The Martin Mullen

260 F. 916, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2135
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedOctober 7, 1919
DocketNos. 3285, 3286
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 260 F. 916 (The Martin Mullen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Martin Mullen, 260 F. 916, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2135 (6th Cir. 1919).

Opinion

KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.

On July 7, 1916, the steamer Martin Mullen, owned by the Pioneer Steamship Company, and the steamer II. K. Oakes, owned by the Beaver Steamship Company, collided in Lake Superior during a fog. The Mullen, which had left the Portage Canal at 3:18 p. m., was bound for Ashland, Wis., and was light. The Oakes was downbound from Ashland and was loaded. Upon a hearing on testimony in open court, the District Judge found both vessels at fault. The damages to the respective ships were stipulated and division made accordingly. Each party appeals.

The court found that on entering the fog each boat blew fog signals regularly as required by7 the rule (the wind, which was light, was from the Mullen to the Oakes, and perhaps for this reason the Mullen failed to hear the Oakes’ fog signals, while the latter heard several from the Mullen); that on hearing these signals the Oakes’ speed was checked to dead slow and a two-blast passing signal given, the wheel being immediately put hard astarboard. No response to this signal being received, the Oakes a little later blew a second two-blast passing signal, which was answered by like signal from the Mullen. On hearing the Mullen’s passing signal, which indicated that that vessel was dangerously near and slightly to the starboard of dead ahead, the Oakes’ engines were reversed and put full speed astern. It was found that at the time of the collision the Oakes was going three miles an hour.

The court found that the Mullen entered the fog at 6:30 p. m.; that she was then considerably to the north of her regular course (she being, however, absolved from fault on that account); that she was running at her full speed of 13 miles an hour when she saw the fog bank ahead and 'immediately checked to 8 miles; that after running for a short time in the fog, and before her speed was quite reduced to 8 miles, she heard a two-blast passing signal from the Oakes which bore about a point on the Mullen’s starboard bow, which signal was promptly answered with two blasts and the wheel put hard astarboard; [918]*918that almost immediately thereafter the Oakes was seen in the fog, whereupon the Mullen’s engines were put full speed astern — her speed being still about 8 miles, neither her course nor speed having been much affected by the .starboard helm or engine reversal. It was found that the boats approached each other on courses nearly parallel, but slightly converging. They collided on' their starboard bows at an angle of about one point.

The Oakes was found at fault (1) for not having a competent lookout on duty when approaching and. entering the fog and in the lookout’s failure to properly perform his duty while in the fog; (2) in entering the fog at full speed, instead of checking when the fog could have been seen, so as to enter at moderate speed; (3) in the maneuver made after the dangerous nearness of the Mullen appeared. The Mullen was found at fault in running in the fog at a speed of 8 miles an hour which the court held immoderate. She was otherwise relieved from fault.

[1] 1. The Fault of the Oakes. — We think the Oakes was rightly held guilty of fault contributing to the collision. In our opinion she ran through the fog at an immoderate speed within the meaning of rule 15 pertaining to navigation on the Great Lakes. She actually entered the fog at her full speed of 11 miles an hour. After entering the fog the Mullen’s fog signals indicated to the Oakes that she was, at the most, not more than one or two points from right ahead. The Oakes did not at once reduce her speed to bare steerage way, as the rule required, but contented herself with making such check as would ultimately bring the speed to dead slow. She had apparently run at least five minutes under that check and had not yet reached' bare steer-ageway before she reversed, and this she did only (as the court found) on hearing the Mullen’s passing signal, which indicated her dangerous nearness. Whether the reverse was made a half minute before receiving this passing signal is not important. Danger meanwhile, was the more to be apprehended from the fact that the Mullen had not replied to the Oakes’ first passing signal. Had the Oakes been at moderate speed when she entered the fog, and later reduced to steerageway when the Mullen’s fog signals were heard, the collision would probably have been avoided.

We also agree with the District Judge that the Oakes was at fault in her maneuver after hearing the Mullen’s passing signal.. As said by the trial judge:

“The wind was from the Mullen to the Oakes. The captain of the Oakes at the time suspected that the Mullen was failing to hear the whistles from the Oakes.”

And we think it should have been evident to the Oakes that the two boats were rapidly approaching each other on converging courses. In our opinion there was then apparent ground for apprehension that a starboard to starboard passing was attended with danger, and that,, instead of still insisting upon such passing, prudence required that the Mullen be advised of the situation by an alarm signal under rule 26. It seems, moreover, very plain that the backing of the Oakes at a time [919]*919when, as her master thought, the vessels' were less than a half mile apart (and the distance was probably not much more than that), made the collision inevitable, for such backing, in spite of a faint suggestion to the contrary, would naturally cause the Oakes’ bow to swing to starboard, and thus directly into collision.

The Oakes was also at fault, in our opinion, in respect of her lookout. The lookout (this was his first trip in that capacity) had not been on duty as such for several hours (being otherwise engaged), and was only called to his station as the fog was actually entered. There was testimony that such practice was not unusual in clear weather, and the weather was clear, except for occasional thick fog banks. However, the failure to have a lookout on duty at the least imposes a heavy burden on the Oakes of showing that his earlier presence at his post could not have prevented the collision. The George W. Roby (C. C. A. 6) 111 Fed. 601, 614, 49 C. C. A. 481. But as there is otherwise sufficient evidence of fault directly contributing to the collision we need not pursue this subject farther.

2. As to the Fault of the Mullen. — As already said, the trial court found that at the time of the collision the Mullen’s speed was about 8 miles per hour. It was held that under the circumstances of this case an 8 miles speed was at least 2 miles in excess of moderate speed. Without finding it necessary to hold, as did the court below, that moderate speed in a fog can never be more than one-half of full speed, we have no difficulty in concluding that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Mullen’s speed was immoderate, if more than 5 to 6 miles at the outside, having regard to the density of the fog, the direction of the wind, which made it difficult (as the Mullen’s navigator must have known) to hear for any great distance the fog and passing signals of approaching boats directly ahead,'and the fact that she was sailing, in the height of the navigation season, in a much-frequented lane of Great Takes commerce, where vessels were naturally to be expected. The Geo. W. Roby (C. C. A. 6) 111 Fed. 601, 608-610, 49 C. C. A. 481, and cases cited. She insists that her speed was no more than 3 or 4 miles an hour.

There was, however, testimony on the part of several of the Oakes’ witnesses substantially tending to show that the Mullen’s speed was fully as great as found by the court.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
260 F. 916, 1919 U.S. App. LEXIS 2135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-martin-mullen-ca6-1919.