The Invincible

13 F. Cas. 80, 3 Sawy. 176, 1874 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195
CourtDistrict Court, D. California
DecidedOctober 14, 1874
DocketCase No. 7,056
StatusPublished

This text of 13 F. Cas. 80 (The Invincible) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Invincible, 13 F. Cas. 80, 3 Sawy. 176, 1874 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195 (californiad 1874).

Opinion

HOFFMAN, District Judge.

In the spring of 1864 the libellants shipped on board the Invincible, then lying at the port of New York, and bound on a voyage to San Francisco, .760 baskets of champagne in two lots, one of 500 baskets and the other of 250. By the terms of the bills of lading given for the first lot, the wine was to be stowed in the house on deck. The second lot was to be stowed In the cabin staterooms and house on deck. Under these contracts 659 baskets were placed in the house on deck and the remainder in the cabin staterooms.

On the arrival of the ship the wine stowed in the staterooms was found to be in perfect order. But that stowed in the house was damaged to the extraordinary and almost unprecedented extent of 57 per cent, of its entire value. At the hearing the carrier, after proofs of this loss had been given, attempted to excuse himself by showing that the house on deck was an unfit place for the stowage of goods, and that goods so placed were exposed to extraordinary perils to which cargo below decks was not liable. Although it appeared that the voyage was somewhat rough and boisterous, the claimants failed to show that the injury to the goods was attributable to the direct operation of any peril of the sea, in the strict sense of the term, but they established beyond doubt that the loss of the wine was caused by what is known as “blowage and breakage” — that is, escape of the contents of the bottles, either through their mouths or by their bursting.

He thus proved prima facie, that the injury was occasioned by natural causes, arising from the inherent quantities and perish-ability of the goods themselves and the nature of the voyage. To this the libellants replied that the damage was excessive and unprecedented, and that it could not be ascribed to the intrinsic infirmity of an article which is every year brought to this port in enormous quantities without serious loss. Some other cause for the injury must therefore be sought for, and this was to be found in the total neglect of the master during the [81]*81entire voyage to give to tlie wine proper and necessary ventilation by opening, as occasion permitted, the doors and windows of the house. That through this omission the temperature of the house became so high as to cause the wine to “blow” and the bottles to burst.

It is not pretended on the part of the carrier that any effort whatever was made to ventilate the goods during the voyage by opening the windows or doors of the house. The master seems to have considered it his right and his duty to leave the goods and the house which contained them, in the same condition during the voyage as when they left New Xork, and this, though apprised by the leakage of wine through the scupper holes of the house for a considerable period, that the goods from some cause were sustaining great injury.

The answer sets up that the excessive heat arose upon the decomposition or fermentation of the straw in which the bottles were packed, caused by its being wetted with salt or fresh water. But the evidence fails to sustain this allegation. No noticeable accident happened to the deck-house during the voyage. The chemical experts failed to detect in the straw when examined here, any trace of the presence of salt, or to discover any signs of chemical changes which could have generated excessive heat.

But even if the heat was due to this cause, it was as much the duty of the carrier to endeavor to mitigate its effects by opening the doors and windows of the house, as to resort to the same expedients to diminish heat caused by the sun’s rays. Whether his omission to do so was negligence for which he is liable, is the real point of the case.

The answer also alleges that the champagne in question was a spurious article of inferior quality, and the loss arose from its inherent perishability caused by “defective manufacture, preparation, bottling, corking and packing.”

In support of these allegations no proof whatever is offered, save that a few of the baskets were somewhat rat-eaten. The wine was the “Charles Heidseck Champagne,” so well known and extensively used in this country, and does not appear to have differed in the mode in which it was manufactured, prepared, bottled and corked, from the wine which the libellants, whose commercial house is of the highest respectability, have for years been in the habit of importing. The fact that all the wine stowed in the cabin arrived in perfect order, would seem to afford decisive proof that there could have been no such defective preparation and packing as the answer alleges.

The whole evidence points. I think, unmistakably, to the conclusion that the blowing and breaking of the bottles was caused by the excessive heat to which they were subjected by being stowed, during the whole of a voyage in which the equator was twice crossed, in a deck-house, tightly closed and exposed on its roof and sides to the direct ■and reflected rays of the sun.

The question is thus presented, was the omission on the part of the master to cool and ventilate the deck-house by opening its doors and windows when the weather permitted, negligence for which the vessel is liable?

The libellants contend that he was bound to do so by express stipulation, and by his general duty as a carrier — especially when apprised by the leakage of the vessel that the wine was sustaining serious injury. The claimants excuse their omission on the grounds: 1st. That by express agreement the goods stowed in the deck-house were to be at the sole risk of the shipper, and the ship was in no case to be liable for any injury that might befall them. 2d. That the doors and windows were closed and fastened with the full knowledge of Mr. Crosby, the shipper, and with the understanding that they were so to remain during the voyage. 3d. That it was impracticable to open the doors and windows without exposing the goods to injury from salt or fresh water or from the depredations of the crew, and that it was not the duty of the carrier, nor had he the right to meddle in any way with ear-go stowed under the supervision and by direction of the shipper.

1. In regard to the alleged agreement, Mr. Hastings, part owner of the ship, testifies that he consented with much reluctance and at Mr. Crosby’s earnest request, to the stowage of the wines in the deck-house, and that it was the express understanding that the ship should assume no responsibility and incur no liability “of any name or nature.” That the carpenter and stevedore were to fit up the house and stow the goods as Mr. Crosby should direct, and that thereafter the goods were to be at the sole risk of the shipper. In these statements Mr. Hastings is corroborated by Deane, the ship-keeper. Mr. Crosby denies that any such agreement was entered into.

The disputed matter of fact I do not deem it necessary to determine. If the agreement was as broad and absolute as is alleged, parol testimony to prove it was inadmissible. for it is inconsistent with and contradictory to the written stipulations of the bill of lading. Nor if reduced to writing would its legal effect be to exonerate the carrier from the consequences of his actual negligence. The policy of the law will not permit a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself and his servants. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. [84 U. S.] 357. Whether there was in this case actual negligence is the very question at issue.

2. The alleged understanding with Mr. Crosby that the doors and windows of the deck-house should be tightly closed and so remain during the voyage, was, if made, un

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Bluebook (online)
13 F. Cas. 80, 3 Sawy. 176, 1874 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-invincible-californiad-1874.