The New Jersey

18 F. Cas. 77
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 15, 1846·Published

Opinion

BETTS, District Judge.

The proofs show that the sloop Hamlet, owned by the libel-lant, on her passage to New York from Bristol, on the North river, came in collision with the steamboat Nev\ Jersey, owned by the claimant, and was immediately sunk. The occurrence took place in the night time, in October last, on the western side of the river, about half way between Blue Point and Sands’ Dock, a mile or two below Poughkeepsie. The sloop was heavily laden with stone; she had a fair wind, but light and unsteady, and was running nearly directly down the river, about one-tliird its breadth off the west shore. The channel of the river at the place was half a mile wide, with flats each side of it extending a quarter of a mile, making the whole water surface about three-quarters of a mile in width. The early part of the night had been thick and dark, and the wind strong from the north. At the time of the collision, the wind had much subsided; sailing vessels were floating upon a slack tide at the rate of from two to four miles the hour, and could be seen at a distance of from a half to a mile off. The steamboat was proceeding, with one barge in tow attached to her larboard side, at a. speed estimated on board to be six miles the hour, and by persons upon vessels she met and passed, at from ten to twelve miles. The endeavor of the libellant has been to show that the steamboat was negligently headed across the bows'ifof the sloop, and crowded so' near to her track as to come afoul of her, and cause her loss. The effort of the claimant has been to prove that the steamboat was properly conducted, and that the sloop carelessly, or from 'mismanagement, was turned off her true course,, and run directly upon the steamboat.

The laws of navigation impose no general duties or liabilities on steamboats in relation to collisions with sailing vessels not common between themselves, and to that class of vessels also; each is bound, under all circumstances, to use. with reasonable promptitude and skill, all the means in their power to avoid a threatened collision. Abb. Shipp. (Perkins’ Ed.) 238, 311, 312; Car. & P. 538; Lowry v. The Portland [Case No. 8,583]; 1 W. Rob. Adm. 157. It is only because the means at command by steam vessels are so much more efficacious and ready than those possessed by sailing vessels, and that the consequences of an omission to apply such means are so immediate and destructive, that vessels propelled by steam are 'required to use the more watchful precautions, and to avoid vessels under canvas whenever it is plainly within their power to do so, without waiting for any correspondent exertions on the part of the sailing vessel. The Perth, 3 Hagg. Adm. 414; The Shannon, 2 Hagg. Adm. 173. Yet the vessel under sail must contribute to the common security by holding steadily to her course, or take positive measures, if any are within her power, to prevent a collision, and avoid counteracting or embarrassing the steamer in the use of her powers to that end. The owners of steamboats are not to be made insurers against the negligence, ignorance or misconduct of persons in charge of sailing vessels. If a collision occurs through the inattention, want of skill or blameable conduct of the latter, which the steamer, in the use of reasonable endeavors, could not avoid, the consequences must fall upon the vessel in the wrong the same as if both vessels were of the same description. It thus becomes indispensable, in actions for damages by owners of sailing vessels against steamers, to prove ordinary care and skill on their part, and negligence or wilful fault on the part of the steamboat, though the latter may be liable to the implication of a delinquency when it might not, in like circumstances, be imputed to a sailing vessel which fails to avoid a collision.

[79]*79The answer in this case sets up a state of facts which, if proved, would exonerate the .steamer from responsibility for the injuries received by the sloop, because it in effect charges her with having departed from her proper course suddenly and run upon .the .steamer, or placed herself in the way of the .latter. A sailing vessel meeting a steamer is entitled, in all ordinary circumstances, to keep her way; but the privilege involves a -corresponding obligation to adhere to that •course, and thus give the steamer the opportunity to employ its superior facilities to secure the safety of both. A change of direction by the sailing vessel, or manoeuvre indicating the intention to change it, may embarrass the steamer, or prevent the use, in time, of the power to vary or stop her own way; and a collision so produced must be laid to the fault of the vessel and not to that -of the steamer. If, then, the allegation of the answer that the steamer was on a course which would have carried her clear of the sloop had not the latter abruptly luffed, and thus come unexpectedly across her track and into her, had been supported by the proofs, it is clear that she would not only have been acquitted on this libel, but would be entitled to prefer her own claim for damages so sus-tained.

I do not propose to spread out the testimony in detail; the result of it, in my opinion, is that the claimant’s own witnesses contradict the answer in two particulars of -considerable moment in a question of culpable inattention or misconduct; first, in proving that the steamer crossed the track of the -sloop in full view, and less than a third of a mile from her bows; second, in proving that the steamer had not been previously on the west shore; and third, upon the whole evi-dence it is at least doubtful whether the .steamer was not in the act of crossing the river from the east shore, steering westward, when the collision occurred. The testimony -of the two men on board the sloop, strongly ■corroborated by those on board other sloops in the immediate vicinity, and who saw the position and course of the steamer and sloop, is positive that the steamer stood in a direction across the bows of the sloop in a course from the east to the west shore. It also very •satisfactorily appears, from a comparison of the testimony of these witnesses, that the •steamer did not, as is asserted in the answer, ■ commence her course from the eastern shore to the western, at a point from one-half to three-quarters of a mile further down the river than the place of collision; because all the testimony is that her course was up the river, diagonally across, and the diagrams render it certain that the steamer could not have been on the western shore rounded to up the river, when the pilot observed the sloop luffing one-third of a mile off. The pilot of the Washington supposed the steamer had time, after she began crossing, to get to the westward of the sloop, and head up, before reaching the place of collision. He was, however, half a mile below; and after he fell into her wake, he pursued her course, and judged it would bring him over at about Blue Point, which is proved to be as far north of the place of collision as Sands’ Dock is south of it. I am satisfied, that giving due weight to all the evidence, it is proved that the collision occurred whilst the steamer was going towards the west shore, and before she had passed the sloop, and got to the west of her. This necessarily places the steamer in a culpable position, attempting to cross the track of a sailing vessel and run under her bows, when she was entitled by law to hold her course, and it was the business of the steamer to leave it free to her.

The actual collision, as described by eye witnesses, and as far as it can be judged from concomitant circumstances, was not produced by any misconduct or want of care on the part of the sloop.

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The New Jersey, 18 F. Cas. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1846).

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