The Hurstdale

169 F. 912, 1909 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 331
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 26, 1909
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 169 F. 912 (The Hurstdale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Hurstdale, 169 F. 912, 1909 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).

Opinion

ADAMS, District Judge.

This action was brought by Wessell, Du-val & Company against the steamship Hurstdale, and her owner, to recover damages, alleged to amount to $6,000, suffered by reason of the steamer being deficient in speed. She was chartered at a monthly hire by the libellants from the owner by contract dated April 30,'1906, for a round voyage from the United States to ports on the West Coast of South America and return. The contract contained the clause:

“Owners represent that the steamer under ordinary conditions, and laden, will steam on an average about 8% knots per hour on about 17 tons of best Welsh coal per 24 hours and that-her deadweight capacity for cargo and bunkers is about 5,200 to 5,250 tons. These particulars are not guaranteed.”

The libel alleged:

“Third: 'Prior to the execution of said charter-party and also in and by the said charter-party and as an inducement to the libellants to execute said charter-party, the owners of said steamship represented and stated to the libellants that the Hurstdale was a vessel that, under ordinary conditions and when laden, would steam on an average about 8%’ knots per hour on about 17 tons of best Welsh coal per 24 hours.
The said representation was a material representation and was made for the purpose of inducing the libellants to execute said charter-party; the libellants had no knowledge of the speed of said vessel except as contained in the said representation in said charter-party and in cable messages from the owners of said vessel to the aforesaid agents, which cable messages were exhibited to the libellants prior to the execution by them of said charter-party, and in reliance upon said representation, the libellants duly executed said charter-party.
The aforesaid representation so made by the owners of the said steamship Hurstdale, was false and untrue and was known by the said owners to be false and untrue when so made. Said steamship Hurstdale was not then a vessel, that, under ordinary conditions and when laden, would steam on an average about 8% knots per hour on about 17 tons of best Welsh coal per 24 hours.
Fourth: In reliance upon the aforesaid representation, however, the libellants executed the aforesaid charter-party as aforesaid, and on or about the 20th day of May, 1906, said steamship entered upon such charter-party and proceeded on her voyage to the West Coast of South America and return.
Fifth: Said steamer arrived at the Port of Baltimore, U. S. A., on or about the 22d day of December, 1906, on her return from her voyage to the West Coast of South America under said charter-party and the libellants then learned for the first time of the misrepresentation aforesaid.
Sixth: On said round voyage, under the aforesaid charter-party, to the West Coast of South America and return, the Hurstdale steamed on an average only 6% knots per hour for the entire voyage and, in consequence thereof, was greatly delayed both on her outward and homeward voyage to the libellants’ great loss and damage.”

The claimant and respondent answered with some admissions and denials and as follows:

“Ninth: Further answering and by way of defence, they allege that the steamship Hurstdale was supplied by the libellants with the coal that was used while the vessel was engaged under the charter above referred to. This coal was of an inferior quality and was not best Welsh coal. Owing to the nature of the business on which the vessel was engaged, on the libellants’ behalf under the above mentioned charter and to the manner in which the husi[914]*914ness arrangements of the libellants required that it should be carried on, the vessel’s bottom became foul and she did not encounter the ordinary conditions referred to in the charter in connection with which her speed might be ascertained. The owners and officers of the vessel did all that was reasonable and possible to have the voyage of the vessel prosecuted with the utmost despatch and they have duly performed all the obligations resting on them under the above mentioned charter party.”

It appears that the steamer was duly delivered to the charterers on the 19th day of May at 7:30 a. m. and was employed under the contract for over 7 months. The question to be determined is whether the libellants are entitled to recover damages for delay in completing the round trip.

The respondent contends that there were no representations made by the owner to the charterers with respect to speed but what was said by the agents of the owner were merely expressions of opinion between them as agents and do not form any basis for the action. The contract was signed “By cable authority from J. Kilgour & Co., Barber & Co., Inc., F. B. Mackay, Agents for Owners.” The libellant's went into the possession of the vessel under this contract, which was the result of cables between the parties. These cables were shown by Barber & Co. to the libellants before the charter party was entered into and the authority of Kilgour & Co. to negotiate and close the contract has never been questioned. The owner had regularly received and retained the monthly hire. I think therefore that any question of authority on the part of the agents to make the representations may be disregarded and the consideration of the dispute turn upon other matters.

The contract as executed was prepared on one of the regular printed forms used by the libellants in their business of dealing on the West Coast. The form contained the printed clause quoted above excepting the concluding sentence, “These particulars are not guaranteed,” which was typewritten.

The steamer’s average speed was about 7 knots. The libellants claim that her actual steaming time was 133 days 3 hours, while if she- had averaged 8% knots it would have been only 93 days 4% hours, therefore it must be concluded that she was in a similar condition when delivered. The libellants were injured by a deficiency in the expected speed of the vessel and the question to be determined is whether the representations of the owner were designedly false and the libellants thereby induced to make a contract which damaged them in such a manner that they were entitled to seek legal redress.

The owner claims that there were in fact no false representations and the steamer in all respects complied with the warranties in the contract. There can be no doubt that the steamer was seaworthy and fulfilled the warranties, unless there was what was equivalent to one in the statement that she would make a speed of 8% knots. It was not in fact a warranty in view of the wording that the particulars given in the part of the charter covering the speed of the vessel were not guaranteed. It is well understood that in the absence of fraud a statement as to the speed of a vessel, as well as with respect to the quality of an article sold, must be deemed a mere expression of opinion and not-.a contract of warranty.

[915]*915■ The libellants contend that notwithstanding the express disclaimer of any speed guaranty, nevertheless there were false representations made by the respondent. The latter contends that even if the statement, •quoted above, and similar ones in the cables preceding the charter, can be considered as representations, the libellants have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in fact false.

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Bluebook (online)
169 F. 912, 1909 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-hurstdale-nysd-1909.