ex. S1 at 361 -64.
Respondent was reinstated in New York on April 10, 2018. Ex.
S1 at 361. Under the PDJ's determination under C.R.E.
201, we take judicial notice that the Board of Immigration
Appeals reinstated Respondent on August 24, 2018.
[13] In the unsworn declaration
Respondent filed with her prehearing materials, she asserts
that she has practiced law for forty years in jurisdictions
on three different continents. We do not treat
Respondent's statement as evidence, and she has not
sought to introduce exhibits or testimony showing her
licensure in other jurisdictions. Even so, we note that any
additional time as a licensed lawyer beyond our findings
would merely underscore our decision to apply this
factor.
[14] C.R.C.P. 242.30(b)(3).
[15] Addressed, respectively, in ABA
Standards 9.32(a), 9.32(b), 9.32(c), and
9.32(m).
[16] In re Att'y F., 2012 CO
57 ¶ 20 {quoting In re Rosen, 198 P.3d 116, 121
(Colo. 2008)).
[17] Id. ¶ 3.
[18] Compare People v. Varallo,
913 P.2d at 10-11 (Colo. 1996) (concluding that a
lawyer's absence of prior discipline and evidence of good
character did not overcome the presumption of disbarment when
the lawyer knowingly used his client's funds for his
personal benefit), with People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d
109, 110 (Colo. 1995) (suspending rather than disbarring a
lawyer who knowingly converted client funds, where
"extraordinary and tragic factors" applied in
mitigation, including the emergence of a mental disorder that
caused the misconduct); see also Kleinsmith, ¶
14 (reaffirming disbarment as the condign sanction for
knowing conversion and citing People v. Lavenhar,
934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997)).
[19] See, e.g., People v.
Caldbeck, 466 P.3d 1174, 1178-79 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2020)
(in a default proceeding, disbarring a Pennsylvania-licensed
lawyer who failed to pursue his clients' immigration
matters and converted their unearned fees); People v.
Topper 470 P.3d 821, 823-24, 826 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2016)
(in a default proceeding, disbarring a lawyer whose
misconduct included accepting retainers from two clients,
performing little to no work on their cases, failing to
return the clients' unearned fees, and failing to respond
to one client's attempts to contact the lawyer);
People v. Heaphy, 470 P.3d 728, 731 (Colo. O.P.D.J.
2015) (disbarring a lawyer for knowingly converting
settlement funds belonging to his client and for failing to
respond to the client's communications, among other
misconduct).
[20] In general, an order and notice of
sanction will issue thirty-five days after a decision is
entered under C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)(6). In some instances, the
order and notice may issue later than the thirty-five days by
operation of C.R.C.P. 242.35, C.R.C.P. 59, or other
applicable rules.