Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court District Court,
City and County of Denver, Case Nos. 23CR4306 & 21CR6486
Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Beth McCann, District
Attorney, Second Judicial District Ellen Michaels, Deputy
District Attorney Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Megan A. Ring, Public
Defender Christopher Smallwood, Deputy Public Defender
Denver, Colorado
2
CHIEF
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in
which JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL,
JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
3
OPINION
MÁRQUEZ CHIEF JUSTICE
¶1
In this interlocutory appeal under section 16-12-102(2),
C.R.S. (2024) and C.A.R. 4.1, the People seek review of the
trial court's order suppressing drug evidence found in
Defendant Arthur S. Mills's vehicle. The trial court
reasoned that because the Denver Police Department
("Denver Police") did not apply for a warrant to
search Mills's vehicle until three days after seizing it,
the delay rendered the seizure unconstitutional.
¶2
In general, we assess the reasonableness of a seizure by
weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion on an
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the government's law enforcement interests
asserted to justify the intrusion. That overarching balance
of interests applies in this context as well. To determine
whether a seizure of property based on probable cause was
reasonably extended to apply for a warrant to search that
property, we establish a four-factor balancing test that
considers (1) the length of the delay, (2) the nature and
strength of the individual's possessory interest in the
property seized, (3) the strength of the government's
justification for the delay, and (4) the government's
diligence in applying for a search warrant.
¶3
Applying that balancing test here, we conclude that the delay
between the initial seizure and the search of Mills's
vehicle was reasonable. We therefore
4
reverse the trial court's suppression order, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
On a Saturday afternoon during a covert surveillance
operation in a high crime area of Denver, undercover police
officers observed Mills drive into a Walgreens parking lot.
Officer Derek Streeter witnessed a man enter Mills's
vehicle, Mills grab a backpack from the back seat, and the
two men huddle over the center console-behaviors that the
officer believed were consistent with a drug transaction. The
other man left Mills's vehicle. Neither went into the
Walgreens. While Mills was still in the parking lot, Officer
Streeter learned that Mills had a substantial history of
narcotics distribution. When Mills drove out of the parking
lot without using proper turn signals, Officer Streeter
notified fellow officers to make a traffic stop.
¶5
During the traffic stop, Mills failed to produce a
driver's license or proof of insurance for the Range
Rover he was driving; instead, he provided insurance for
three other high-end vehicles. He also used three different
cell phones during the stop.
¶6
Mills refused to get out of the car and became contentious
and uncooperative. Although the officers believed they had
probable cause to arrest him, they did not want to break into
the vehicle and physically remove him. The
5
officers decided to consult Detective Kevin Burke, one of
four narcotics detectives, all of whom were off duty.
Detective Burke instructed the officers to secure the
vehicle, hold it for him, and obtain a search warrant instead
of conducting a search on-scene. Burke also informed the
officers that he would take the investigation from there. The
officers issued Mills a citation for driving without a valid
driver's license and insurance. They permitted him to
have an acquaintance come to the scene to move the vehicle a
short distance to park it legally. Mills and the acquaintance
left the car, and the officers impounded the vehicle.
¶7
Detective Burke did not take any action to apply for a
warrant to search the vehicle later that evening or Sunday,
while he remained off duty. Upon his return to work on
Monday, he requested a K-9 sniff of the vehicle. The K-9
detective informed Detective Burke that the unit was off duty
on Mondays and asked if the sniff could be performed on
Tuesday. Detective Burke assented, believing that because the
police had seven days to execute a search warrant, they could
hold the vehicle for up to a week. He spent Monday
familiarizing himself with the case, drafting the search
warrant, and attending to other cases.
¶8
On Tuesday, Detective Burke contacted the K-9 unit again. The
K-9 unit performed the dog sniff that morning, and the dog
alerted to the presence of drugs inside the vehicle.
Detective Burke completed the search warrant application and
6
affidavit and submitted them late that afternoon. Just over
an hour later, a judge signed the warrant.
¶9
Over the following few days, Denver Police tried
unsuccessfully to obtain Mills's cooperation to search
his vehicle without forcing entry. Detective Burke eventually
entered the vehicle through a side window and found a
backpack in the car containing methamphetamine, heroin,
cocaine, fentanyl, and two digital scales with white residue.
The People charged Mills with four counts of possession with
intent to distribute a controlled substance under section
18-18-405, C.R.S. (2024).[1]
¶10
Mills later filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered
from his vehicle. As relevant here, Mills argued that the
officers lacked probable cause to seize the vehicle and even
if the initial seizure was valid, Denver Police unlawfully
extended the seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution and article II, section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution because Detective Burke waited until
the following Tuesday to apply for a warrant. The People
responded that the officers had probable cause to seize the
vehicle and the delay in seeking the warrant was reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances.
7
¶11
Following a hearing, the Denver County District Court granted
Mills's motion. In an oral ruling, the trial court
concluded that although Denver Police had probable cause to
seize Mills's vehicle, they extended the seizure for a
period that was longer than necessary to apply for a search
warrant. Citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), the trial court reasoned that the reasonableness of
any delay in this context is grounded in necessity; that is,
"the car or item that is being seized to obtain a
warrant can be held for whatever period is necessary to
obtain the warrant." Applying this standard, the court
concluded that the seizure of Mills's vehicle was
unreasonable because the court was "unconvinced . . .
that the car was held for only the period of time necessary
to obtain the warrant." After expressing concern that
the off-duty detective did not seek a warrant over the
weekend, the court ultimately concluded that the car was
seized for longer than necessary because the warrant could
have been obtained on Monday, when Detective Burke got back
to work.[2] The court therefore suppressed the
evidence of narcotics found in the vehicle.
¶12
The People filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial
court denied. The People then filed this interlocutory appeal
under C.A.R. 4.1, seeking relief from the trial court's
ruling.
8
¶13
Because we agree with the People that law enforcement's
three-day delay in applying for the search warrant was
reasonable under the circumstances of this case, we reverse
the trial court's suppression order.
II.
Standard of Review
¶14
A trial court's suppression order presents a mixed
question of law and fact. People v. McIntyre, 2014
CO 39, ¶ 13, 325 P.3d 583, 586-87. We defer to the trial
court's findings of historical fact when competent
evidence in the record supports them. People v.
Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 732, 738.
However, we review the legal effect of those facts de novo.
People v. Deaner, 2022 CO 43, ¶ 10, 517 P.3d
66, 69.
III.
Analysis
¶15
First, we establish that when the police delay seeking a
warrant to search property they have seized with probable
cause, the constitutionality of the extended seizure turns on
the reasonableness of the delay. Next, we set forth a
balancing test for determining whether law enforcement's
delay in seeking a warrant in such circumstances is
reasonable. Finally, we apply the new test to the facts
before us.
9
A.
Reasonableness Is the Touchstone for Assessing the
Constitutionality of a Seizure
¶16
Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable
searches and seizures," U.S. Const. amend.
IV,[3]
whether the seizure here was unconstitutional turns on
whether it was reasonable. Indeed, the Supreme Court and this
court have consistently interpreted questions involving the
Fourth Amendment through the lens of reasonableness.
People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15, ¶ 20, 500 P.3d
1075, 1079 ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness." (citing Brigham City
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))).
¶17
In general, seizures of personal property are unreasonable
unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant based on probable
cause. Illinois v. McArthur,
10
531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). However, if the police have
probable cause to believe that a person's property
contains contraband or evidence of a crime and it is
necessary to seize or secure the property immediately to
prevent its destruction or disappearance, the Fourth
Amendment allows them to seize the property without a
warrant-so long as they follow up by applying for a warrant
to search the property. United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 701 (1983); United States v. Smith, 967
F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir. 2020).
¶18
Law enforcement may not seize and hold property indefinitely
without seeking a warrant to search that property. In other
words, when officers seize property for a search but
"fail to seek a search warrant, at some point the delay
becomes unreasonable" and runs afoul of the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029,
1032 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Moya v. United States,
761 F.2d 322, 325 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Segura
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984) ("[A]
seizure reasonable at its inception because [it was] based
upon probable cause may become unreasonable as a result of
its duration or for other reasons."). The question thus
becomes whether a delay by the police in seeking the warrant
renders a seizure unconstitutional.
¶19
Mills relies on Chambers to argue that the proper
standard of reasonableness is necessity; that is, that a
vehicle may be seized and held without a warrant only for
"whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for
the search." 399 U.S. at
11
51. But Chambers did not actually apply a necessity
standard. There, the police stopped a station wagon that
matched the description of a vehicle involved in a robbery an
hour earlier. Id. at 44. Because one of the station
wagon's occupants also matched the description of a
suspect in the robbery, the police arrested the occupants,
drove the vehicle to the police station, and searched it
without a warrant. Id. The Court upheld the
warrantless search of the vehicle at the police station,
reasoning that there was probable cause to search the vehicle
when it was initially stopped and that an immediate search of
a car is constitutionally permissible because a vehicle is
movable and is thus a "fleeting target" for a
search. Id. at 51-52. The Court observed that,
"we see no [constitutional] difference between . . .
seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable
cause issue to a magistrate and . . . carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant." Id. at 52.
It concluded that either course was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. In sum, although
Chambers mentioned that property may be "held
without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain
a warrant for [a] search," id. at 51, the
police chose to conduct a warrantless search in that case,
id. at 44. In other words, Chambers did not
analyze a situation in which the police seized a vehicle and
then held it to seek a warrant. Chambers therefore
cannot be read to establish a rule limiting police to holding
a seized vehicle for "only whatever period is
necessary" to obtain a warrant.
12
¶20
More recently in McArthur, the Court upheld as
lawful police officers' actions in restricting a resident
from re-entering his trailer for two hours while they sought
a search warrant for marijuana. 531 U.S. at 332. In assessing
the reasonableness of the officers' actions, the Court
noted that the restraint was imposed for a limited period
that was "no longer than reasonably necessary for the
police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant."
Id. In so doing, however, the Court did not purport
to establish a necessity standard; indeed, it later remarked
that it had never "held unlawful a temporary seizure
that was supported by probable cause and was designed to
prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently
obtained a warrant in a reasonable period."
Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
¶21
Having confirmed that the touchstone for the Fourth Amendment
analysis in this context remains reasonableness, we now turn
to the appropriate factors to determine whether a delay in
applying for a search warrant renders an earlier seizure
based on probable cause unreasonable.
B.
Courts Should Apply a Balancing Test to Determine the
Reasonableness of a Delay in Seeking a Warrant
¶22
Courts generally assess the reasonableness of a seizure by
balancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion." Place, 462 U.S. at 703; see
also McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331 ("[W]e balance
13
the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to
determine if the intrusion was reasonable."). In
assessing the reasonableness of a seizure that is extended to
apply for a search warrant, federal courts have weighed the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the
length of the seizure and the nature and strength of the
individual's possessory interest. In Smith, for
example, the Second Circuit instructed courts to consider the
length of the delay in seeking a search warrant, the nature
of the seized property and its importance to the defendant,
and whether the defendant's property interest had been
reduced by consenting to the seizure or voluntarily
relinquishing control of the property to a third party. 967
F.3d 198, 206-08 (2d Cir. 2020). Similarly, in
Burgard, the Seventh Circuit noted that the length
of the seizure is a factor, observing that the longer the
police take to seek a warrant, the greater the infringement
on the person's possessory interest. 675 F.3d 1029, 1033
(7th Cir. 2012). Importantly, the court in Burgard
emphasized that "[o]n the individual person's side
of this balance, the critical question relates to any
possessory interest in the seized object, not to privacy or
liberty interests." Id.
¶23
On the government's side of the balance, federal courts
have evaluated the strength of the government's
justification for the delay and its diligence in applying for
a warrant. In Smith, the court observed that the
fact that an officer has a heavy caseload or is responsible
for a large geographical district does not,
14
without more, justify waiting an unlimited amount of time to
apply for a warrant; rather, the "Fourth Amendment
imposes a time-sensitive duty to diligently apply for a
search warrant if an item has been seized for that very
purpose, and all the more so if the item has been
warrantlessly seized." 967 F.3d at 210. In
Burgard, the court observed that the officer's
delay was not the result of an abdication of his work or the
failure to see any urgency in the matter, but rather because
the officer wanted to "be sure that he had all the
information he needed from the seizing officer" and to
consult with the prosecuting attorney, while attending to his
other duties. 675 F.3d at 1034. The court noted that
"[w]e do not want to discourage this sort of careful,
attentive police work, even if it appears to us that it could
or should have moved more quickly," because
"[e]ncouraging slapdash work could lead to a variety of
other problems." Id.
¶24
Drawing from these cases, we adopt a four-factor balancing
test that weighs the totality of the circumstances, focusing
on (1) the length of the delay, (2) the nature and strength
of an individual's possessory interest in the property
seized, (3) the strength of the government's
justification for the delay, and (4) the government's
diligence in applying for a search warrant.
¶25
The first factor, the length of the delay, is a
context-dependent review of the length of the delay between
the initial seizure and the search warrant application.
See Smith, 967 F.3d at 206-07. Although there is
"no bright line past which a delay
15
becomes unreasonable," the longer the police take to
seek a warrant, generally the greater the infringement on the
individual's possessory interest in the seized property.
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033. If the police have
probable cause to seize an individual's property in the
first place, they usually should be able to promptly
articulate that probable cause in an application for a
warrant. Smith, 967 F.3d at 207.
¶26
The second factor, the nature and strength of the
individual's possessory interest, contains two prongs.
Courts should begin by evaluating the nature of the item
seized. For example, a personal electronic device such as a
smartphone or laptop is likely used by the individual for
communication or the storage of immense amounts of personal
data (much of which may be wholly unrelated to the
investigation for which the item was seized); such items may
carry a stronger possessory interest than a backpack or
suitcase containing less sensitive personal information.
Id. at 208; see also United States v.
Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 614 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
Relatedly,
courts should evaluate the strength of the individual's
possessory interest. For example, courts may take into
account whether the individual's interest may have been
diminished by entrusting the item to a third party, see
United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that a delay after a "seizure is necessarily
less intrusive where 'the owner has relinquished control
16
of the property to a third party'" such as the
United States Parcel Service (quoting Place, 462
U.S. at 705 and n.6)), or reasserted by checking on the
status of the seizure or seeking the return of the item,
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033. Thus, the second factor
considers the degree to which the extended seizure
interrupted the individual's life. Laist, 702
F.3d at 613 (stating that one factor in a court's review
of the reasonableness of an extended seizure is "the
significance of the interference with the person's
possessory interest" (citing Mitchell, 565 F.3d
at 1351)).
¶27
The third factor, the strength of the government's
justification for the delay, objectively examines the
reasonableness of the delay given the resources available to
the government and the complexity of the case.
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033 (noting that when the
police lack "any good explanation" for a delay in
seeking a warrant, "it appears that the state is
indifferent to searching the item and the intrusion on an
individual's possessory interest is less likely to be
justifiable"); Smith, 967 F.3d at 210
(observing that the record in that case did not reflect any
particular investigation or duty that delayed the officer in
applying for a search warrant); United States v.
Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting
that the agent who seized the defendant's property was
called upon to help with indisputably higher priority
undercover operations in other cases).
¶28
The fourth factor examines the government's diligence in
applying for a search warrant. Smith, 967 F.3d at
202 (observing that when the police
17
"temporarily seize a suspect's personal
property" with probable cause and the intent "to
apply for a warrant to search the property for evidence of a
crime...., the Fourth Amendment requires that they act with
diligence to apply for a search warrant"). Consideration
of the government's diligence safeguards against
unreasonably long seizures by imposing a "time-sensitive
duty" to apply for a search warrant. Id. at
210. At the same time, evaluation of the government's
diligence allows for appropriately "careful, attentive
police work." Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034.
¶29
We emphasize that this balancing test is fact-intensive,
context-specific, and dependent on the totality of the
circumstances. Christie, 717 F.3d at 1162
("What reasonably justifies a brief delay . . . may not
reasonably justify a longer one."). Because the standard
is reasonableness, not necessity, the government is not
required to apply for a search warrant at the earliest
possible time or "pursue[] the least intrusive course of
action." United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d
623, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th. Cir. 2002));
see also Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034 (noting that
"police imperfection is not enough to warrant
reversal" because "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight,
courts 'can almost always imagine some alternative means
by which the objectives of the police might have been
accomplished,' but that does not necessarily mean that
the police
18
conduct was unreasonable" (quoting United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985))).
¶30
Having adopted this balancing test, we now apply it to the
facts before us.
C.
Application
¶31
Weighing the factors we have identified, we conclude that the
delay in this case to apply for a search warrant was
reasonable. Accordingly, the extended seizure did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
¶32
First, the three-day delay in this case was relatively brief
(ultimately less than seventy-two hours). This is especially
true considering that much of this time fell over a weekend
while the lead investigating officer was off duty.
Martin, 157 F.3d at 54 (noting that an eleven-day
delay that included two weekends and a holiday "could
explain the difficulty in promptly obtaining the [search]
warrant"). ¶33 Second, we examine the strength and
nature of Mills's possessory interest in the seized
vehicle. Although a vehicle can be used to store personal
possessions and is obviously an important (and sometimes
exclusive) means of transportation, in this case, the record
indicates that Mills had little to no ability to lawfully use
the vehicle because he failed to produce a valid driver's
license or proof of insurance for the vehicle. Furthermore,
nothing in the record suggests that the vehicle was
Mills's essential means of transportation-he appeared to
have three
19
other vehicles at his disposal.[4] The record is also inconclusive
regarding whether Mills's attorney requested that Denver
Police return Mills's vehicle in a message left for
Detective Burke on the night when the police seized the
vehicle.
¶34
Third, we examine the strength of Denver Police's
justification for the delay. Even though the police believed
they had probable cause to seize and search the vehicle for
evidence of drug-related crimes, Mills's conduct raised
concerns for officer safety that prompted a more cautious
approach. The record also reflects that the on-scene officers
believed that a K-9 sniff could not be performed while the
vehicle was occupied, and Mills was refusing to get out of
it. Moreover, there were no K-9 units on duty or nearby at
the time the vehicle was pulled over. After Denver Police
seized the vehicle, Detective Burke determined that waiting
for a K-9 sniff would be an appropriate measure to take
before seeking a search warrant. Although a court may well
have issued a search warrant without the results of a dog
sniff, we do not fault Denver Police for their thoroughness
in arranging for and conducting the K-9 sniff before applying
for the search warrant. We do not wish to discourage the kind
of careful, attentive police work that ultimately serves to
protect defendants' Fourth Amendment interests. See
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034.
20
¶35
Fourth and finally, we evaluate Denver Police's diligence
in applying for the warrant. To be sure, Detective
Burke's mistaken belief that the police could hold the
vehicle for a week because they had seven days to execute a
warrant did not justify a delay. That said, he requested a
K-9 sniff shortly after he got back to work on Monday and
continued working on the search warrant application while he
waited for the K-9 unit to become available. Cf.
Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1352-53 (holding that a delay in
obtaining a warrant was not justified but acknowledging that
some delay to seek assistance of another officer may be
reasonable). The K-9 unit performed a search the next day,
and the detective submitted a search warrant and affidavit
that afternoon. That Detective Burke could have submitted an
application for a search warrant on Saturday, Sunday, or
Monday does not make his efforts any less diligent.
Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1034 (noting that even when a
police officer may have been able to work more quickly, an
officer delaying to "be sure that he had all the
information he needed from the seizing officer . . . while
attending to his other law enforcement duties" does not
"necessarily mean that the police conduct was
unreasonable"). In the end, Detective Burke submitted
the search warrant application on the same day that he
finished gathering all material facts regarding probable
cause that he included in the application. Cf.
Smith, 967 F.3d at 207 (finding that this factor weighed
substantiality in favor of the defendant where every fact set
forth in the search warrant application that was
21
material to probable cause was known to the police on the
same day the police seized the property in question).
¶36
Weighing these four factors, we conclude that the three-day
delay here did not render the seizure unreasonable. Although
Tuesday was not the earliest possible time the
warrant application could have submitted, it was still
submitted within a reasonable time. Thus, the trial
court erred in suppressing the evidence of the narcotics
found inside the vehicle based on the delay.[5]
IV.
Conclusion
¶37
Weighing the length of the delay, the nature and strength of
Mills's possessory interest in the vehicle seized, the
strength of Denver Police's justification for the delay,
and Denver Police's diligence in applying for a search
warrant, we conclude that the delay between the initial
seizure of Mills's vehicle and the search warrant
application was reasonable. Thus, the extended seizure was
not unconstitutional. We reverse the trial court's
suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
---------
Notes:
[1] This case was joined with two other
pending drug distribution cases against Mills, and the trial
court consolidated them into case number 23CR4306.
[2] The court also ruled that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not
apply.
[3] As noted above, Mills contends that
the seizure of his vehicle violated both the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution and article II, section 7 of the
Colorado Constitution. However, because "[t]he Colorado
and U.S. Constitutions are generally coextensive with regard
to warrantless searches and seizures," we discuss only
the Fourth Amendment in this opinion. Eddie's Leaf
Spring Shop & Towing LLC v. Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 218 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo. 2009) (citing
People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1358-59 (Colo.
1997)). Mills offers no reason to treat article II, section 7
differently in this context. People v. Taylor, 41
P.3d 681, 686 (Colo. 2002) ("The essential purpose of
the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a
standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials including law enforcement agents, in
order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions.") (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979))); cf. People v.
McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶¶ 41-42, 446 P.3d 397,
407-08 (reasoning that the legalization of marijuana under
article XVIII, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution
"expanded the protections of article II, section 7 to
provide a reasonable expectation of privacy to engage in the
lawful activity of possessing marijuana in
Colorado").
[4] We reject the People's argument
that Mills's possessory interest in his vehicle was
weakened because it was subject to civil forfeiture. The
vehicle was not subject to civil forfeiture during the
initial seizure or subsequent search.
[5] Because we conclude the delay was
reasonable, we need not address the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.