NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2978-24
THE LAW OFFICE OF RAJEH A. SAADEH, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SYED AHMAD,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Argued May 18, 2026 – Decided June 17, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. DC-003922- 24.
Rajeh A. Saadeh argued the cause for appellant (Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorneys; Rajeh A. Saadeh and Cynthia L. Dubell, on the briefs).
Syed Ahmad, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf.
PER CURIAM In this collection action, the Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC
(plaintiff) appeals from three orders: a May 12, 2025 order dismissing its
complaint for unpaid legal fees following a bench trial; a February 10, 2025
order denying plaintiff's motion to disqualify or recuse the assigned trial judge ;
and an April 25, 2025 order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that defendant Syed Ahmad, a former
client, failed to pay outstanding attorney's fees and costs consistent with the
parties' duly signed retainer agreement. Plaintiff sought recovery under theories
of breach of contract, book account, and unjust enrichment. Having reviewed
the record, we affirm the order denying plaintiff's motion for disqualification,
reverse the orders dismissing plaintiff's complaint and denying summary
judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Defendant retained plaintiff to represent him in a post-judgment child
support matter and the parties executed a written retainer agreement on August
22, 2023, setting forth the relevant financial terms of plaintiff's representation.
The retainer listed the hourly rates for the attorneys and professionals
"who may provide you with legal services," with associated hourly rates of $125
for paralegal services, $450 for services provided by plaintiff's managing
member, Rajeh A. Saadeh, Esq., and $340 for Rachel L. Baxter, Esq. (Baxter)
A-2978-24 2 who the parties do not dispute provided most if not all of the attorney services
at issue to defendant.
The retainer agreement further states in relevant part:
Statements: Monthly statements will be rendered to you via email for all months in which you have been provided services or for which disbursements were made on your behalf. . . . Payment is due upon your receipt of the statement, and you agree to pay promptly. A late charge of one percent (1%) per month will be due on all amounts outstanding more than thirty (30) calendar days after a statement date and every thirty (30) calendar days after a statement date until the statement and all late charges thereon have been paid in full. . . . If you fail to pay balances in accordance with this paragraph, then we reserve the right to seek and obtain security from you for your outstanding indebtedness and/or to terminate our professional relationship. If our relationship ends, we will assert a lien on any amounts recovered by you in settlement or adjudication of your case for the amount you owe. If we utilize any legal process to collect any amount outstanding, we will be entitled to recover the cost of collection, including for professional time expended by attorneys in and outside of the [plaintiff], and reasonable expenses, including but not limited to court, service, and execution cost.
Defendant paid the initial $1,500 retainer. From September 2023 through
January 2024, plaintiff provided legal services primarily through attorney
Baxter, as evidenced in the invoices contained in the record and defendant paid
an additional $2,284.20.
A-2978-24 3 By February 2024, plaintiff claimed defendant owed an outstanding
balance of $4,589.55 in unpaid legal fees and costs.1 The parties agreed to settle
the matter for $4,000, but defendant failed to remit payment. Thereafter,
plaintiff sent defendant a Fee Arbitration Pre-Action Notice in May 2024 to his
home address in East Brunswick, advising defendant that he had thirty days to
pursue arbitration,2 which defendant declined to do in time.
On July 3, 2024, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in the Special Civil
Part, seeking $4,589.55 on "a certain book account," and alleging defendant
failed to pay for legal services rendered pursuant to the parties' retainer
agreement and "would be unjustly enriched if payment . . . is not made to
[p]laintiff(s)." And, although defendant initially filed an answer and
counterclaim which disputed the accuracy and propriety of plaintiff's invoices,
and asserted the fees were excessive, unsupported, and unjustified, defendant
later withdrew the counterclaim. 3
1 At trial, plaintiff had increased its demand to $18,333.85, inclusive of collection costs. 2 The notice enclosed copies of the retainer agreement and itemized invoices and further advised that failure to timely pursue fee arbitration would permit plaintiff to institute collection litigation. 3 After defendant failed to comply with discovery obligations, the court entered an order striking defendant's answer and entering default against him. The court
A-2978-24 4 In November 2024, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without
prejudice after plaintiff's principal witness Saadeh failed to appear for trial.
Plaintiff then moved to both reinstate the complaint and disqualify the judge.
The recusal motion included a certification filed by Cynthia L. Dubell, Esq., an
attorney employed by plaintiff, which outlined allegations of biased treatment
by the judge in the handling of similar fee disputes. Dubell further certified that
the judge "has become substantially more hostile towards [p]laintiff and its
attorneys," and "has demonstrated that she cannot be fair or impartial to
[p]laintiff and its attorneys." On February 10, 2025, the Presiding Judge denied
plaintiff's disqualification motion, finding no evidence of bias or impropriety,
and reinstated plaintiff's complaint.
On March 10, 2025, plaintiff next moved for summary judgment and
provided a certification from Dubell, billing records, invoices, and the retainer
agreement. Defendant opposed summary judgment and disputed the reliability
and accuracy of plaintiff's invoices for the services allegedly performed.
On April 25, 2025, the court denied summary judgment based on its
finding that defendant had demonstrated genuine issues of material fact
later vacated the default and reinstated defendant's answer following additional motion practice and supplemental discovery proceedings, permitting the matter to proceed on the merits. A-2978-24 5 concerning plaintiff's billing practices. The court also questioned whether
defendant received the fee arbitration notice, whether the invoices were
fraudulently created, and whether plaintiff properly mitigated damages during
settlement discussions.
On May 12, 2025, the court held a bench trial. Only Saadeh was called to
testify. Plaintiff presented the testimony of Saadeh as the managing member of
plaintiff's law firm, and he testified regarding the firm's representation of
defendant, the execution and terms of the retainer agreement, the firm's billing
practices, and the maintenance of invoices in the ordinary course of business.
Plaintiff also moved the retainer agreement, invoices, and payment records into
evidence as business records without objection and the court admitted the
evidence.
During cross-examination, defendant questioned Saadeh regarding his
personal knowledge of the work reflected in the invoices, the services allegedly
performed by Baxter, and the absence of testimony from Baxter herself, who
had performed most of the underlying legal work. Saadeh admitted that he did
not have personal knowledge "as to what [] Baxter worked on that led to the
drafting of these invoices" and further conceded that, aside from reviewing the
invoices themselves, he had no independent knowledge concerning the
underlying motion practice or services performed in defendant's matter.
A-2978-24 6 Defendant did not testify, present witnesses, or introduce documentary or expert
Following trial, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
The court found plaintiff failed to satisfy its burden of proof and concluded that
unresolved factual disputes remained concerning plaintiff's billing practices, the
reliability of the invoices, the receipt of the fee arbitration notice, and plaintiff's
mitigation efforts. The court further found that the invoices did not "speak for
themselves" because even Saadeh did not possess personal knowledge of the
nature of the specific billing entries made and the invoices.
Plaintiff appealed from the court's February 10, 2025 order denying its
motion to disqualify the judge, the April 25, 2025 order denying summary
judgment, and the May 12, 2025 order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice following the bench trial. We address plaintiff's arguments seriatim.
II.
Our review of a judgment entered following a bench trial is very limited.
We apply a deferential standard of review. D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J.
168, 182 (2013). When the trial judge acts as the factfinder in a bench trial, we
"must accept the factual findings of" that trial judge, when such findings "are
'supported by sufficient[,] credible evidence in the record.'" State v.
Mohammed, 226 N.J. 71, 88 (2016) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424
A-2978-24 7 (2014)). We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Griepenburg
v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc.
v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). For mixed questions of law
and fact, the appellate court gives deference to the trial court's supported factual
findings but reviews de novo the application of legal rules to those facts. State
v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015).
A.
Denial of Plaintiff's Disqualification Motion
As a preliminary matter, we reject plaintiff's argument the court erred in
denying his motion for disqualification of the judge.
A trial court's decision on a motion to disqualify a judge is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 186 (1997); State v. McCabe,
201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010). However, where the issue is whether the facts, as found,
meet the legal standard for disqualification, the appellate court reviews that legal
conclusion de novo. State v. Dalal, 221 N.J. 601, 607 (2015). A judge must be
disqualified when the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and
the objective inquiry is whether a reasonable, fully informed person would have
A-2978-24 8 doubts about the judge's impartiality. DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517
(2008).
Here, plaintiff contends the judge should have been disqualified based on
her conduct during the November 13, 2024 trial call, during which she dismissed
plaintiff's complaint without prejudice after plaintiff appeared without Saadeh
present. Plaintiff asserts the judge improperly dismissed the matter despite
counsel's explanation that Saadeh mistakenly believed the proceeding had been
scheduled for mediation rather than trial. Plaintiff adds that the judge engaged
in objectively disparate treatment by dismissing this matter for failure to appear
trial-ready while permitting "every other attorney that day" to proceed to
mediation without their clients present, thereby treating plaintiff "worse than
similarly-situated litigants."
After reviewing the audio recording and submissions related to the
November 13 proceeding, the Presiding Judge expressly found no evidence of
improper conduct. Instead, the Presiding Judge found that the judge acted in a
"completely professional" and "well-reserved" manner and appropriately
managed the proceeding.
Plaintiff's assertions of the judge's hostility and disparate treatment,
notwithstanding, prove insufficient to establish actual bias or an objectively
reasonable appearance of impropriety warranting disqualification under
A-2978-24 9 DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517. As the Presiding Judge noted, the judge dismissed
plaintiff's complaint for lack of trial readiness, an action which falls within the
purview of judicial case management, as "[b]ias cannot be inferred from adverse
rulings against a party." See Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App.
Div. 2008) (citing Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super. 441, 444-47 (Ch.
Div.1984)). And, we agree that nothing in the record demonstrates that a
reasonable, fully informed person would question the judge's impartiality based
on her comments and decision. See DeNike, 196 N.J. at 517. Additionally, the
court's subsequent rulings denying summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's
complaint do not retroactively establish bias. See Marshall, 148 N.J. at 276
(quoting State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 591 (1960)) ("[a]bsent a showing of bias
or prejudice, the participation of a judge in previous proceedings in the case
before him is not a ground for disqualification").
B.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
We review a trial court's order on summary judgment de novo and apply
the same standard used by the trial court. Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468, 477
(2024). "In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court does not 'weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter'; it only 'determine[s] whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.'" C.V. ex rel. C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of
A-2978-24 10 Educ., 255 N.J. 289, 305-06 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Rios v. Meda
Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021)). "To decide whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from
the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J.
449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev,
225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). If the "competent evidential materials presented,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient
to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party," the movant is not entitled to summary judgment. Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995); see also Globe
Motor Co., 225 N.J. at 480. A court should grant summary judgment "[o]nly
'when the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.'" Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236, 257 (2018)
(quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff maintains defendant's opposition to its motion was wholly
inadequate and legally insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiff
argues his evidentiary support was "thorough, complete, and conclusive with
ample documentary support," including certifications demonstrating the signed
agreement, itemized invoices, and proof that defendant "failed to pay" for
services rendered. Plaintiff characterizes defendant's opposition as containing
A-2978-24 11 "bald, foundation-free, and irrelevant statements" and "mere allegations . . .
without evidential support," such as claims that the invoices were "flawed,
erroneous, inflated, egregious, inaccurate, unsupported, [or] unjustifiable, " none
of which were supported by "a single fact or piece of evidence."
Defendant maintains that plaintiff "did not present any affidavits, or any
sworn statements or any deposition [testimony] from witnesses or its employees
or staff that would attest to the veracity of any of the entries created on the
alleged invoice." Defendant further contends that plaintiff could not "identify
which of its employees performed which tasks on the alleged invoice," could
not explain "how the entries are created," and did not produce the client file or
other documents that would connect the billed entries to work actually
performed. Defendant maintains that factual disputes existed as to whether
plaintiff notified defendant who was working on the case, whether the invoices
were fraudulently created, and whether plaintiff properly mitigated damages
during the June 2024 settlement discussions.
The court stated that "it is undisputed that plaintiff and defendant entered
into a contract," it found that "a reasonable jury or factfinder could conclude"
there was a factual dispute as to whether plaintiff breached the retainer
agreement "with the manner in which it . . . billed . . . defendant in this matter."
A-2978-24 12 We note that, defendant's opposition to summary judgment consisted
primarily of argument and generalized assertions that plaintiff had "not met its
burden of proof" and had "not presented any facts, affidavits, depositions, sworn
statements from witnesses, or any legal authority that would support its
[motion]." We further disagree with defendant's characterization of plaintiff's
motion as legally insufficient and note that in failing to refute plaintiff's
statements of fact, defendant's opposition was insufficient under Rule 4:46-2,
which required a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to "file a
responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the
movant's statement." (emphasis added). And, contrary to defendant's repeated
claims that plaintiff failed to provide any affidavit regarding the accuracy of its
invoices, Dubell certified that Baxter provided legal services to defendant at an
hourly rate of $340 and to the costs and fees incurred by plaintiff for work
performed.
Based on this record, we are satisfied that, viewing the motion record in
the light most favorable to non-movant defendant, the court had sufficient
uncontroverted proof of plaintiff's legal services, and defendant raised no
genuine issue of material fact to defeat the motion. In fact, defendant seemingly
raised similar claims of fraud and unsupported billing practices that were
initially in his counterclaim, which he had previously voluntarily dismissed.
A-2978-24 13 Accordingly, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on liability .
See Brill, 142 N.J. at 540.
C.
Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint
Even in the absence of the court's error in denying summary judgment,
plaintiff also contends the court erred in dismissing its complaint following trial,
arguing that the testimony presented at trial, together with the admitted business
records, including invoices, payment history, and retainer agreement,
sufficiently established defendant's liability and entitlement to the relief sought.
In particular, plaintiff contends the invoices were admissible business records
that "speak for themselves," and that once admitted into evidence, they
constituted prima facie proof of the services rendered and fees incurred. On this
point, plaintiff established the foundational requirements for admissibility
through Saadeh's testimony that the invoices were maintained in the ordinary
course of business, reviewed on a weekly basis, and generated
contemporaneously with, or within one week of, the work performed.
The court concluded plaintiff failed to sustain its burden because "there
was no one here with personal knowledge as to the work that was done on
[defendant]'s case," and because Saadeh "admitted on a number of occasions
that he had no -- did not have personal knowledge as to any of the work that was
A-2978-24 14 completed on [defendant]'s case." The court further concluded that plaintiff
failed to sufficiently demonstrate "that they assisted [defendant] at each stage of
his case in deciding upon a course of action" or "evaluat[ed] and weigh[ed] the
costs of a particular course of action against a likely outcome and risk."
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) states:
A statement contained in a writing or other record of acts, events, conditions, and, subject to [N.J.R.E.] 808, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time of observation by a person with actual knowledge or from information supplied by such a person, if the writing or other record was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular practice of that business to make such writing or other record.
"This exception does not apply if the sources of information or the
method, purpose or circumstances of preparation indicate that it is not
trustworthy." 4 Ibid. However, admissibility does not compel a factfinder to
accept the contents of the records as true or persuasive. The rule expressly
requires circumstances indicating trustworthiness, and the weight afforded to
admitted business records remains for the trier of fact. See Konop v. Rosen, 425
N.J. Super. 391, 403 (App. Div. 2012); Garden State Bldgs., L.P. v. First Fid.
4 Business records are addressed under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6), and their admissibility generally requires proof that the record was made in the regular course of business, within a short time of the act or event recorded, and under circumstances indicating trustworthiness. State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 29 (1985); Konop, 425 N.J. Super. at 403 (App. Div. 2012). A-2978-24 15 Bank, N.A., 305 N.J. Super. 510, 524-25 (App. Div. 1997). Moreover,
credibility determinations and the weight to be assigned to documentary
evidence are entitled to substantial deference on appeal, particularly following
a bench trial. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998); Seidman v. Clifton
Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011).
The court gave plaintiff's business records little or no weight because,
during his testimony, Saadeh acknowledged that he did not have "any personal
knowledge as to what Baxter worked on that led to the drafting of these
invoices," and could not otherwise explain certain invoice entries on cross-
examination. Although a factfinder is not required to accept admitted business
records as conclusive proof, see Konop, 425 N.J. Super. at 403, the court wholly
rejected competent, credible, and largely unrefuted evidence contained in
plaintiff's business records. While defendant categorized the invoices as
"inflated," "unsupported," and "fraudulent," those assertions largely remained
conclusory and unsupported by competent evidence in the record. See Ridge at
Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 98-99 (App. Div. 2014).
The court expressly found that "there was no one here with personal
knowledge as to the work that was done on [defendant]'s case," and that even
the managing member "could not decipher even the first entry that we were
trying to go over together while we were here in court." The court also observed
A-2978-24 16 that Saadeh "admitted on a number of occasions" that he lacked personal
knowledge of the work performed, and that plaintiff had "no person with
personal knowledge here" to explain how the firm assisted defendant, evaluated
the costs and risks of particular actions, or connected the invoice entries to actual
legal services rendered. Those findings went to the trustworthiness of the
invoices, not just admissibility.
The court's reasoning, however, inferred that Saadeh was required to
possess personal knowledge regarding the specific legal work reflected in the
invoices, or that only the attorney who performed the work, in this case Baxter,
who was by then a former employee of the firm, could testify concerning the
validity of the invoices and the services rendered. However, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)
has no such rigid requirement.5
Rather, a business record may be established as "trustworthy" if it is
authenticated through a qualified witness familiar with the business's ordinary
record-keeping practices, even if the witness lacks direct personal knowledge of
the underlying events. See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Dudnick, 292 N.J. Super.
5 "Nothing in N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6) constrains the rule to records created by the same entity that is the proponent of the evidence at trial. Indeed, parties to litigation routinely seek the admission of documents created by other parties or nonparties under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6)." Inv'rs Bank v. Torres, 243 N.J. 25, 48-49 (2020) A-2978-24 17 11, 18-19 (1996) ("the foundation witness generally is not required to have
personal knowledge of the facts contained in the record"). While the court
remained free to scrutinize the invoices and reject unsupported entries, the full
dismissal of plaintiff's claims despite the existence of admitted business records,
corroborating payment history, and an executed retainer agreement was not
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See Rova Farms Resort,
65 N.J. at 484.
Accordingly, we conclude the court mistakenly exercised its discretion
and improvidently rejected the evidence of plaintiff's business records, which
were admitted into evidence, without objection from defendant. Thus, although
we affirm the February 10, 2025 order, we reverse and remand the denial of
summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and order a new trial
as to plaintiff's claim for damages. On remand, a different judge shall conduct,
if necessary, a new or supplemental hearing on the issue of damages related to
attorney's fees and costs. We reach this conclusion because the judge previously
made credibility findings, and thus, it is "appropriate that the matter be assigned
to a different trial court." R.L. v. Voytac, 199 N.J. 285, 306 (2009). Nothing in
our opinion should be interpreted as an expression of our view on the merits of
the remanded proceedings.
A-2978-24 18 Because we reversed and remanded the orders denying summary judgment
and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, we need not address any of the parties'
remaining arguments.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for a proof hearing on
damages. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-2978-24 19