The Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 4.

20 F. Supp. 394, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1630
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 12, 1937
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 20 F. Supp. 394 (The Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 4.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 4., 20 F. Supp. 394, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1630 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).

Opinion

LEIBELL, District Judge.

This is a motion by one Frank Conte for an order sustaining his exceptions to the petition for limitation of liability filed herein by Grasselli Chemical Company, Inc., and E. I. Du Pont De Nemours, Inc., successors in interest as owners of the barge Grasselli Chemical Co. No. 4. Conte also seeks an order vacating an order of this court restraining him from prosecuting in the New York Supreme Court an action at law against the petitioners in this proceeding.

The petition for limitation of liability -describes an accident which took place aboard petitioners’ barge, while it was moored alongside the steamship Wind Rush on August 27, 1936. While the cargo of the barge was being loaded onto the steamship, a portion of the hoisting apparatus went awry, and three employees of the stevedoring company engaged in the work have asserted claims against petitioner for injuries .sustained as a result of the accident. One of them is the moving party, Frank Conte.

*395 On September 4, 1936, petitioners received written notice of the claim of Patsy Marotto, another of the persons injured in the accident. The petition for limitation of liability was not filed until March 23, 1937, more than six months after notice of Marotto’s claim.

On June 5, 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 185, was amended (46 U.S.C.A. § 185), so as to read as follows:

“§ 185. Petition for Limitation -of Liability; Deposit Value of Interest in Court; Transfer of Interest to Trustee.
“The vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such owner written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the provisions of this chapter and the owner (a) shall deposit with the court, for the benefit of claimants, a sum equal to the amount or value of the interest of such owner in the vessel and freight, or approved security therefor, and in addition such sums, or approved security therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the provisions of section 183 of this title, or (b) at his option shall transfer, for the benefit of claimants, to a trustee to be appointed by the court his interest in the vessel and freight, together with such sums, or approved security therefor, as the court may from time to time fix as necessary to carry out the provisions of section 183 of this title. Upon compliance with the requirements of this section all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease (as amended June 5, 1936, c. 521, § 3, 49 Stat. 1480.)”

The exceptions to the petition are based on the sole ground that under the above amendment (which is in reality a new section), the petition must be filed within six months after written notice of “a claim.” It is contended that “a claim” means the first claim in point of time, and that if the petition for limitation of liability is not filed within six months after written notice of the first claim it may not be availed of at all with respect to any claim arising out of that particular accident or disaster.

The claimant Marotto heretofore moved this court for an order vacating a restraining order entered against the prosecution of his claim. This application was granted on May 25, 1937, by Judge Goddard, for the reason that the petition had not been filed within six months after written notice of the Marotto claim. Marotto’s was the first claim in point of time, of which petitioner had written notice.

Petitioners contend, however, that although their petition for limitation of liability was late with respect to Marotto, it is timely as against Conte, the moving party herein, because filed within six months after notice of Conte’s claim. The disposition of this motion depends entirely upon the construction to be given the new section 185 of title 46, United States Code (46 U.S.C.A. § 185). Apparently, the question has not heretofore been presented for determination.

. In my opinion the proper construction to be given the new section is that it requires the ship owner to act promptly and, if he fails to file a petition for limitation of liability within six months after receipt of “a claim,” he may not avail himself of the privilege with respect to any claims arising out of the particular accident or disaster in question.

Undoubtedly, it was the purpose of the new legislation (49 Stat. 1479) to cut down the rights and privileges of the ship ownqr. This becomes evident from a consideration of the amendment to section 183 of title 46 of the Code (46 U.S.C.A. § 183), which was enacted at the same time as section 185. Prior to these amendments there was no time limit upon the filing of a petition for limitation of liability. The purpose of the new section 185 was to set up a time limit where there was none before. The Senate Report upon this legislation (Senate Report No. 2061) says significantly (page 6 of the Report): “The proposed amendment to section 4285 [46 U.S.C.A. § 185] provides, first, that the vessel owner, within 6 months after a claimant shall have given to or filed with such owner written notice of claim, may petition a district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability. Under the old law there was no time fixed within which such a petition might be filed.”

To give the section the construction for which petitioners contend would require a holding that Congress did not intend to place an absolute time limit of six months on the filing of the petition, but rather intended the limitation proceeding to apply only to claims of which the shipowner had notice within the period of six months preceding the actual filing of the petition. *396 If that were so, we must assume that Congress intended that a limitation proceeding might be effective with respect to some claims and ineffective with respect to others,- even though all the claims arose out of a single incident.

Such a construction appears to be negatived also by the last sentence of the section (46 U.S.C.A. § 185), which reads as follows : “Upon compliance with the requirements of this section all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question shall cease.”

What is the meaning of “all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in question”? Does that not indicate an intention on the part of Congress to deal in the limitation proceeding with all claims arising out of the “matter in question”? That provision would rebut any inference that Congress intended to divide the claims into‘two groups and to give effect to the petition for limitation of liability in respect to one group but not as to the other.

The construction I place upon the -section seems tc. have been anticipated.by the Department of Commerce, which in a letter dated February 19, 1936, addressed to Hon. S. O.

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Bluebook (online)
20 F. Supp. 394, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-grasselli-chemical-co-no-4-nysd-1937.