The New-York & Harlem Railroad v. Lyon

16 Barb. 651, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 128
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 12, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 16 Barb. 651 (The New-York & Harlem Railroad v. Lyon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The New-York & Harlem Railroad v. Lyon, 16 Barb. 651, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 128 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1853).

Opinion

S. B. Strong, J.

The warrant under which the defendant claims a justification for seizing and selling the plaintiffs’ cars in the town of Bedford, required him, as collector of that town, to collect from the several persons named in the assessment roll annexed to it the several - sums mentioned in the last column on each page, opposite to their respective names : and [653]*653authorizes him, in case any of them should refuse or neglect to pay such sum, to levy the same by distress and sale of his goods and chattels. The defendant insists that the plaintiffs are named in the assessment roll annexed to his warrant, and that therefore he was authorized, -on their refusal to pay the tax, which was proved on the trial, to take and sell their personal property in the town of Bedford. The plaintiffs contend that they are not named at all in the roll; or that if they are, there is sufficient in that paper to show that it was done without competent authority. If the plaintiffs are right in either of these positions, the alleged justification must fail. The warrant does not authorize the seizure or sale of the property of persons not, named, or whose names it is apparent from the face of the papers, the assessors had no right to set down. What is stated in the roll, so far as it relates to the plaintiffs, is in a part of it separate from the assessment of the property of the taxable inhabitants of the town, in a first column, headed “non-resident,” and in the following words : “ Harlem Rail Road, about 6 miles track and three stations.” The jury found by their verdict that the plaintiffs are generally designated as “ The Harlem Rail Road”; and although that is not their corporate name, yet it resembles it sufficiently to denote the company if it is apparent that it was so intended by the assessors. Its direct and more appropriate application is to the road itself, and the defendant was not authorized, nor am I, to interpret it as the nominative of the company, without some correspondent evidence; and in this case there was none. I am, however, unwilling to decide this case simply upon verbal criticisms, and shall therefore consider the more substantial question, whether the assessors are authorized by the statute to insert the names of non-resident owners in their rolls.

It is apparent from the first section of title 1 of the chapter of the revised statutes relative to the assessment and collection of taxes, that it was designed to make provision for the assessment and taxation of all lands and all personal estate within this state, subject to certain exemptions which are inap- . plicable to this case. By the 2d title of the same chapter, the [654]*654lands in each ward and town are divided into two classes ; those of residents, and of non-residents. There is no other specification or distinction. It is true that the third section of this title defines the “lands of non-residents” as unoccupied lands not owned by a person residing in the town or ward where the same are situated; and it was contended by the counsel for the defendants that, as the-road was confessedly occupied by the plaintiffs, as was stated in their complaint, the provisions of the statute relative to the assessment of non-residents were inapplicable. That might be so, if the word “unoccupied” was used to distinguish a part only of the lands of non-residents. ,If that had been the design, the article “the” should have been prefixed to the word “ unoccupied.” As the sentence stands, “ unoccupied -lands, not owned by a person residing in the ward or town ” may well be considered as a phrase and its definition. The statute may thus be construed to mean the absence of residentiary occupation by the owner. That this is the true construction, is, I think, evident from the following considerations. There is no provision in the statute, for the assessment of the lands of persons residing out of the ward or town, whether occupied in fact or vacant, except as the lands of non-residents. The article of the revised statutes in which the provision is inserted purports to designate the place in which property generally is to be assessed. Ho exception is mentioned, and there can be no reason why any should be inferred. There is no provision in the statute, nor in any subsequent act, for the collection of unpaid taxes, except upon the lands of residents or non-residents as designated by the statute. The unpaid tax on the land of a resident may be imposed the following year upon the same land; and by the fifth section of the act of April 10, 1850, if that and the tax for the succeeding year shall remain unpaid or uncollected, the same proceeding shall be had thereon as if it was the land of a non-resident. When the tax upon the land of a non-resident remains unpaid, the land may be eventually sold by the state comptroller. All these provisions have reference to the designation used in the statutes, and if they do not embrace the lands actually occupied by non-residents, they [655]*655cannot be assessed; or, should they be assessed, there is no provision to coerce the ultimate payment of the tax. The 27th section of the 3d title of the chapter of the revised statutes providing for the imposition and collection of taxes makes provision for the eventual collection of taxes on any farm or lot of land assessed to a resident, which shall be returned as unpaid, in consequence of such premises becoming vacant by the removal of the occupant.” This has reference to his removal from the ward or town, and implies that such removal would put an end to the occupancy, as the term is used in the statute. There are other provisions in the statute, confirmatory of this interpretation, but I deem it unnecessary to quote them.

The remaining question is whether the assessors are authorized to name in their rolls the actual or supposed owners of what the statute denominates non-resident lands. They are expressly required to set down in a particular column the names of all the taxable inhabitants of their town or ward. There is no provision requiring or authorizing them to set down the names of non-residents. On the contrary, they are required to insert in a column, similar to that containing the names of the residents, and apparently as a substitute therefor, descriptions of the lands of such non-residents. The only reference to the names of the owners is in the provision for the description of a subdivision of a tract, where they are required to put down in a first column the number of the lot without the name of the owner. By the 26th section of title 2, the assessors are required to certify, and by the 8th section of the act of April 15, 1851, they are required to swear, that their assessment roll contains a true statement of the aggregate amount of the taxable personal estate of each and every person named in the said roll, over and above the amount of his debts and taxable stocks. Now, as they cannot insert in their roll the amount of the taxable personal estate of non-residents, this provision, construed literally, implies that their names should not be inserted at all. If it had been designed that such names should be inserted, the application of this part of the certificate and oath should, and no doubt would, have been expressly restricted to residents.

[656]*656The reason why the names of residents should be inserted in the roll, and those of non-residents omitted, is palpable. The assessors have general jurisdiction to assess the property and thereby effectuate the imposition of a tax upon the residents of their respective towns and wards.

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40 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 279 (New York Supreme Court, 1884)
People ex rel. Buffalo & State Line Railroad v. Fredericks
48 Barb. 173 (New York Supreme Court, 1866)
People ex rel. Hoyt v. Commissioners of Taxes
21 How. Pr. 385 (New York Court of Appeals, 1861)
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23 N.Y. 224 (New York Court of Appeals, 1861)
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Johnson v. Learn
30 Barb. 616 (New York Supreme Court, 1859)

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Bluebook (online)
16 Barb. 651, 1853 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-new-york-harlem-railroad-v-lyon-nysupct-1853.