The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc., Michael Miller, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson v. Quartzview, Inc., Roger Haas, Simon P. Westbrook, Douglas W. Charlton, and Does 1 through 100

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 27, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-00376
StatusUnknown

This text of The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc., Michael Miller, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson v. Quartzview, Inc., Roger Haas, Simon P. Westbrook, Douglas W. Charlton, and Does 1 through 100 (The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc., Michael Miller, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson v. Quartzview, Inc., Roger Haas, Simon P. Westbrook, Douglas W. Charlton, and Does 1 through 100) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc., Michael Miller, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson v. Quartzview, Inc., Roger Haas, Simon P. Westbrook, Douglas W. Charlton, and Does 1 through 100, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THE ORIGINAL SIXTEEN TO ONE MINE, INC., a California Corporation; 12 MICHAEL MILLER; HUGH DAN No. 2:23-cv-00376-TLN-SCR O’NEILL III; ROBERT BESSO, 13 JONATHAN FERRELL; TOM 14 WOODFIN; and KEITH ROBERTSON, ORDER

15 Plaintiffs,

16 v. 17 QUARTZVIEW, INC., a California 18 Corporation; ROGER HAAS; SIMON P. WESTBROOK; DOUGLAS W. 19 CHARLTON; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 20 Defendants. 21

22 23 This matter is before the Court on Defendants Quartzview, Inc. (“Quartzview”), Roger 24 Haas (“Haas”), and Simon P. Westbrook’s (“Westbrook”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to 25 Dismiss.1 (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiffs The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc. (“OSTO”), Hugh Dan 26 1 Defendant Douglas W. Charlton (“Charlton”) filed a notice of joinder to the instant 27 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 39.) When the Court uses “Defendants” in this Order, the Court is referring to Defendants Quartzview, Haas, Westbrook, and Charlton. When the Court uses 28 “individual Defendants” the Court is referring to Defendants Haas, Westbrook, and Charlton. 1 O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson filed an 2 opposition. (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiff Michael Miller (“Plaintiff Miller”) also filed an opposition.2 3 (ECF No. 42.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 46.) For the reasons set forth below, the 4 Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 5 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 6 The factual background of this case is set forth in full in the Court’s March 29, 2024 7 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ first motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) On 8 February 25, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging claims for the 9 following: manipulation of securities to gain control; declaratory relief; violation of California 10 Corporations Code §§ 25400–25304; breach of contract by OSTO against Quartzview; inducing 11 breach of contract; elder financial abuse; theft in violation of California Penal Code § 484; and 12 unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200. (ECF No. 13 37.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on March 17, 2025. (ECF No. 38.) 14 II. STANDARD OF LAW 15 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 17 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 18 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See 19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the 20 complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon 21 which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 22 “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment 23 motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz 24 v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 25

26 2 When the Court uses “OSTO Plaintiffs” in this Order, the Court is referring to Plaintiffs 27 OSTO, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, Keith Robertson. When the Court uses “Plaintiffs” in this Order, the Court is referring to the OSTO Plaintiffs and 28 Plaintiff Michael Miller. 1 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 2 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every 3 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 4 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 5 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 6 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 7 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 8 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 9 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 10 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 11 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 12 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 13 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 14 statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove 15 facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 16 been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 17 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 18 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 19 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 21 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 22 misconduct alleged.” Id. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability 23 requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 24 Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 25 draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 26 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may only consider the complaint, any exhibits 27 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 28 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 1 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 2 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 3 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 4 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 5 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 6 III. ANALYSIS 7 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiffs’ 8 first cause of action seeks relief for Defendants’ manipulation of securities to gain control in 9 violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Act”) § 10(b). (ECF No.

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The Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc., Michael Miller, Hugh Dan O’Neill III, Robert Besso, Jonathan Ferrell, Tom Woodfin, and Keith Robertson v. Quartzview, Inc., Roger Haas, Simon P. Westbrook, Douglas W. Charlton, and Does 1 through 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-original-sixteen-to-one-mine-inc-michael-miller-hugh-dan-oneill-caed-2025.