The Oritani

40 F.2d 522, 1930 A.M.C. 230, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1854
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided December 11, 1929·No. 111 of 1925·Published·Cited by 17 cases

Opinion

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

On the night of April 21, 1925, at 11:45 o’clock, the steamship Oritani, leaving the harbor of Port Morant, Jamaica, with a cargo of bananas bound for Philadelphia, stranded upon a coral reef near the entrance of the harbor. She remained fast on the reef until 4:45 in the afternoon of the following day, at which time she was pulled off by a wrecking tug and then proceeded under -her own power to Kingston, where she was laid up several days for repairs made necessary by the stranding. In order to float her it had been necessary to jettison part of the cargo, and, owing to the fact that ventilation in the hold was entirely dependent upon the vessel’s forward motion, the remainder of the bananas began to ripen rapidly. As a result of the stranding it became necessary in the interests of all parties concerned to sell the oargo at Kingston. The salvage was trifling and the cargo may be considered as almost a total loss.

This is an action in rem by the Atlantic Fruit Company, Limited, owners of the cargo, against the vessel to recover damages for the loss of the cargo. An answer has been filed by the Ormes Steamship Company, Limited, of Montreal, Canada, claimant and owner of the vessel. At the time of the stranding, the Oritani was under a seven months’ charter to the Atlantic Navigation Corporation, which for the purposes of this suit is the same corporation as the Atlantic Fruit Company, Limited, the libelant.

The theory upon which the action proceeds is that under the third section of the Harter Act (27 Stat. 445, 46 USC § 192 [46 USCA § 192]) if the vessel was unseaworthy in any particular at the beginning of the voyage, the owners are responsible for the loss of the cargo without regard to whether the stranding was directly or indirectly caused by such unseaworthiness. The libelant’s position is based upon the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in The Willdomino, 300 F. 5,11. In that ease the court held that: “If the carrier fails to meet that burden [the burden of proving the ship seaworthy when she sailed] he is liable for damage to the cargo resulting from negligence of the master and crew in the navigation or management of the vessel, and the carrier is so liable wholly without regard to whether or not there was any causal connection between the lack of due diligence to make the ship seaworthy in all respeets and the loss caused by the negligence in navigation or in the management of the vessel.” The claimant has presented an interesting and forceful argument in which he challenges the soundness of the rule so stated; to which argument might have been added the suggestion that in the Willdomino Case there was at least a remote causal connection between the unseaworthiness, and the stranding, in that the shortage of fuel which was held to have rendered the vessel unseaworthy required a deviation from her course which took her into the difficult waters in which she stranded. [1-3] These considerations, however, are for the Circuit Court of Appeals, should the matter be presented to them. There can be no mistake about what was decided in the Will-domino Case, and I am bound to follow it. The interpretation placed upon the third section of the Harter Act in that decision is contained in the following propositions, which ■are correctly stated by the libelant in his brief: (1) That the exercise of due diligence by the vessel owner is a condition precedent to the operation of the exemptions contained in the act; (2) that the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence is upon the vessel owner; and (3) that the due diligence must have been exercised in all respeets wholly without regard to any causal action between the vessels wholly without regard to any causal action between the vessel’s seaworthiness and the subsequent loss. To these rules may be added the following corollaries, applicable in the ease now before the court but not covered by the Willdomino decision: (4) That if the owner accepting the burden of proof shows that the vessel at the time of sailing was in point of fact seaworthy in all respects and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, he will be held to have exercised the due diligence required by the statute, and will be entitled to exemption from responsibility for faults of navigation; (5) that upon the question of seaworthiness at the time of sailing, evidence of the condition and performance of the vessel and her mechanical equipment during the subsequent voyage may be considered. The last of the propositions above stated disposes of the libelant’s criticism of what he terms ex post facto evidence of seaworthiness. Retrospectant evidence is always relevant to prove a fact and is universally accepted both in law and in the ordi *524 nary conduct of human affairs as having probative value. See The F. & T. Lupton (D. C.) 182 F. 144.

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The Oritani, 40 F.2d 522, 1930 A.M.C. 230, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1854 (E.D. Pa. 1929).

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