03/04/2025
DA 24-0278 Case Number: DA 24-0278
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 45N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
TASHA STUCK, f/k/a TASHA SQUILLACIOTTI,
Petitioner and Appellee,
and
BRIAN SQUILLACIOTTI,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDR-2023-70 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Brian Squillaciotti, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Tasha Stuck, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 4, 2025
Decided: March 4, 2025
Filed: ir,-6‘A•-if __________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Appellant Brian Squillaciotti, representing himself, appeals from the April 23, 2024
order issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, that denied his
second request to amend the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) that the District Court
incorporated into the dissolution decree. We affirm.
¶3 On February 3, 2023, Tasha Stuck, then known as Tasha Squillaciotti, petitioned for
dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Stuck and Squillaciotti each represented themselves
in the dissolution proceedings.
¶4 On August 4, 2023, Stuck and Squillaciotti filed a joint affidavit requesting
dissolution without hearing. On August 11, 2023, they filed a PSA. The PSA provided,
in relevant part, that Stuck and Squillaciotti jointly owned a mobile home, located on a
rented lot in a trailer park. They had purchased the home for approximately $66,000, and
it was encumbered with a remaining loan balance of approximately $6,000. By the time
they entered into the PSA, Stuck had moved out of the trailer and Squillaciotti continued
to reside there. In the PSA, they agreed Squillaciotti would continue to live in the trailer
but, within 90 days of the decree of dissolution, he would obtain a cash-out refinance or
2 assumption of the loan and pay Stuck $30,000 for her equity in the trailer. The PSA further
provided that Squillaciotti would be solely responsible for the loan payments until he made
the equity payment to Stuck and, if he could not obtain financing within 90 days, he would
sell the trailer and split the sale proceeds with Stuck 50-50.
¶5 On August 11, 2023, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Final Decree of Dissolution (Decree). The court found that the PSA terms were
not unconscionable as to the distribution of the parties’ property, debts, and maintenance,
and concluded that the PSA created an equitable distribution of the marital estate. It
therefore incorporated the PSA in its ruling. Thus, under the terms of the PSA, Squillaciotti
had until November 9, 2023, to pay Stuck $30,000 for her equity in the trailer.
¶6 On August 28, 2023, Squillaciotti filed a motion that was, in substance, a motion to
amend the distribution of the marital estate as set forth in the Decree. Relevant to his
present appeal, Squillaciotti explained in the motion, in part, that he wanted to renegotiate
the terms regarding the trailer. Squillaciotti alleged that he has a learning disability that
interfered with his ability to fully comprehend the agreed-upon terms. He admitted that,
when he and Stuck negotiated the terms of the PSA, he understood that he was agreeing to
either refinance the trailer within 90 days or put it up for sale. However, he alleged he did
not understand at the time that he could “get into trouble” if he did not abide by the PSA’s
terms. Instead, he believed he could disregard the PSA without adverse consequences.
¶7 Squillaciotti advised the court that he wanted to continue living in the trailer and
making monthly payments on the current loan until the $6,000 balance was paid in full.
After he paid off the loan, he intended to sell the trailer. However, instead of dividing the
3 sale proceeds 50-50, as the parties had agreed, he would instead retain $6,000 for himself
and then split the remainder of the proceeds 50-50.
¶8 On October 18, 2023, the District Court held a hearing on Squillaciotti’s motion.
The hearing proceeded as an Informal Domestic Relations Trial pursuant to MUDCR 17.
Both parties were self-represented; a family friend with experience assisting disabled
individuals assisted Squillaciotti at the hearing. The court then issued rulings to resolve
disagreements and misunderstandings about the PSA on October 23, 2023. Relevant to the
trailer, the court amended the property distribution as follows: “[Stuck] agreed that, even
though she needs the money for her share of the trailer home, she will give [Squillaciotti]
150 days (rather than 90 days) to refinance the home. When the home is refinanced,
[Stuck] will receive one-half of the amount the trailer appraises for, minus the loan balance
as of September 1, 2023.” (Emphasis in original.) The Order does not specify whether the
150 days was to run from the date of this Order or from the Decree of Dissolution. The
later date gave Squillaciotti until March 21, 2024, to refinance the trailer.
¶9 On March 11, 2024, Squillaciotti filed a “Motion for extension on property
distribution of selling mobile home,” which asked the court to amend the property
distribution a second time. He explained the trailer was on the market, but he was
dissatisfied with the offers he had received. He further alleged that his real estate agent
had ceased showing the property on March 10, 2024, and he was seeking a new agent.
¶10 Stuck responded in opposition to Squillaciotti’s motion for additional time. She
alleged Squillaciotti had received several reasonable offers, but he declined all of them.
She further alleged that Squillaciotti’s real estate agent ceased representing the property
4 because Squillaciotti had refused the purchase offers. She asserted that Squillaciotti was
not trying to sell the trailer.
¶11 On April 23, 2024, the District Court issued an order denying Squillaciotti’s motion
for additional time to sell the trailer. The court’s order does not set forth its reasoning. It
is a form order upon which the court handwrote, “the extension is DENIED.” Squillaciotti
then filed this appeal.
¶12 On appeal, Squillaciotti asserts that he ran out of time to sell the trailer and that he
does not know why the court denied his second request for more time because the court
did not explain its reasoning in the order. Squillaciotti asks this Court to appoint a new
District Court judge and provide him more assistance in resolving the dispute with Stuck.
Squillaciotti further indicates that he has engaged a new real estate agent but does not
intend to proceed with selling the trailer until this appeal is resolved.
¶13 Under § 40-4-202, MCA, a district court has broad discretion to distribute a marital
estate equitably according to the circumstances of the case. In re Marriage of Gerhart,
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03/04/2025
DA 24-0278 Case Number: DA 24-0278
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 45N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
TASHA STUCK, f/k/a TASHA SQUILLACIOTTI,
Petitioner and Appellee,
and
BRIAN SQUILLACIOTTI,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDR-2023-70 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Brian Squillaciotti, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Tasha Stuck, Self-Represented, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 4, 2025
Decided: March 4, 2025
Filed: ir,-6‘A•-if __________________________________________ Clerk Chief Justice Cory J. Swanson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Appellant Brian Squillaciotti, representing himself, appeals from the April 23, 2024
order issued by the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, that denied his
second request to amend the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) that the District Court
incorporated into the dissolution decree. We affirm.
¶3 On February 3, 2023, Tasha Stuck, then known as Tasha Squillaciotti, petitioned for
dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Stuck and Squillaciotti each represented themselves
in the dissolution proceedings.
¶4 On August 4, 2023, Stuck and Squillaciotti filed a joint affidavit requesting
dissolution without hearing. On August 11, 2023, they filed a PSA. The PSA provided,
in relevant part, that Stuck and Squillaciotti jointly owned a mobile home, located on a
rented lot in a trailer park. They had purchased the home for approximately $66,000, and
it was encumbered with a remaining loan balance of approximately $6,000. By the time
they entered into the PSA, Stuck had moved out of the trailer and Squillaciotti continued
to reside there. In the PSA, they agreed Squillaciotti would continue to live in the trailer
but, within 90 days of the decree of dissolution, he would obtain a cash-out refinance or
2 assumption of the loan and pay Stuck $30,000 for her equity in the trailer. The PSA further
provided that Squillaciotti would be solely responsible for the loan payments until he made
the equity payment to Stuck and, if he could not obtain financing within 90 days, he would
sell the trailer and split the sale proceeds with Stuck 50-50.
¶5 On August 11, 2023, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Final Decree of Dissolution (Decree). The court found that the PSA terms were
not unconscionable as to the distribution of the parties’ property, debts, and maintenance,
and concluded that the PSA created an equitable distribution of the marital estate. It
therefore incorporated the PSA in its ruling. Thus, under the terms of the PSA, Squillaciotti
had until November 9, 2023, to pay Stuck $30,000 for her equity in the trailer.
¶6 On August 28, 2023, Squillaciotti filed a motion that was, in substance, a motion to
amend the distribution of the marital estate as set forth in the Decree. Relevant to his
present appeal, Squillaciotti explained in the motion, in part, that he wanted to renegotiate
the terms regarding the trailer. Squillaciotti alleged that he has a learning disability that
interfered with his ability to fully comprehend the agreed-upon terms. He admitted that,
when he and Stuck negotiated the terms of the PSA, he understood that he was agreeing to
either refinance the trailer within 90 days or put it up for sale. However, he alleged he did
not understand at the time that he could “get into trouble” if he did not abide by the PSA’s
terms. Instead, he believed he could disregard the PSA without adverse consequences.
¶7 Squillaciotti advised the court that he wanted to continue living in the trailer and
making monthly payments on the current loan until the $6,000 balance was paid in full.
After he paid off the loan, he intended to sell the trailer. However, instead of dividing the
3 sale proceeds 50-50, as the parties had agreed, he would instead retain $6,000 for himself
and then split the remainder of the proceeds 50-50.
¶8 On October 18, 2023, the District Court held a hearing on Squillaciotti’s motion.
The hearing proceeded as an Informal Domestic Relations Trial pursuant to MUDCR 17.
Both parties were self-represented; a family friend with experience assisting disabled
individuals assisted Squillaciotti at the hearing. The court then issued rulings to resolve
disagreements and misunderstandings about the PSA on October 23, 2023. Relevant to the
trailer, the court amended the property distribution as follows: “[Stuck] agreed that, even
though she needs the money for her share of the trailer home, she will give [Squillaciotti]
150 days (rather than 90 days) to refinance the home. When the home is refinanced,
[Stuck] will receive one-half of the amount the trailer appraises for, minus the loan balance
as of September 1, 2023.” (Emphasis in original.) The Order does not specify whether the
150 days was to run from the date of this Order or from the Decree of Dissolution. The
later date gave Squillaciotti until March 21, 2024, to refinance the trailer.
¶9 On March 11, 2024, Squillaciotti filed a “Motion for extension on property
distribution of selling mobile home,” which asked the court to amend the property
distribution a second time. He explained the trailer was on the market, but he was
dissatisfied with the offers he had received. He further alleged that his real estate agent
had ceased showing the property on March 10, 2024, and he was seeking a new agent.
¶10 Stuck responded in opposition to Squillaciotti’s motion for additional time. She
alleged Squillaciotti had received several reasonable offers, but he declined all of them.
She further alleged that Squillaciotti’s real estate agent ceased representing the property
4 because Squillaciotti had refused the purchase offers. She asserted that Squillaciotti was
not trying to sell the trailer.
¶11 On April 23, 2024, the District Court issued an order denying Squillaciotti’s motion
for additional time to sell the trailer. The court’s order does not set forth its reasoning. It
is a form order upon which the court handwrote, “the extension is DENIED.” Squillaciotti
then filed this appeal.
¶12 On appeal, Squillaciotti asserts that he ran out of time to sell the trailer and that he
does not know why the court denied his second request for more time because the court
did not explain its reasoning in the order. Squillaciotti asks this Court to appoint a new
District Court judge and provide him more assistance in resolving the dispute with Stuck.
Squillaciotti further indicates that he has engaged a new real estate agent but does not
intend to proceed with selling the trailer until this appeal is resolved.
¶13 Under § 40-4-202, MCA, a district court has broad discretion to distribute a marital
estate equitably according to the circumstances of the case. In re Marriage of Gerhart,
2003 MT 292, ¶ 16, 318 Mont. 94, 78 P.3d 1219. We review a district court’s distribution
of a marital estate for abuse of discretion. The test is whether the court acted arbitrarily
without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason
resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Thorner, 2008 MT 270, ¶ 21, 345 Mont.
194, 190 P.3d 1063.
¶14 In this case, it would have been preferable if the District Court’s April 23, 2024
order had included the court’s reasoning. However, the court’s reasoning is apparent when
this order is viewed in context with the orders preceding it. The court distributed the
5 marital estate equitably in the Decree, and later found good cause to amend that
distribution. When Squillaciotti moved the court to amend the distribution a second time,
the court summarily denied that request because the court had previously received
information that Squillaciotti was not fulfilling the PSA in good faith, and it determined
that the distribution was equitable. Squillaciotti has not convinced us that the District Court
abused its discretion in the manner in which it distributed the marital estate and we will not
disturb that court’s decision.
¶15 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review.
¶16 Affirmed.
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ JIM RICE