The Manhattan v. The Agnes Manning

E.D. Pennsylvania

The Manhattan v. The Agnes Manning

44 F. 110, 1890 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15

DecidedOctober 31, 1890

StatusPublished

This text of 44 F. 110 (The Manhattan v. The Agnes Manning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

The Manhattan v. The Agnes Manning, 44 F. 110, 1890 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15 (E.D. Pa. 1890).

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Opinion

Butler, J.

The Manhattan was in fault. The proofs show this very distinctly, — so distinctly that her proctor admitted it on the argument. Her duty required her to keep off, and she did not. Her lookout was defective, and the Manning’s approach was not observed until the vessels were so near each other as to create danger, notwithstanding the fact that her lights were burning brightly and the night was favorable to a distant view. They should have been seen readily a mile and a half away, yet they were not observed until the vessels were but a few lengths apart. This is the more reprehensible because the Manhattan was known to respond tardily to her wheel. — While admitting her fault, (which is amply sufficient to account for the disaster,) she charges the Manning with contributory negligence. Such charges, under similar circumstances, are very common. The crew of the offending vessel usually seeks to relieve itself from censure and responsibility by charging the other with improper change of course and voluntarily running into danger. To sustain such a charge the evidence should be very clear. In this case it certainly is not. While tho witnesses for the Manhattan say the schooner changed after they had ported, those from the latter declare just as positively that she did not. They say á slight change was made much further back, a considerable period before the Manhattan ported, and that this was the only change made. These witnesses are most likely to be accurate respecting the fact. If the wheel was changed, as charged, they must know it, while the others might be mistaken; and they pertainly have no greater motive for falsifying than the latter. Besides, they are supported by the probabilities of the case. It is improbable that she would so change after seeing the Manhattan turn in that direction and thus run into greater danger. It is quilo clear, to say the least, that the charge of contributory negligence is not proved.

If it were proved, however, it would not tend to relieve the steamer. The vessels were then in peril, and the change, though erroneous, would be excusable. That the situation was perilous when the steamer ported [112]*112cannot well' be doubted; the conduct of the officers Shows it. They resorted immediately to extreme measures, such as are only taken to escape threatened danger. It is evident they were seriously alarmed.

The steamer’s claim to damages cannot, therefore, be sustained, and a decree must be entered accordingly.

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Butler, J.

The Manhattan was in fault. The proofs show this very distinctly, — so distinctly that her proctor admitted it on the argument. Her duty required her to keep off, and she did not. Her lookout was defective, and the Manning’s approach was not observed until the vessels were so near each other as to create danger, notwithstanding the fact that her lights were burning brightly and the night was favorable to a distant view. They should have been seen readily a mile and a half away, yet they were not observed until the vessels were but a few lengths apart. This is the more reprehensible because the Manhattan was known to respond tardily to her wheel. — While admitting her fault, (which is amply sufficient to account for the disaster,) she charges the Manning with contributory negligence. Such charges, under similar circumstances, are very common. The crew of the offending vessel usually seeks to relieve itself from censure and responsibility by charging the other with improper change of course and voluntarily running into danger. To sustain such a charge the evidence should be very clear. In this case it certainly is not. While tho witnesses for the Manhattan say the schooner changed after they had ported, those from the latter declare just as positively that she did not. They say á slight change was made much further back, a considerable period before the Manhattan ported, and that this was the only change made. These witnesses are most likely to be accurate respecting the fact. If the wheel was changed, as charged, they must know it, while the others might be mistaken; and they pertainly have no greater motive for falsifying than the latter. Besides, they are supported by the probabilities of the case. It is improbable that she would so change after seeing the Manhattan turn in that direction and thus run into greater danger. It is quilo clear, to say the least, that the charge of contributory negligence is not proved.

If it were proved, however, it would not tend to relieve the steamer. The vessels were then in peril, and the change, though erroneous, would be excusable. That the situation was perilous when the steamer ported [112]*112cannot well' be doubted; the conduct of the officers Shows it. They resorted immediately to extreme measures, such as are only taken to escape threatened danger. It is evident they were seriously alarmed.

The steamer’s claim to damages cannot, therefore, be sustained, and a decree must be entered accordingly.

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44 F. 110, 1890 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-manhattan-v-the-agnes-manning-paed-1890.