The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC v. Kevin Pidgeon

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 22, 2025
• Docket: A-0798-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0798-24

THE LAW OFFICE OF RAJEH A. SAADEH, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellants,

v.

KEVIN PIDGEON,

Defendant-Respondent. ___________________________

Submitted September 29, 2025 – Decided October 22, 2025

Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Docket No. DC-002640- 24.

The Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh, LLC, attorneys for appellants (Cynthia L. Dubell, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM In this collection action, plaintiff the Law Office of Rajeh A. Saadeh

appeals from the following two orders: an October 21, 2024 order denying

plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees without prejudice; and a November 12, 2024

order amending the judgment and awarding a fraction of the attorney's fees

sought. Plaintiff argues the court erred as the attorney's fees sought were

contractually required under the terms of his retainer agreement with defendant

and former client Kevin Pidgeon. 1 We affirm the court's award of attorney's fees

as modified to include fees incurred by plaintiff related to resubmitting his

motion.

Plaintiff represented defendant in two family-related matters pursuant to

separate retainer agreements dated January 5, 2024, and January 25, 2024,

respectively. Both agreements provided for billing attorney services at an

hourly rate of between $310 to $550 and of an advance retainer of $2,500.

Additionally, relevant to our determination of the issue before us, paragraph C

in both agreements provides:

If our professional relationship ends, we will assert a lien on any amounts recovered by you in settlement or adjudication of your case for the amount you owe. This does not foreclose us from exercising any other rights at law or in equity to collect or secure our fee. If we

1 Defendant's brief is suppressed pursuant to our order for failing to file a response to this appeal. A-0798-24 2 utilize any legal process to collect any amount outstanding, we will be entitled to recover the costs of collection, including for professional time expended by attorneys . . . and reasonable expenses, including but not limited to courts, service, and execution costs.

It is undisputed that at the conclusion of plaintiff's representation,

defendant failed to pay timely for all services rendered, prompting plaintiff to

file a complaint against defendant.2 When defendant failed to respond to the

complaint, plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which was granted on

October 21, 2024, in the amount of $3,275.25, inclusive of unpaid fees. The

court, however, denied plaintiff's application for reasonable attorney fees—an

additional $8,971.95—without prejudice, stating "the total amount of legal

services provided in [p]laintiff's invoices do not match the amount sought in

[p]laintiff's certification in support of this motion."

Plaintiff moved anew for attorney's fees related to its collection efforts

under paragraph C of the retainer agreements, which the court reviewed as a

motion to reopen the case. On November 12, 2024, the court granted plaintiff's

motion in part and amended the previous judgment to include an award of

attorney's fees of $2,987.20. In its statement of reasons, the court found

2 Plaintiff sent a Fee Arbitration Pre-Action Notice to defendant prior to filing the complaint in the Law Division. A-0798-24 3 plaintiff's hourly rate for attorney and paralegal services reasonable. Regarding

the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, the court struck several entries,

finding them excessive, "not clearly related to this action," clerical in nature,

and unreasonable. Based on these findings, the court reduced plaintiff's award

by $7,458.95, stating, "[t]he court awards the remainder of the amount sought,

as this amount is reasonable and related to the instant matter," and awarded

$2,987.20.3 This appeal followed.

"[A] reviewing court will disturb a trial court's award of counsel fees 'only

on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'"

Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting

Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)). Where the trial

court has followed the law and made appropriate findings of fact, an award is

accorded "substantial deference." See Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 466

(App. Div. 2000). see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.

4.7 on R. 5:3-5 (2024).

In Rendine v. Pantzer, the Supreme Court explained the process for

analyzing an award of attorney fees:

[T]he first step in the fee-setting process is to determine the "lodestar": the number of hours reasonably

3 Instead of the requested award of $10,446.15. A-0798-24 4 expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.... [T]he trial court's determination of the lodestar amount is the most significant element in the award of a reasonable fee because that function requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing party to support the fee application.

[141 N.J. 292, 334-35 (1996).]

Further, the Court noted "the attorney's presentation of billable hours

should be set forth in sufficient detail to permit the trial court to ascertain the

manner in which the billable hours were divided." Id. at 337. "[W]ithout some

fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities

. . . the court cannot know the nature of the services for which compensation is

sought." Ibid.

Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC") 1.5(a) mandates that "[a] lawyer's

fee shall be reasonable" and requires consideration of these factors:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

A-0798-24 5 (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

[RPC 1.5(a).]

Before us, plaintiff principally argues it is entitled to costs of collection,

including professional time expended by its attorneys pursuant to the retainer

agreement with defendant. Plaintiff challenges the court's comprehensive

review of its billing under Rendine, arguing "the format utilized by [p]laintiff

does not require a detailed and thorough analysis of each separate word for each

time entry. The trial court simply need[ed] to determine[] are the hours and

work cited reasonable, and if so, the award must be given." Plaintiff maintains

its billing entries are detailed and provide the court with a good understanding

of the nature of the work performed, along with a general timeframe in which

such work was undertaken, and "[a]ll of the fees incurred in taking these steps

are considered 'any legal process to collect any amount outstanding' under the

terms of the [a]greement(s) . . . , and therefore should be awarded in full."

A-0798-24 6 As to the October order, plaintiff maintains that "[i]nstead of enforcing

the retainer agreements and awarding full attorney fees, in the first instance, the

trial court denied [p]laintiff any attorney fees," in error. Plaintiff asserts the

court's reasoning that the invoices did not match the amount sought in the

certification was incorrect and constitutes plain error.

Regarding the November order, plaintiff asserts the "court's error on the

initial fee application forced [p]laintiff to have to complete additional work that

was unnecessary," which unduly burdened plaintiff's attorneys and paralegal.

Plaintiff next disputes seriatim each of the entries the court modified, reduced

or struck, specifically disputing the court's finding on each entry, and concluding

the court erred. After reviewing the orders separately, plaintiff contends

"generally as to the effect of both orders overall, what should be most notable

here is that the trial court's reductions and stricken entries fail to respect that

[d]efendant expressly consented, in a contract, to responsibility for 'costs of

collection, including for professional time . . .'" This is no doubt the

predominant theme in plaintiff's briefs.

Plaintiff maintains defendant failed to respond to the litigation, "and thus

made no argument for or against an award of attorney['s] fees. The [c]ourt

cannot sua sponte deny [p]laintiff's requested [relief] [sic] on behalf of a

A-0798-24 7 [d]efendant who fails to raise the issue." And, the court's disregard of entire

entries and reduction in time led to "a miscarriage of justice and was not only

improper, but an abuse of discretion."

Lastly, plaintiff avers the court erred by striking the requested five percent

for disbursements, which the court found unreasonable pursuant to Gruber &

Colabella, P.A. v. Erickson, 345 N.J. Super. 248, 249 (Law Div. 2001).

Applying the well-settled legal principles above, we reject plaintiff's

contentions the court clearly abused its discretion in reviewing and reducing his

fee award. There is no question the parties had separate retainers entitling

plaintiff to payment for legal services rendered to defendant based on paragraph

C of the retainer agreements. Attorney fee applications, however, are subject to

court review, analysis, and approval, as it is the court that determines whether

the hours billed and legal services performed are reasonable. Rendine v.

Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995). Plaintiff acknowledges this fact in its brief,

despite repeatedly advocating for a straightforward contract analysis pursuant to

the retainer agreements.

We reject plaintiff's contention the court erred in its analysis of its fee

application by failing to apply general principles of contract law. As plaintiff

acknowledges in its brief, "[a]greements between attorneys and clients

A-0798-24 8 concerning the client-lawyer relationship generally are enforceable, provided

the agreements satisfy both the general requirements for contracts and the

special requirements for professional ethics." See Cohen v. Radio-Electronics

Officers Union, 146 N.J. 140, 155 (1996). Despite observing this well-settled

legal principle, plaintiff rehashes the argument that "[p]er the retainer

agreement, as a matter of contract, [p]laintiff seeks and is entitled to attorney

fees incurred in connection with collection, including motion work, trial and

pre-trial events and effort."

Our Supreme Court held in Rendine, the court "should not accept

passively the submissions of counsel to support the lodestar amount." 141 N.J.

at 335. Instead, the court is entitled to conduct a "critical review of the

certification to be supplied by counsel." Scullion v. State Farm Ins. Co., 345

N.J. Super. 431, 441 (App. Div. 2001). Thus, contrary to plaintiff's claims,

Rendine requires rather than abrogates the court's right to analyze fee

applications, to determine the "lodestar": the number of hours "reasonably

expended" multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.

We observe this well-settled legal principle in Hrycak v. Kiernan, 367 N.J.

Super. 237 (App. Div. 2004), another case involving a law firm and retainer

agreement which provided the client would be responsible for collection costs .

A-0798-24 9 There, we noted "[a]greements between attorneys and clients generally are

enforceable as long as they are fair and reasonable." 367 N.J. Super. 237, 239

(App. Div. 2004) (citing Cohen v. Radio-Elecs. Officers Union, 146 N.J. 140,

155 (1996)). And, we found the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable additional

compensation under the retainer agreement, "[s]ubject to review of

reasonableness by the court." Ibid. The court's role is to determine the

reasonableness of the requested fees. We therefore discern no abuse of

discretion in the court's review and adjustments made to plaintiff's entries for

the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the fees. As the court properly

noted, "abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the discretionary act was not

premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon

consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error

in judgment.' Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005)."

Here, the court conducted the appropriate analysis, finding the attorney

and paralegal rates were reasonable. The court next reviewed the reasonableness

of the number of hours billed, reducing and striking certain entries for various

reasons, including that certain of the entries were excessive, clerical in nature,

and unrelated to defendant's matter. The court articulated its reasoning for each

adjusted or modified entry, though plaintiff disputes these determinations.

A-0798-24 10 Although we discern no error with the court’s review of plaintiff’s billing

entries for purposes of addressing the motion, we part ways with the court's

dismissal of plaintiff's initial motion, which plaintiff claims constitutes error. In

the October order, the court granted plaintiff $3,275.25 in fees related to filing

cost and service of the complaint. The court, however, rejected plaintiff's

application for attorney's fees without prejudice, finding a discrepancy in the

total amount provided in plaintiff's invoices and plaintiff's certification. Before

us, plaintiff argues such a finding constituted error and any discrepancy was de

minimis at best.

In reaching its conclusion, the court failed to analyze the reasonableness

of plaintiff's entries and as a result, plaintiff incurred additional fees related to

preparation and filing of its second motion, which would not have been

necessary had the court not erred in its denial of the initial fee application. 4

Plaintiff's certification contains the following entries for counsel post the

October 21 order:

10/21/24 Legal Fees: Hourly CLD: Read Court email; Retrieve and read Order granting Default Judgment but

4 Plaintiff asserts the court's error is essentially two-fold: (1) denying any fees on the initial fee application based on an incorrect finding, which then forced it to complete additional work on the new motion; and (2) "by only awarding $2,987.20 of [p]laintiff's requested $10,446.15."

A-0798-24 11 Denying Fees (without prejudice); Instruct staff to save and distribute Order; Collections case management/strategy review for new fee application. [Total hours:] 0.50.

10/25/24 Legal Fees: Hourly CLD: Update time records (0.2); Revise Cert Attorney Services with new time (0.3); Revise Letter Brief (0.1); Revise Cert of Proof (0.3); Revise Cert of Service (0.1); Draft NOM Amend Atty Fees (0.3); Draft Form of Order (0.3); Revise Filing Letter (0.2); e-file NOM Amend Atty Fees (0.2); instruct staff to serve Def & save all to file (0.1). [Total hours:] 2.10.

Expenses and disbursements to date (copying, printing, postage, shipping, handling, filing fees): $463.15 (5% of all attorney and paraprofessional fees per paragraph B of Retainer Agreement).

The court modified each of these entries in the following manner: as to

the October 21 entry, the court struck the half-hour billed, finding it was clerical

in nature; the court reduced the October 25 entry to one half-hour, finding it

unreasonable and excessive. As to the five percent expense charges, the court

declined to enforce that provision of the retainer agreement finding it

"unreasonable." Lastly, the court concluded plaintiff is not entitled to

anticipatory legal fees, stating, "[t]his is an unopposed motion for final default

judgment. As such, the attorney fee award is reduced by the $720 sought for

anticipatory legal fees."

A-0798-24 12 Because we conclude the court erred in denying plaintiff's initial motion,

the court's reduction and striking of plaintiff's entries relative to its preparation

of the November motion for reconsideration constitutes a mistaken exercise of

discretion. Moreover, attorney fee awards must be grounded in evidence of

services actually performed and rendered, and cannot include speculative fees

for work that may not have occurred. Gruber & Colabella, 345 N.J. Super. at

251 (stating that an agreement for attorney's fees can bind parties to "specific or

easily ascertainable sums"). Accordingly, the court correctly excluded

anticipatory legal fees.

We therefore modify the order awarding attorney's fees to include fees in

the amount of $936 related to the refiling of plaintiff's motion, which the court

considered as a motion for reconsideration, plus the $463.15 for expenses,

totaling $4,386.35. Thus, we direct the court to issue an amended order

reflecting the modified judgment. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Affirmed as modified.

A-0798-24 13