The Manitoba

16 F. Cas. 620, 2 Flip. 241
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 15, 1878
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 16 F. Cas. 620 (The Manitoba) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Manitoba, 16 F. Cas. 620, 2 Flip. 241 (E.D. Mich. 1878).

Opinion

BROWN, District Judge.

Before entering upon a discussion of the testimony, there is a legal proposition, to which the attention of the court was challenged at the outset of the argument, and which libellants claim is decisive of the case. Admitting the theory of the Manitoba to be true, that she made first the bright and then the green light of the Comet, three-quarters of a point on her starboard bow, it was insisted that the steamers were still meeting “nearly end on” within the 13th article, and that it was incumbent upon the Manitoba to port, instead of starboarding, as she did. The words “nearly end on” used in the 13th article, are susceptible of two entirely distinct interpretations. On behalf of the Comet, it is urged, that if vessels are approaching so nearly end on, that prudence will suggest a change of the helm to avoid a misapprehension or chance of collision, such change should always be made by porting, notwithstanding the approaching vessel may exhibit a green light upon the starboard bow. Under the other definition, if the two vessels are each exhibiting to the other lights of the same color, there is no risk of collision within the meaning of the article, and each vessel is bound to beep its own side and may pursue its course with unabated speed, or, as formulated in the lines of Mr. Gray: “Green to green or red to red, perfect safety, go ahead.”

The earlier decisions, both English and American, no doubt go far to sustain the position of the libellants upon this point. The merchant shipping act, which in England preceded the present law, under which the vessels of all civilized nations are now navigated, provided that: “Whenever any ship, whether a steam or sailing ship, proceeding in one direction, meets any other ship, whether a steam or sailing ship, proceeding in another direction, so that if both ships were to continue their respective courses they would pass so near as to involve any risk of a collision, the helms of both ships shall be-put to port, so as to pass on the port side of the other” (14 & 15 Vict. c. 79) — a rule substantially like the 13th article, except that it imposes upon the sailing vessel an obligation to port when meeting a steamer. In construing this rule in the case of The Mangerton, Swab. 120, a ship which was running free was held to be in fault, because seeing a steamer’s .green or starboard light three or four points on her starboard bow, she held on her course, the master believing that, if the steamer did likewise, the vessel would have gone clear. He ought, it was said, to have expected that the steamer, on seeing his light, would have followed the rule and have ported; and should, therefore, have ported his own helm. See, also, The Admiral Boxer, Id. 193. In The Cleopatra, Id. 135, a steamer was condemned for having starboarded on making the bright and green lights of an approaching vessel three points on her starboard bow, distant about three miles. So, too, in the case of The Stork, Holt,'Adm. Cas. 151, decided after the present law had taken effect, Dr. Lusbington held, that in order to excuse the Stork from porting, “it must be quite clear there were three points difference and not less, for surely it would never do to contend, where they were so nearly meeting end on, that if the evidence should be it was one or two points only in the direction they were meeting, that that would be sufficient to dispense with the observance of this rule.” On appeal to the privy council, the court refused to adopt the language of Dr. Lushington, but observed it was not necessary to lay down any rule if it were competent for them to do so. “It is sufficient to say, that, whether the vessels were in such a relative position as to involve the risk of a collision, must be always a question of fact to be determined upon the circumstances.” The court, however, found that the vessels were in such a relative position that their course, if pursued, would have involved risk of a collision, and dismissed the appeal. In the case of The City of Paris, Id. 21. the question was put to the assessors: “When the steamer first saw the steam tug moving toward her, and two points on her starboard bow, taking into consideration these vessels being on opposite courses, was there danger of their meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve a risk of collision?” and they answered, “that the vessels were coming nearly end on, and the duty of each was to have ported.” In the case of The Fingal, Id. 160, the court considered that if vessels were within two points of meeting end on, they would fall within the latter part of the statement, “nearly end on.” In the case of The Artemas, Id. 75, a difference of two points was held not to exempt the vessels from the regulation of the 11th article. See, also, The Mexican, Id. 130. A similar want of definiteness is apparent in the American authorities. See The Milwaukee [Case No. 9,626]; The Nichols, 7 Wall. [74 U. S.] 656.

These varying constructions of the act naturally led to a want of uniformity in the practice, ship masters as well as courts disagreeing among themselves as to how great a variance from dead ahead would still meet the requirements of nearly end on. There was a further difficulty involved in the fact that the exhibition of a green light or green and white lights directly ahead, or on the [622]*622starboard bow is consistent not only with vessels approaching npon a parallel course, but upon a course across that of the other vessel, in which case porting the helm would bring about the very disaster it was designed to avoid; in other words, the light may be dead ahead or nearly dead ahead, and yet the two ships may not be meeting end on. To justify porting under article 13, not only must the ship carrying the light be end on, but the two ships must be meeting each other in that position, and the exhibition of a single colored light directly ahead by no means justifies that inference.

To put an end to this uncertainty, and to define with the utmost practicable exactness the meaning of the words “nearly end on,” on the 30th of July, 1868, an order in council was issued to the following effect: “The said two articles, numbered .11 and 13 respectively, only apply to cases where ships are meeting end on or nearly end on, in such a manner as to involve risk of collision. They consequently do not apply to two ships which must, if both keep on their respective courses, pass clear of each other. The only cases in which the said two articles apply are when each of the two ships is end on or nearly end on to the other; in other words, to cases in which, by day, each ship sees the mast of the other in a line or nearly in a line with her own, and, by night, to cases where each ship is in such a condition as to see both of the side lights of the other. The said two articles do not apply by day to cases in which the ship sees another ahead crossing her own course or, by night, to cases where the red light of one ship is opposed to the red light of the other, or where the green light of one ship is opposed to the green light of the other, or where a red light without a green light or a green light without a red light is seen ahead, or where both red and green lights are seen anywhere but ahead.” While this order has never been formally accepted by the supreme court as the correct interpretation of the 13th article, it has received the sanction of the district courts for the Southern and Eastern districts of New York, and has not, so far as I can gather, been repudiated anywhere. It was adopted verbatim by Judge Blatchford in the case of The America [Case No. 281], and was approved by Judge Benedict in The Sylvester Hale [Id. 13,712].

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 F. Cas. 620, 2 Flip. 241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-manitoba-mied-1878.