The Great Republic

90 U.S. 20, 23 L. Ed. 55, 23 Wall. 20, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1292
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedDecember 18, 1874
Docket78
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 90 U.S. 20 (The Great Republic) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Great Republic, 90 U.S. 20, 23 L. Ed. 55, 23 Wall. 20, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1292 (1874).

Opinion

Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is some excuse, even for a party in fault, when two boats collide in tempestuous or foggy weather, or on a dark night, but there are no exculpatory circumstances attending this disaster. It happened before dark, in the middle of the Mississippi, and when the light was good enough to distin *29 guish small objects on both banks of the river. The weather was clear and calm, and the river unobstructed, affording ample room for passage on either side of the point where the vessels collided.

It is very plain that the collision ought to have been avoided, and the inquiry is, who is to blame for it. It almost uniformly happens in cases of this description that different accounts are given of the occurrence by those in the employment of the respective vessels, and that the court has difficulty in this conflict of evidence of deciding to which side a preferable credence should be given. There are generally, however, in every case, some undeniable facts which enable the court to determine where the blame lies, and this case is one of that character.

There is no dispute that the Cleona was a small stern-wheel boat of the burden of 118 tons, that the steamboat Great Republic was of the burden of 2200 tons; a large and very fast vessel with side wheels; that both boats crossed the river, from the right to the left bank, just above Nine-mile Point, and straightened up on the left bank and ran parallel with the shore for some time, the Cleona being some distance ahead, and the Republic following almost in her wake; that just previous to reaching Twelve-mile Point the Cleona started to cross the river in an oblique direction, intending to make a landing at "Waggaman’s plantation to put out freight; that the Republic kept bearing to the left, following the Cleona, instead of keeping her course, and finally overtook her about the middle of the river, and that the collision occurred. There is a great deal of discrepancy in the testimony relative to the distance between the two boats at the time the Cleona started to cross for the Waggaman plantation. Under the most favorable circumstances •it is impossible to measure distances on the water with accuracy, but in times of excitement there is very little reliance to be placed on the opinion of any one on this subject, and especially is this so when the condemnation of a boat may depend upon it. If the Cleona was only some two or even three hundred yards ahead of the Republic, it was cer *30 tainly imprudent in her officers to undertake to cross the river, but if she was more than double this distance in advance there is no reason why she should not have attempted to cross if she had business on the opposite side.

"Without discussing the testimony to show on which side the.probabilities are, there are certain things in connection with this part of the case which are inconsistent with the theory advanced by the respondents. According to the testimony of nearly all the witnesses the Republic was going twice as fast as the Oleona, or, in other words, making two hundred yards to the Cleona’s one hundred. It is quite clear that the Oleona was not more than forty or fifty yards from the left shore when she turned to cross over, and must have sailed to reach the middle of the river (a half mile wide at that point and confessedly the place of collision) nearly, if not quite, four hundred yards, and occupied, at her rate of speed, at least two minutes of time in doing it. As the Republic was swinging to the larboard, which would increase her distance outside of the Cleona, she must have gone considerably over eight hundred yards to reach the point of collision. Besides, if the distance between the two boats when the Cleona undertook to ci’oss was as short as the respondents say, the collision would have occurred much sooner, as the speed of the Republic, by the weight of the testimony, was twelve miles an hour, enabling her to make three hundred and fifty yards in one minute. It would, therefore, seem quite clear that the Cleona was far enough ahead to cross with safety, on the supposition that the following boat would pursue the prescribed rules of navigation. Apart from this view of the subject the Republic cannot escape condemnation if the ease be tested by the account which the pilot at the wheel gives of the affair. He says that he thought when the Cleona turned to the larboard she was sheering — running off from the shore; that at this time the Republic was below her in the current about two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards, and to the larboard of her about the same distance; that as soon as the Cleona sheered to the larboard he pulled to the larboard, *31 and rang first the stopping-bells and then the backing-bells, and that the Cleona gave no signal until she had been running out about half a.minute, when she blew two blasts of her whistle, and that the collision occurred in about half a minute from the time the backing-bells were rang. This pilot acted on the belief that the Cleona had sheered when she made the sudden turn, and, therefore, followed her until he overtook her in the middle of the river, instead of keeping his course, which the whole evidence shows would have prevented the collision.

That the Cleona’s movement was not a mere sheer is manifest enough, but what right had the pilot to proceed on that supposition ? Impressions of this sort are' not admissible, and ought never to be entertained by a pilot, and if disaster occurs the consequences must rest on the boat he is guiding. The cause of this collision is clearly traceable to this mistake, and, to use no harsher term, the pilot, showed great incapacity on the occasion. It was his duty to have kept his course, and if he had done this instead of swinging to the larboard the accident would not have happened. Even- had he ported his helm but for a few seconds after the danger was imminent, it would at least have checked the swinging of his boat to the larboard, and this would have prevented the disaster, as the evidence shows ten feet would have cleared the Cleona, and five feet saved everything except a few of her wheel-arms.

As boats are not apt to sheer in deep water there was no excuse for the mistake made by the pilot. If, however, sheering were possible, as it is out of the common course of things, ordinary prudence would have told this pilot to have exchanged signals, so as to have understood what the movement was. Instead of this he did not answer the signals of the Cleona, which the law says he must do, in order to avoid mistakes. Two whistles were blown on the Cleona, which this pilot and others on board the Republic interpreted as meaning but one signal. Whether these whistles constituted one signal or two, answer should have been *32 made, and, it may be, if this had been done the result would have been different.

The signals were given by the Cleona for each boat to keep to the right, and, if seasonably given, were the proper ones.

It is said, however, that the Cleona should have given three whistles, indicating a purpose to land, but the boat was not close enough to land, and all the signal that was required was one which should tell which side she desired to take.

But the pilot says no signal was given by the Cleona until half a minute after she turned to cross.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
90 U.S. 20, 23 L. Ed. 55, 23 Wall. 20, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-great-republic-scotus-1874.