The Netherland of South Beach Condominium Association, Inc. v. Ankinyele Adams

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: February 12, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0903
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed February 12, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Nos. 3D22-2046 & 3D24-903 Lower Tribunal No. 18-20410

Ian Hendry, et al., Appellants,

vs.

Ankinyele Adams, Appellee.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. Miller, Judge.

GrayRobinson P.A., Jack R. Reiter, and Robert C. Weill, for appellants.

Hunter & Lynch PA, Steven K. Hunter, and Christopher J. Lynch, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOBREE and GOODEN, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J. Ian Hendry, Club Management, LLC, and the Netherland of South

Beach Condominium Association, Inc. (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the

trial court’s amended final judgment entered in favor of Ankinyele Adams, in

Case 3D22-2046. Appellants also appeal the final judgment for attorney’s

fees and costs entered in favor of Adams, in Case 3D24-0903. The appeals

have been consolidated for the purpose of decision only. Because Adams

did not plead racial discrimination in the fourth amended complaint, the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of racial discrimination. We

therefore reverse the final judgment and remand for a new trial. Because we

are reversing for a new trial in the primary case, we also reverse the final

judgment for attorney’s fees entered in favor of Adams.

Adams, an African American male, brought suit against Appellants on

five counts for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy to commit malicious

prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), related

to Adams’s arrests for alleged noise violations at Adams’s restaurant, V-Live.

During trial, Adams claimed that these arrests were racially motivated.

Before trial, Appellants moved in limine to preclude any reference to

racial discrimination, arguing that there was no competent evidence to

support the allegation, and it was never pleaded. The trial court denied the

2 motion on the basis that the evidence “would go directly to credibility and

bias.” Adams never amended the complaint to plead racial discrimination.

During the pretrial conference, Adams noted his intent to tell the jury

that he was the first black-owned business owner on South Beach and the

only business owner arrested for a noise violation on South Beach.

Appellants moved in limine to prevent Adams from making these statements

arguing that Adams provided no supporting evidence, and this would

improperly inject race into the case. The trial court denied the motion.

At the close of Adams’s case, Appellants moved for a directed verdict

or, alternatively, for a new trial or motion for remittitur on the claims for

malicious prosecution, IIED, and civil conspiracy to commit malicious

prosecution. The trial court reserved ruling.

After the jury trial, the jury found for Adams on all claims, except for

punitive damages. Adams was awarded $5 million in non-economic

damages and $300,000 to compensate him for the legal fees on the criminal

charges. Afterward, the trial court denied Appellants’ directed verdict motion.

Appellants filed post-trial motions. The trial court denied all motions except

the motion to remit the attorneys’ fee award, which it remitted to $125,000.

Appellants appealed.

3 The trial court’s evidentiary rulings and the denial of a motion for new

trial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Asad, 78

So. 3d 660, 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Appellants argue on appeal that racial discrimination was not properly

pleaded in Adams’s fourth amended complaint. We agree. Adams’s second

amended complaint contains Count VI for “Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights,

42 U.S.C. section 1983(3).” This count for a civil rights violation is absent

from the initial complaint and was removed from the third and fourth

amended complaints. The language from Count VI of the second amended

complaint leaves no question that Adams was at one point asserting a claim

for racial discrimination but later abandoned this claim.

In Weaver v. Leon County Classroom Teachers Association, 680 So.

2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), the First District found that “the second

amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action” under Title VII when

plaintiff alleged: 1) he was a black person, 2) that the union “knew the Board

had a history of racial discrimination against him,” and 3) “[the union] failed

in its duty to represent him,” constituting the union’s “acquiescence in the

racial discrimination practiced against him.” Id. at 479-81. In State v. Burch,

545 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the Fourth District found that

defendants’ claim that a statute discriminated against black people “should

4 not be heard since it is not supported by statistical evidence and the

defendants did not plead or prove a discriminatory intent on the part of the

state.” Id. at 283. The court further reiterated, “[T]he defendants did not plead

or prove that they were personally targeted for arrest and prosecution for

racial reasons.” Id. (emphasis added); see also St. Louis v. Florida Int’l.

Univ., 60 So. 3d 455, 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011), City of W. Palm Beach v.

McCray, 91 So. 3d 165, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

At a minimum, Adams was required to include in the complaint: 1) his

race, and 2) that he was arrested for racial reasons. After first asserting these

points in his second amended complaint, he abandoned all mention of race

thereafter in his later amended complaints.

Because the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of

racial discrimination when Adams failed to plead racial discrimination, we

reverse the final judgment and remand for a new trial, in Case 3D22-2046.

As we are reversing for a new trial in the primary case, we also reverse the

final judgment for attorney’s fees entered in favor of Adams, in Case 3D24-

0903.

Reversed and remanded.