The MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC. v. TURNER

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: June 24, 2025
• Docket: S25G0132
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 24, 2025

S25G0132. THE MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC., et al. v. NORKESIA TURNER, et al.

LAGRUA, Justice.

After Allen Turner died from surgical complications, his

daughter, Norkesia Turner (“Turner”), sued Drs. William Thompson

and Heather Nolan, as well as their employer, the Medical Center of

Central Georgia, Inc. (collectively, “MCCG”), for medical

malpractice and wrongful death.1 The action proceeded to trial, and

the jury returned verdicts in Turner’s favor. Among other damages

not at issue here, the jury awarded approximately $7.2 million in

noneconomic damages specifically “for wrongful death” – a figure

meant to quantify, as best the law can, “the full value of the life of

1 Turner’s medical malpractice claims were brought in her capacity as

administrator of her father’s estate. See OCGA §§ 51-1-27 and 53-7-1. Turner’s wrongful death claim was brought in her personal capacity as her father’s surviving next of kin. See OCGA §§ 51-4-1 et seq. the decedent, as shown by the evidence.” OCGA §§ 51-4-1 and 51-4-

2 (a). After the verdicts, but before entry of final judgment, MCCG

moved the trial court to reduce the $7.2 million noneconomic

damages award to the maximum amount allowable under OCGA §

51-13-1 (b) and (c). 2 Pointing to our decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic

Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010), the

trial court denied MCCG’s motion and concluded that the statutory

2 OCGA § 51-13-1 was enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005 to

“limit[] awards of noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to a predetermined amount.” See Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010) (citing Ga. L. 2005, p.1, § 1). The subsections relevant to the present case provide: (b) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care providers, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the number of defendant health care providers against whom the claim is asserted or the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based. (c) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action, including an action for wrongful death, against a single medical facility, inclusive of all persons and entities for which vicarious liability theories may apply, the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based. OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c). See also OCGA § 51-13-1 (a) (defining terms) and OCGA § 51-13-1 (e) (setting an aggregate limit on noneconomic damages recoverable under subsections (b) and (c)). 2 maximum limits on noneconomic damages (or “caps”) contained in

OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c) were “not applicable” to the wrongful

death noneconomic damages awarded to Turner on the basis that

this Court had already “found [the caps] to be unconstitutional” in

Nestlehutt. See generally 286 Ga. at 732-738 (2).

MCCG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the

trial court and echoed its reasoning that our decision in Nestlehutt

“foreclosed” MCCG’s post-trial efforts. See The Medical Center of

Central Georgia, Inc. v. Turner, 372 Ga. App. 644, 652-655 (2) (905

SE2d 858) (2024) (rejecting MCCG’s argument that the $7.2 million

noneconomic damages award for wrongful death “must be remitted

and amended because it exceeded the $350,000 cap on noneconomic

damages imposed by OCGA § 51-13-1” on the basis that “this

argument is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court of Georgia

precedent”). MCCG petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari,

which we granted to address whether the Court of Appeals properly

applied our precedent for determining whether a legislative

enactment violates Georgia’s constitutional right to trial by jury. See

3 Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 732-738 (2); Taylor v. The Devereux

Foundation, Inc. et al., 316 Ga. 44, 55-81 (III) (885 SE2d 671) (2023).

See also Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, Par. XI (1983) (“The right to trial by

jury shall remain inviolate . . . .”).

Today, we do not reach the ultimate question of whether

Turner’s constitutional right to trial by jury would be violated by

application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million

noneconomic damages awarded in this case because the record

shows – and the parties agree – that the lower courts have not

applied the analytical framework set out by our precedent to the

wrongful death claim and the “full value of the life” damages

awarded in this case. See OCGA §§ 51-4-1 and 51-4-2 (a). Instead,

both lower courts appear to have interpreted and applied the

language of our decisions in concluding that Nestlehutt controlled

the outcome. While we recognize that our decision in Nestlehutt used

broad and, at times, imprecise language when discussing the

interplay between the constitutional right to trial by jury and the

statutory caps in OCGA § 51-13-1, see generally Nestlehutt, 286 Ga.

4 at 732-738 (2), the language relied upon by the lower courts was not

a holding that controls the outcome of this case.

Courts must take care not to apply a given judicial decision by

simply parsing or interpreting the language of that decision, like we

might construe a statute. Instead, ascertaining “whether a

precedent controls a decision in a later case turns on the scope of the

relevant holding of that precedent.” State v. Wierson, __ Ga. __, __

(__ SE2d __) (2) (b) (ii) (Case No. S24G1299, decided May 28, 2025).

As a general matter, the holding of a judicial decision “includes, to

some degree, the reasoning or principles that were necessary to that

decision.” Id. Of course, if a court did not reach a decision on a

particular issue, it necessarily issued no holding on that issue. And

a court cannot reach a decision on a particular issue when that issue

is not presented or implicated by the “factual context of the case

being decided.” Schoicket v. State, 312 Ga. 825, 832 (1) (865 SE2d

170) (2021) (citation omitted). See Wierson, __ Ga. at __ (2) (b) (ii)

(“[W]hen courts distinguish past precedents, they do not look for just

any facts that are different from the case before them, but rather for

5 circumstances relevant to, and which place the current case outside

of, the [holding] of the precedent in question.”) (citations omitted).

In short, “[l]anguage that sounds like a holding – but actually

exceeds the scope of the case’s factual context – is not a holding no

matter how much it sounds like one.” Schoicket, 312 Ga. at 832 (1).

In Nestlehutt, the only issue before us was whether OCGA § 51-

13-1’s caps could be constitutionally applied to reduce a jury’s award

of noneconomic damages for pain and suffering and loss of

consortium following a verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor for medical

malpractice claims. See 286 Ga. at 732-738 (2). In resolving that

issue, we considered whether the type of underlying claim of liability

at issue (i.e., a medical malpractice claim) existed in Georgia in

1798,3 whether the right to trial by jury attached for that type of

claim in Georgia in 1798, and whether the damages awarded by the

3 In evaluating the type of underlying claim of liability at issue under

Nestlehutt’s framework, we do not require a perfect match in nomenclature and a suitable analog cognizable “under late eighteenth century English common law” may suffice. See, e.g., Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 732-733 (2) (a) (tracing “[t]he antecedents of the modern medical malpractice action” to common law “medical negligence claims”); Taylor, 316 Ga. at 64 (III) (D) (1) (explaining how predecessor to modern theory of premises liability flowed from common law “liab[ility] for failure to keep their premises safe for invitees”). 6 jury (i.e., noneconomic damages for pain and suffering and loss of

consortium) were damages determined by juries for that type of

claim in Georgia in 1798. See Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 732-738 (2);

Taylor, 316 Ga. at 59-81 (III). Ultimately, we concluded that the

answer was “yes” as to each of those considerations, such that

application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the noneconomic damages

for pain and suffering and loss of consortium that were awarded to

the plaintiffs for their successful medical malpractice claims

violated the constitutional right to trial by jury. See Nestlehutt, 286

Ga. at 732-738 (2). In other words, the analytical framework that we

set out and applied in Nestlehutt – that is, “the reasoning [and]

principles that were necessary to that decision” – was claim- and

remedy-specific. Wierson, __ Ga. at __ (2) (b) (ii). See id. Therefore,

because the question of whether OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps can be

constitutionally applied to statutory wrongful death claims (and

their associated “full value of the life” damages) was not at issue in

Nestlehutt, the Nestlehutt Court could not (and did not) decide the

issue presented in this case. Wierson, __ Ga. at __ (2) (b) (ii) (citations

7 and punctuation omitted); Schoicket, 312 Ga. at 832 (1) (citation

omitted). See generally Nestlehutt, 386 Ga. at 732-738 (2).

Consequently, Nestlehutt’s holding does not control the question at

issue in this case, and the lower courts erred in concluding

otherwise.

Because the lower courts relied upon a contrary view of

Nestlehutt’s breadth in reaching their shared conclusions and, as a

result, did not apply the analytical framework set out by our

precedent, the constitutional questions in this case have not been

addressed by the lower courts consistent with our precedent. We

decline to apply that framework in the first instance. See

Wasserman v. Franklin County, 320 Ga. 624, 653 (III) (B) (911 SE2d

583) (2025) (“We are a court of review, not of first view[.]”) (citation

omitted). See, e.g., Efficiency Lodge, Inc. v. Neason, 316 Ga. 551, 567

(3) (889 SE2d 789) (2023) (vacating and remanding case where lower

courts had yet to apply the relevant legal framework set out by our

precedent to the issues presented). See also Brewer v. State of Ga.,

281 Ga. 283, 284-285 (2) (637 SE2d 677) (2006) (explaining that

8 constitutional arguments “not raised and ruled on below” will not be

addressed by this Court).

Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and

remand with direction for the Court of Appeals to return this case to

the trial court for additional proceedings in light of this opinion.

Judgment vacated and case remanded. Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ concur. Peterson, CJ, disqualified.

9 COLVIN, Justice, concurring.

I concur in full with the majority opinion. I write separately

only to reiterate that, in an appropriate case where the issue is

squarely presented, we should reexamine whether we correctly

decided Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga.

731 (691 SE2d 218) (2010). As I have previously noted, the

constitutional right to a jury trial has traditionally been understood

as “a procedural right to have a jury, rather than a judge, decide

questions of fact” in certain cases. Taylor v. Devereux Found., Inc.,

316 Ga. 44, 103 (885 SE2d 671) (2023) (Colvin, J, concurring

specially) (emphasis omitted). And Nestlehutt appears to be

inconsistent with that traditional understanding of the right in that

it “recognize[d] a novel substantive component of the right,” which

“limits a legislature’s ability to define the legal principles applicable

to a cause of action.” Id. at 102, 104. Whether Nestlehutt was

correctly decided is a question beyond the scope of our order granting

certiorari in this case. But I continue to believe that “[w]e should

take a careful look at Nestlehutt in an appropriate case.” Id. at 104.