The Matter of Anne Marie R. Colon v. Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 14, 2024
• Docket: 25
• Status: Published

Opinion

State of New York MEMORANDUM Court of Appeals This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

No. 25 In the Matter of Anne Marie R. Colon, Appellant, v. Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York, Respondent, Yvonne Davalos, &c., Respondent.

Kerstin M. Miller, for appellant. Jamison M. Davies, for respondent Teachers' Retirement System of the City of New York.

MEMORANDUM:

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Under article 15 of the Retirement and Social Security Law, “accidental death

benefits”—generally payable when the head of the retirement system determines that a -1- -2- No. 25

member died because of a work-related accident—are paid to a pension fund member’s

statutorily enumerated “statutory beneficiary,” typically a spouse, child under the age of

25, or other dependent relative (Retirement and Social Security Law §§ 601 [d]; 607 [a]).

“Ordinary death benefits”—a lump sum payable when an employee dies before retirement

of causes not related to a work accident—are paid to the “designated beneficiary”

nominated by the member (see id. § 606-a [a] [3]; [b], [c]). The amount of an accidental

death benefit will always be equal to or greater than that of an ordinary death benefit. 1

In May 2020, the legislature enacted Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-i,

granting accidental death benefits to the statutory beneficiaries of members who contracted

COVID-19 within 45 days of reporting to work on or after March 1, 2020, and died of

related causes (see L 2020, ch 89, § 4). Decedent died in April 2020 in circumstances

undisputedly qualifying for accidental death benefits under section 607-i. Decedent’s

daughter was his statutory beneficiary (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 601 [d]

[2]), and petitioner, his registered domestic partner, was his designated beneficiary.

1 An accidental death benefit is an annuity “equal to fifty percent of such member’s wages earned during [their] last year of actual service” (Retirement and Social Security Law § 607). Statutory beneficiaries receiving an accidental death benefit for a New York City employee are also eligible for health coverage paid for by the City (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 12-126 [b] [2] [i]). An ordinary death benefit is “equal to one-half of the amount of the ordinary death benefit which would have been payable had the member’s death occurred on the last day of service upon which membership was based” (Retirement and Social Security Law § 606-a [c]). An accidental death benefit is always at least as generous as an ordinary death benefit because, “[i]f the aggregate [accidental death] benefits . . . have not exceeded the amount of the ordinary [death benefit],” the difference is paid out to the member’s surviving statutory beneficiary or the member’s distributees (id. § 607 [c]).

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Respondent accepted decedent’s daughter’s claim for accidental death benefits and rejected

petitioner’s claim for ordinary death benefits. Petitioner filed this CPLR article 78

proceeding alleging that respondent’s determination denying her claim was arbitrary and

capricious, and, alternatively, that the amendments to the Retirement and Social Security

Law violated the Pension Impairment Clause of the State Constitution (NY Const, art V, §

7 [a]).

The statutory text refutes petitioner’s argument that respondent’s denial of her claim

for ordinary death benefits was irrational. Retirement and Social Security Law § 607-i (a)

(3) provides that the accidental death benefit “shall” be paid to a member’s statutory

beneficiary if the member meets the stated criteria. This is consistent with the recognition

in the legislative history that “[o]nce the statutory beneficiary demonstrates this proof,

entitlement to the [a]ccidental [d]eath [b]enefit is mandatory” (Mem of Div of Budget, Bill

Jacket, L 2020, ch 89 at 12). Additionally, preexisting law provided that an ordinary death

benefit is only available when accidental death benefits are unavailable (see Retirement

and Social Security Law § 606-a [a] [3]). The only relevant provision permitting the

recovery of both types of benefits does not apply (see id. § 607-i [b]; Fiscal Note, 2020 NY

Senate Bill S8427, 2020 NY Assembly Bill A10528 [“If any ordinary death benefit has

already been paid it will be used as an offset against the accidental death benefit”]).

Petitioner’s arguments that the amendments violated the Pension Impairment

Clause are meritless. Generally, we consider whether a benefit attendant to membership

in a pension plan is impaired from the member’s perspective (see Ballentine v Koch, 89

NY2d 51, 56 [1996]). Initially, the record does not establish that Retirement and Social

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Security Law § 607-i effected any change to decedent’s benefits, let alone impaired them,

because it is unclear whether his death would have qualified for accidental death benefits

under the pre-existing law (see Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO

v Regan, 71 NY2d 653, 658 [1988]). Regardless, no absolute right to choose a beneficiary

exists, given that members cannot designate a beneficiary for accidental death benefits or

know whether they will die as a result of a work-related accident. Rather, petitioner’s

argument, at its core, is that granting superior death benefits by classifying COVID-19

deaths as accidental in turn impaired decedent’s supposed subjective preference to have his

chosen beneficiary receive an inferior death benefit. Even if decedent had such a

preference, it is not protected by the Pension Impairment Clause because expanding the

availability of accidental death benefits only increased the potential value of the available

benefits (see Birnbaum v New York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 5 NY2d 1, 9, 11

[1958]).

Petitioner’s contention that she had protected vested rights under the Pension

Impairment Clause also fails. Even assuming that the “vesting” of benefits could confer

rights under the Pension Impairment Clause independent of the member’s, petitioner has

failed to show that she had any such vested right.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur.

Decided March 14, 2024

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