The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC v. Wendy McCarsky

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: A-3083-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3083-24

THE LAW OFFICE OF RAJEH A. SAADEH, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WENDY MCCARSKY,

Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________

Submitted March 10, 2026 – Decided April 7, 2026

Before Judges Firko and Vinci.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-0130-25.

Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Cynthia L. Dubell, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM By leave granted, plaintiff The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC

appeals from an April 24, 2025 order denying its request for summary

disposition pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a) seeking the entry of judgment against

defendant Wendy McCarsky in the amount of $15,715.43 based on a fee

arbitration determination (fee award) of the District XIII Fee Arbitration

Committee (Committee), and $6,704.03 in contractual attorneys' fees and costs

pursuant to the parties' retainer agreement. Because the court improperly denied

plaintiff's application for judgment in the amount of the fee award, we reverse

that aspect of the April 24 order. We affirm to the extent the order denied

plaintiff's application to proceed in a summary manner on its separate

contractual claim for fees and costs.

On November 2, 2022, the parties entered into a retainer agreement in

connection with a post-judgment matrimonial matter relating to the negotiation

of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) for equitable distribution of

defendant's ex-husband's retirement account. The retainer agreement provides,

"[s]hould it be necessary to utilize the legal process to collect any amount

outstanding, [plaintiff] will be entitled to recover the costs of collection,

including for professional time expended by attorneys in and outside of

[plaintiff], and reasonable expenses."

A-3083-24 2 Plaintiff assigned an associate, Rachel L. Baxter, Esq., to represent

defendant. On April 1, 2024, Baxter left plaintiff to form her own firm. The

QDRO was not completed when Baxter left. On April 10, 2024, plaintiff sent

defendant a fee arbitration pre-action notice demanding payment of unpaid

invoices in the amount of $15,715.43. Defendant requested fee arbitration, and

a hearing was conducted by the Committee on November 14, 2024.

Plaintiff did not seek "any costs associated with collection efforts as [it]

would be permitted to do [so] in a court action under the[] retainer agreement."

Defendant testified at the hearing and "explained she was not contesting the

reasonableness of the fees or the amount of money she owes." Defendant

contended she was not yet obligated to pay plaintiff because "Baxter agreed that

once the QDRO was in place, [defendant] would pay [plaintiff]."

On December 10, 2024, the Committee determined "the fees charged by

[plaintiff] were reasonable" and issued the fee award. In doing so, the

Committee noted "[u]ltimately, [plaintiff] (through . . . Baxter) was able to

obtain the result [defendant] sought, namely, entry of a QDRO." The fee award

did not include any amount for "costs and disbursements." The Committee

advised defendant she had twenty-one days to appeal the fee award to the

A-3083-24 3 Disciplinary Review Board (DRB). Defendant did not appeal to the DRB or pay

the fee award.

On January 13, 2025, plaintiff filed a verified complaint seeking

"[r]eduction of the [fee award] . . . of $15,715.43 to judgment" (count one), and

"[c]ontract damages . . . in the amount of $6,704.03" for the "costs of collection"

based on the retainer agreement (count two). Plaintiff simultaneously applied

for an order to show cause (OTSC) to proceed in a summary manner pursuant to

Rule 4:67-1(a) and Rule 1:20A-3(e).

Defendant, self-represented, filed an answer in which she denied she was

obligated to pay plaintiff because an "agreement was set in place to pay

[p]laintiff . . . when [the] QDRO was completed." Defendant asserted she

"made numerous pleas to [p]laintiff . . . to please continue [the] agree[ment] that

was made in 2023 [where] the fee would [be] paid once [the] QDRO was

complete."

On March 7, 2025, the court conducted a remote hearing on plaintiff's

application for an OTSC. Defendant appeared and testified that the "QDRO

[was] still not finished" and Baxter agreed she did not need to pay plaintiff until

the QDRO was completed. Defendant conceded she did not appeal the fee award

to the DRB.

A-3083-24 4 The court noted it was "concern[ed] . . . that the [Committee] in their

decision seem[ed] to have clearly made a mistake . . . because they sa[id] that

now the QDRO is completed . . . so [defendant has] to pay." The court

acknowledged defendant "should have filed an appeal [to the DRB] within

[twenty-one] days but she did[ not]." It was "hesitant to be hard on [defendant]

because the [Committee] clearly made an error" when "[t]hey said that the

QDRO has been completed." The court adjourned the hearing to

"have . . . Baxter join . . . because if [she] confirm[ed] that . . . was the

agreement that was made, and the arbitration award was made with the mistaken

belief that the QDRO had actually been completed . . . then the arbitration award

is a mistake."

On April 24, 2025, the court conducted a second remote hearing on

plaintiff's application for an OTSC. The court was unable to contact Baxter and

she did not appear. Baxter, however, sent an email to the court stating she "did

advise [defendant] that given her financial situation, [she] would wait until the

QDRO [was] done before seeking payment of the legal fees." 1 Baxter

"acknowledge[d] . . . [her] representations to work with [defendant] and have

1 Baxter's email is not included in the appellate record. Our understanding of the content of the email is based on the transcript of the April 24 hearing. A-3083-24 5 her balance satisfied upon completi[on] . . . of the [QDRO] were not made on

behalf of [plaintiff]." Baxter confirmed "there is no written agreement between

[defendant] and [plaintiff] for her balance to be satisfied as previously

described."

After hearing argument, the court entered an order denying plaintiff's

application for an OTSC supported by an oral opinion and a brief written

statement of reasons. In its written statement of reasons, the court found "a

significant fact relied upon by the [Committee] was false." In its oral opinion,

the court determined "[i]t appears . . . there is a fact question as to whether or

not [plaintiff] agreed to hold off on collections until the QDRO was completed."

Specifically, "whether or not there is an agreement entered by someone who had

apparent authority to enter into that agreement."

With respect to the fee award, the court determined "there is a fact

question that was not addressed in the arbitration. In fact, in the arbitration [the

Committee] . . . said there was no . . . dispute, that the QDRO was done. So[,]

the arbitration award was mistaken." The court concluded it could not "enter an

order on a summary fashion when there is a fact question like that outstanding"

and would "allow the parties to proceed with whatever discovery is appropriate."

A-3083-24 6 We reverse the April 24, 2025 order to the extent it denied plaintiff's

application, pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a) and Rule 1:20A-3(e), for the entry of

judgment in the amount of the fee award. We review a trial court's interpretation

of court rules de novo. State v. Anthony, 443 N.J. Super. 553, 564 (App. Div.

2016) (citation omitted).

The court rules make clear that the DRB has exclusive jurisdiction to

review a fee arbitration committee determination. It has long been established

that the Law Division lacks jurisdiction to review a fee arbitration

determination. See Linker v. Co. Car Corp., 281 N.J. Super. 579, 586 (App.

Div. 1995) (finding, under an earlier iteration of the applicable rules, the Law

Division is powerless to review a fee arbitration award).

Pursuant to Rule 1:20A-2(a), "[a] fee arbitration determination is final and

binding upon the parties except as provided by [Rule] 1:20A-3(c)." Rule 1:20A-

3(c) provides that "[n]o appeal from the determination of a [f]ee [c]ommittee

may be taken by the client or the attorney to the [DRB] except" under limited

specifically enumerated circumstances. Rule 1:20A-3(d) requires that "[t]he

party taking an appeal shall file a notice of appeal in the form prescribed by the

[DRB] within twenty-one days after . . . receipt of the [f]ee [c]ommittee's

written arbitration determination."

A-3083-24 7 Rule 1:20A-3(e) provides:

[T]he attorney or client may, by summary action brought pursuant to Rule 4:67, obtain judgment in the amount of the fee or refund as determined by the [f]ee [c]ommittee. In any application for the entry of a judgment in accordance with this rule, no court shall have jurisdiction to review a fee arbitration committee determination. Said review is reserved exclusively to the [DRB] under Rule 1:20-15(l).2

Here, the court improperly reviewed the fee award and determined the

Committee "was mistaken." Pursuant to Rule 1:20A-3(e), review of a fee

arbitration determination is reserved exclusively to the DRB. It is undisputed

defendant did not appeal the fee award to the DRB. As expressly provided in

Rule 1:20A-3(e), the court lacked jurisdiction to review the fee award and was

required to enter judgment "in the amount of the fee . . . as determined by the"

Committee.

We conclude, however, the court correctly denied plaintiff's request for

summary disposition on count two of the complaint seeking an award of

contractual fees and costs not included in the fee award. We reach this

conclusion for two reasons.

2 Rule 1:20-15(l) provides, "[t]he [DRB] shall review an appeal from a determination of a fee arbitration committee in accordance with [Rule] 1:20A- 3(c)." A-3083-24 8 First, plaintiff's request to proceed in a summary manner on its contractual

claim for fees and costs pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a) was improper. 3 Rule 4:67-

1(a) applies only to "actions in which the court is permitted by rule or by statute

to proceed in a summary manner." In support of its request to proceed in a

summary manner, plaintiff relied on Rule 1:20A-3(e), which provides, "the

attorney . . . may, by summary action brought pursuant to Rule 4:67, obtain

judgment in the amount of the fee . . . as determined by the [f]ee [c]ommittee."

In this case, the fee award did not include any amount for "costs and

disbursements." Plaintiff's claim for fees and costs is based on its purported

contractual right under the retainer agreement, not the fee award. Therefore,

plaintiff's reliance on Rule 1:20A-3(e) in support of its application for summary

disposition was misplaced. Because there is no applicable rule or statute that

permits the court to proceed in a summary manner on plaintiff's claim for

contract damages, plaintiff did not have the right to seek summary disposition

pursuant to Rule 4:67-1(a).

3 Because "an appeal is taken from a trial court's ruling rather than reasons for the ruling, we may rely on grounds other than those upon which the trial court relied." State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176 (App. Div. 2011). "A trial court judgment that reaches the proper conclusion must be affirmed even if it is based on the wrong reasoning." Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018).

A-3083-24 9 Second, even if plaintiff's application was properly supported, we are

satisfied the court appropriately denied its application for summary disposition

on count two. We review a court's summary disposition determination for an

abuse of discretion. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports &

Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that

because a trial court's denial of summary disposition is a discretionary ruling,

an appellate court will "reverse only when the exercise of discretion was

'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances" (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement

Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007))).

Based on defendant's testimony at the March 7 and April 24, 2025

hearings and the correspondence it received from Baxter, the court determined

there exists a material question of fact that precludes summary disposition.

Specifically, whether plaintiff, through Baxter, entered into an agreement with

defendant to defer her obligation to pay any outstanding fees and costs until after

the QDRO was completed. There is no reason for us to conclude the court

misapplied its discretion by denying plaintiff's request for summary disposition

on count two and permitting the parties to conduct discovery.

A-3083-24 10 Reversed as to count one and remanded for entry of judgment in the

amount of the fee award. Affirmed as to count two and remanded for further

proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-3083-24 11