The Havre

11 F. Cas. 849, 1 Ben. 295
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 15, 1867·Published

Opinion

SHIPMAN, District Judge.

Before examining the case on its merits. I notice two preliminary questions. The first is the objection raised on the part of the Havre, that the alleged owner of the Scotland has failed to prove his title. It is intimated by the advocate of the Havre that this is not a mere technical objection; that the omission of such proof on the part of the Scotland was#not a mere inadvertence, but that this issue was avoided because it could not be proved that the libellant Richardson was the owner. On the other hand, it is claimed on the part of the Scotland that the failure to prove title was inadvertent, and that this proof can be supplied without difficulty. If this latter statement is correct, I should not be justified in dismissing a suit of this character where the fact can be easily supplied. Proof of title should be made, and I will permit evidence to be gone into on both sides, on this single point, hereafter. This cannot embarrass the owners of the Havre.

The other question arose out of a suggestion of the court at the trial, on the pleadings being read, that the answer of the Havre to the Scotland’s libel, and the original libel of the former, did not set forth with sufficient particularity the manner in which the alleged fault of the Scotland caused the collision. The advocate for the Havre insists that the allegation is sufficiently explicit; and that, if it is not, no advantage can be taken of it because no exceptions were filed. I think the allegation in question is not in the general sense of the law of pleading' sufficiently full and specific, but as the controversy, as developed on the trial, is of a simple character, the defect in the averment is not attended with any embarrassment. No amendment will therefore be required in this court. But to avoid misapprehension hereafter, it is proper to state in this place, that I by nc means accede to the suggestion of the advocate of the Havre, that all defects of this character are to be overlooked by the court unless preliminarily excepted to by counsel. If counsel omit to file exceptions at the proper time, they are precluded from raising objections to the pleadings; but this court, at all times, upon its own motion, has power to compel the parties to conform their pleadings to rules laid down by the supreme court. Rule 23, in relation to libels, and" rule 27, relating to answers, should be observed, as conformity thereto contributes to the clear and orderly proceedings in the case, and tends to simplify and facilitate the labors of the court This court has more than once been embarrassed in the disposition of collision cases by the vague allegations of both libel and answer where no exceptions had been taken to either, and has, in one instance, dismissed a case’ on the ground that the pleadings as well as the proofs were not’ sufficiently explicit to found a judgment thereon. Of course it is well understood that the technical rules of special pleading at common law are not to be applied to a libel and answer in a suit in admiralty, but it is equally true that the libel, and the answer where it goes beyond a denial of allegations of the libel, should clearly and explicitly, though briefly, set forth the facts relied on. This is especially important in collision cases. Clear statements in the pleadings tend to produce an orderly arrangement of the proofs. The proofs then naturally crystallize around the allegations, which conduces to an easier and more lucid exposition of the material points in the controversy. To secure this result, the court ha^ the power in any stage of the case to require the parties to supply any defects in the pleadings, though counsel can appeal to the court for this purpose only by exceptions filed at the proper time.

We come now to the merits of this case. The collision took place between nine and ten o’clock in the evening. The night was fair, starlight, though perhaps not with as perfectly clear atmosphere as is sometimes the ease. There was a fresh breeze, blowing at the rate of ten or twelve knots. There was some sea, but not very heavy. The allegation in the Scotland’s libel that it was blowing a gale, with a very heavy sea and a mist on the water, is not sustained by the proofs. The wind was about northwest by west/- The Scotland was on her port tack, under short sail, and heading north by east and moving slowly, not more than three miles an hour. The Havre was heading about southwest on her starboard tack, under a heavier press of sail, and moving at the rate of eight knots. She was a ship of nearly one thousand tons burden, and the Scotland was a bark of nearly four hundred tons. The vessels had been on these respective tacks for some.time preceding the collision, and were both close hauled. Both had green and red lights. The Havre discovered the green light of the Scotland about two points [851]*851on her lee bow, some two miles off, and about fifteen minutes before the collision. Those in charge of her movements assert that she ■did not change her course till the collision; that she was kept steadily on the wind to the last The witnesses from the Scotland say that the Havre appeared to be passing her to leeward, and, when about abeam of the Scotland, luffed up into the wind and struck her, with her sails shaking. But this latter statement I do not credit. Upon no fair view of the evidence, as a whole, can it be entertained. I hold, therefore, as matter of fact, that the Havre kept her course by the wind from the time she discovered the Scotland’s green light approaching her for about fifteen minutes, when she struck the Scotland fourteen or fifteen feet from her stern as the latter was crossing her track in front of her. This blow carried away a large portion of the Scotland’s stern, and did considerable damage. It would seem that a slight starboard movement of the wheel of the Havre would have averted the collision.. Whether this could and ought to have been done is the only delicate or doubtful question in the case. This point will be considered at length hereafter. I hold that the Scotland was in fault for not having discovered the green light of the Havre sooner. This discovery was not made until the vessels were very near. Capt. Maynard, of the Scotland, saw the Havre’s light immediately after it was reported, and says it was then not more than an eighth or a quarter of a mile off — of course he would not place the vessels nearer together than they actually were, in his testimony — when the Havre’s light was discovered. They were, therefore, without doubt, very near, in view of his statements. Indeed, they were so near when the Havre’s light was first sighted as to produce some excitement, if not alarm, on board the Scotland. This is quite evident from the fact stated in the Scotland’s proofs, that her second mate came running, or, to use a more expressive phrase of Capt. Maynard, came “rushing” aft as soon as the light was announced by the lookout. The second mate saw it, four or five points on the lee bow, and immediately ran aft to report it to the captain. Now, in the then state of the weather, and the positions and courses of these vessels, the green light of the Havre could have been discovered by the Scotland probably two miles, but, beyond. all doubt, more than a mile off. Yet her captain says that in fact it was first seen at a distance at the furthest of not more than a quarter of a mile. This becomes a serious fault when we consider the situation and responsibility of the Scotland. In the first place, she was on ground frequented constantly by a large number of vessels seeking and leaving the port of New York, where there is great danger of collision, as is well known to navigators.

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The Havre, 11 F. Cas. 849, 1 Ben. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1867).

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