The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, L.L.C. v. Omar Abdou

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 6, 2025
• Docket: A-2965-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2965-23

THE LAW OFFICE OF RAJEH A. SAADEH, L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OMAR ABDOU,

Defendant-Respondent. _____________________________

Submitted December 17, 2024 – Decided January 6, 2025

Before Judges Smith and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. DC-001583-24.

The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Cynthia L. Dubell, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM Plaintiff appeals from a Law Division order awarding it only partial

attorney fees in its collection action against a former client, defendant Omar

Abdou. We affirm.

On or about October 24, 2023, defendant hired plaintiff to represent him.

Paragraph C of the retainer agreement states in relevant part: "[i]f we utilize any

legal process to collect any amount outstanding, we will be entitled to recover

the costs of collection, including for professional time expended by attorneys in

and outside of [Plaintiff] and reasonable expenses, including but not limi ted to

court, service, and execution costs."

After the representation concluded, plaintiff sent a Fee Arbitration Pre-

Action Notice to defendant. After defendant failed to request Fee Arbitration,

plaintiff sued defendant for attorney fees, including fees incurred pursuing

collection. When defendant failed to answer, plaintiff moved for default.

The trial court granted default judgment against defendant in the amount

of $6,276.51 for plaintiff's representation, making findings. After finding

plaintiff's hourly rate was reasonable and similar to rates charged in the locality,

the trial court analyzed the reasonableness of the number of hours billed. The

court found plaintiff expended 6.2 hours of time on this matter. The court then

A-2965-23 2 deducted certain charges, finding: 2.7 hours of block billing 1 duplicative; 0.10

hours vague; 0.24 hours clerical; and 1.36 hours excessive. The court also

rejected 3 hours of anticipatory fees. As such, the court reduced the award for

collection-related attorney fees to $1,308.60 from the $3,846.75 sought.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court acted arbitrarily by finding

certain billing entries were "block billing," "duplicative," "excessive," or

"vague."

In reviewing the grant or denial of a counsel fee award, we accord

significant deference to the trial judge's determinations. McGowan v. O'Rourke,

391 N.J. Super. 502, 508 (App. Div. 2007). A trial judge's "fee determination

'will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a

clear abuse of discretion.'" Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372,

402 (2009) (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring) (quoting Packard-Bamberger & Co. v.

Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)). However, where a trial judge's determination

of fees was based on "irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear

1 "'Block billing' is 'the time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.'" Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1554 n.15 (10th Cir. 1996)).

A-2965-23 3 error in judgment," we must intervene. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181,

193 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571

(2002)).

A trial court should consider the lodestar, "which is that number of hours

reasonably expended by the successful party's counsel in the litigation,

multiplied by their reasonable hourly rate." Litton, 200 N.J. at 386. The lodestar

amount "is the most significant element in the award of a reasonable fee because

that function requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the

aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing

party to support the fee application." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 335

(1995). The court "should not accept passively the submissions of counsel to

support the lodestar amount . . . ." Ibid. "[T]he attorney's presentation of

billable hours should be set forth in sufficient detail to permit the trial court to

ascertain the manner in which the billable hours were divided among the various

counsel . . . ." Id. at 337.

To determine the reasonableness of the hourly rate, the court must

compute the rate to that of similar services for lawyers of reasonably comparable

skill, experience, and reputation. Ibid. The determination of the reasonable rate

need not be unnecessarily complex or protracted but the court "should satisfy

A-2965-23 4 itself that the assigned hourly rates are fair, realistic, and accurate, or should

make appropriate adjustments." Ibid. Where time entries note an unreasonable

number of hours expended for tasks such as "routine correspondence and

preparation of routine pleadings," for example, there is a need for "critical

review of the certification to be supplied by counsel." Scullion v. State Farm

Ins. Co., 345 N.J. Super. 431, 441 (App. Div. 2001).

Guided by these principles, we are convinced the court appropriately

analyzed plaintiff's counsel's submissions, which included counsel's imprecise

time entries. The record shows the court considered the difficulty of the matter,

the skill required, and the results obtained. The amount represents the court's

determination of the reasonable numbers of hours plaintiff's attorney expended

for each task minus anticipatory fees multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate

for the attorney who performed the task. The court properly exercised its

discretion.

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

contentions, we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant further

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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