The Helen R. Cooper

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York

The Helen R. Cooper

11 F. Cas. 1050, 10 Blatchf. 212, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1340

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York

DecidedOctober 4, 1872

StatusPublished

This text of 11 F. Cas. 1050 (The Helen R. Cooper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

The Helen R. Cooper, 11 F. Cas. 1050, 10 Blatchf. 212, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1340 (circtedny 1872).

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Opinion

WOODRUFF, Circuit Judge.

This is a motion on behalf of the R. L. Mabey, in substance, for an order directing the libellants to execute the decree, (which is, in form, against both vessels,) against the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper and their stipulators, or to exhaust their remedies, under the decree, against such claimants and their stipulators, before proceeding to execute the decree against the R. L. Mabey.

The proofs now laid before me show that, in relation to the subject in controversy, the claimants of the R. L. Mabey, and their sureties, stood in the relation of sureties for the others, and that the latter had assumed the litigation and agreed to indemnify the former. It is, therefore, just and equitable, that the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper, and their stipulators, should pay the damages and costs awarded to the libellants by the decree. This brings the case within the principle of the decision in The D. S. Gregory [Case No. 4,100], and 9 Wall. [76 U. S.] 513, where the court directed, that, as between the two vessels, the recovery be equally apportioned, and that, although each was assumed to be liable for the whole amount to the libellant, and, so, in respect to each one-half, each vessel was surety, for the other, the libellant, on receiving from either vessel one-half, should stay proceedings until execution had been issued and returned as against the other. Although no direction was given, in the decree in the present case,, as to an apportionment, or otherwise settling the equities between the defendants, and while it is also clear that no modification of the decree should now be made, I think the court has power to control the manner of its execution, so as to do justice between the defending parties, if thereby the libellants are deprived of no right. They must be permitted to collect their whole decree out of some one or all of the parties liable.

In analogy, therefore, to the decision in the case above referred to, an order is granted, that the libellants first issue execution against the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper and their stipulators, and that proceedings against the claimants of the R. L. Mabey and their stipulators be stayed until the return of such executions against the others. Either party is to be at liberty to apply to the court for further direction, ¿s they may be advised.

[The facts upon which the decree referred to was based are given in Cases Nos. 6,333 and 6,334.]

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WOODRUFF, Circuit Judge.

This is a motion on behalf of the R. L. Mabey, in substance, for an order directing the libellants to execute the decree, (which is, in form, against both vessels,) against the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper and their stipulators, or to exhaust their remedies, under the decree, against such claimants and their stipulators, before proceeding to execute the decree against the R. L. Mabey.

The proofs now laid before me show that, in relation to the subject in controversy, the claimants of the R. L. Mabey, and their sureties, stood in the relation of sureties for the others, and that the latter had assumed the litigation and agreed to indemnify the former. It is, therefore, just and equitable, that the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper, and their stipulators, should pay the damages and costs awarded to the libellants by the decree. This brings the case within the principle of the decision in The D. S. Gregory [Case No. 4,100], and 9 Wall. [76 U. S.] 513, where the court directed, that, as between the two vessels, the recovery be equally apportioned, and that, although each was assumed to be liable for the whole amount to the libellant, and, so, in respect to each one-half, each vessel was surety, for the other, the libellant, on receiving from either vessel one-half, should stay proceedings until execution had been issued and returned as against the other. Although no direction was given, in the decree in the present case,, as to an apportionment, or otherwise settling the equities between the defendants, and while it is also clear that no modification of the decree should now be made, I think the court has power to control the manner of its execution, so as to do justice between the defending parties, if thereby the libellants are deprived of no right. They must be permitted to collect their whole decree out of some one or all of the parties liable.

In analogy, therefore, to the decision in the case above referred to, an order is granted, that the libellants first issue execution against the claimants of the Helen R. Cooper and their stipulators, and that proceedings against the claimants of the R. L. Mabey and their stipulators be stayed until the return of such executions against the others. Either party is to be at liberty to apply to the court for further direction, ¿s they may be advised.

[The facts upon which the decree referred to was based are given in Cases Nos. 6,333 and 6,334.]

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Bluebook (online)

11 F. Cas. 1050, 10 Blatchf. 212, 1872 U.S. App. LEXIS 1340, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-helen-r-cooper-circtedny-1872.