The Old Point Comfort

187 F. 765, 109 C.C.A. 513, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMay 2, 1911
DocketNo. 994
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 187 F. 765 (The Old Point Comfort) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Old Point Comfort, 187 F. 765, 109 C.C.A. 513, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225 (4th Cir. 1911).

Opinion

BRAWLEY, District Judge.

A collislbn occurred at half past 2 o’clock on the morning of March 27, 1910, between the schooner bound down Chesapeake Bay and the steamer bound up, at a point a little west of the center of the bay off Bloody Point, the weather being perfectly clear with a light wind from the northeast, the schooner striking the steamer at right angles about 20 feet abaft the stem on her starboard side, her bowsprit penetrating the steamer’s side, inflicting a slight damage to the steamer, and resulting in the sinking of the schooner. There are cross-libels, consolidated and heard to[766]*766gether, and the decree of the court below, which heard the testimony of all the witnesses, is against,the steamer. The opinion of the court seems to have been delivered orally and afterwards reduced to writing and filed. It contains no specific findings of fact. Such findings of fact by a judge who has had the advantage of hearing the testimony would be justly entitled to great weight here. In so far as it relates to the facts, the following seems to he all that is pertinent:

■ “You have taken, Mr. Hayne (proctor for the steamer), a certain hypothesis, that is supported by the testimony on your side, and, assuming one cardinal fact to be fixed, you have demonstrated beyond any question that the decree of the court ought to he for you, to the extent of holding the schooner also in fault. There is no doubt in the world about that. The only trouble of it all is that you assume that the north-northeast course has been fixed absolutely, and you decline to accept the south by west course. ISfow, the collision may have occurred as a result, either of your not being on a north-nortlieast course, or of the schooner not being on a south by west course. I have no means of reconciling those two conflicting courses, except by looking at the witnesses and making up my mind which of them, on the whole, is giving the testimony that impresses me as most likely to be true.”

He then states his belief that the witnesses for the schooner have told the truth, and decrees accordingly. Our opinion, after a careful examination of the testimony, is that the steamer was on a north-northeast course, and that the schooner was, immediately before the -collision, on a south by west course; but, as this has led us to a conclusion different to that of the learned judge below, it is proper that we should state the facts somewhat in detail.

[1] It is apparent from the government charts that the noythnortheast course is the true course from Poplar Island to Sandy Point-, which is the locality traversed by the steamer, and there is always a presumption that a vessel takes the usual and customary course. As said by Judge Brown in The Alberta (D. C.) 23 Fed. 810:

“The probability that a vessel bound from one headland to another will take the usual and direct course between them is so strong that a deviation from such a course without adequate cause ought to be established by the clearest preponderance of testimony.”

“ The overwhelming preponderance of testimony is that the steamer was on a north-northeast course. All the witnesses on the steamer testify that she was on that course, directl)'-, positively, and consistently, and there is no positive testimony to the contrary. All the probabilities and presumptions being in harmony with the uncontradicted testimony of those who were on the deck of the steamer, we think it established beyond a doubt that the steamer was on this course. The court below has not found to the contrary, but its opinion seems to be that if this, which it states to be a “cardinal fact,” is established, it would be bo'und to hold the schooner also in fault as at least contributing to the collision, saying: “There is no doubt in the world about that.” The opinion is puzzling, in that it seems to hold that it was disputed in the court below on the part of the steamer that the schooner was on a south by west course before the collision. Such has not been the contention here; on the contrary, it is a part of the steamer’s case that the schooner was, immediately before the collision, on a south by west course, and that she had changed her course [767]*767from a southwest course to a south, by west course, and it is this-change of course that is relied upon by the steamer as her exculpation.

[2] There is no dispute as to the law or the rules of navigation applicable to this case. One of these rules requires the steamer to keep out of the way of the sailing vessel, but there is a corresponding obligation on the sailing vessel to keep her course. The vessels were about a mile apart when they saw each other; the steamer going up at the rate of about 10 miles an hour, and the schooner coming down with a very light wind at a speed of about 2l/2 miles an hour. Obviously, in these circumstances, there was risk of collision, and it was the duty of the steamer to keep out of the way of the other vessel, and, if necessary, slacken her speed or stop or reverse. Admittedly she did neither; but it does not follow, because there was a collision, that the steamer is at fault for failing to slacken her speed or stop. She is required to do this “if necessary.” She is not so required if the course of the other vessel is such that there is no danger of a collision. The duties imposed upon vessels in this condition are of a mutual character, and it is as much the duty of the sailing vessel to keep her course as oE the steamer to keep out of the wajc A change of course on the part of the schooner is equally as unlawful as any dereliction that may be imputed to the steamer.

[3] We will now consider the testimony as to the navigation of the schooner. Her master and all of his witnesses testify-that from Sandy Point down to the time of the collision he was running on a south by west course, and that at no time was there any change of course. The proctor for the steamer contends that a departure from Sandy Point, say 500 yards, as testified by the witnesses for the schooner, continued on a south by west course without change, would land the schooner ashore at Bloody Point. The proctor for libelant contends that by this course the schooner would pass Bloody Point about a mile to the westward. As it is admitted that the collision did not occur near Bloody Point, but to the westward of the center of the bay, which is said to be about two miles to the westward of Sandy Point, it is unnecessary to decide between these conflicting theories, for we are satisfied, from a consideration of all the testimony'and from the physical facts, that the schooner, when first seen by the witnesses on board the steamer, was not upon a south by west course, but upon a southwest course, and such was the testimony oí Robim son, the master of the schooner, before the inspectors, at an examination on the day following the hearing before the court, in answer to this question by one of the inspectors:

“Q. Wliat course was you steering when you first saw her? A. S. W. course.'’

All the witnesses on the schooner testify substantially that they first saw the tights of the steamer over their port bow. Johnson, the mate of the schooner, testifies that:

When he first saw the steamer both lights were showing clear. “It seems like in about a minute's time when she was coming she showed her red light. It was showing clearer than the green light was, because her stern light was [768]

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Bluebook (online)
187 F. 765, 109 C.C.A. 513, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 4225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-old-point-comfort-ca4-1911.