The Graf Klot Trautvetter

8 F. 833, 5 Hughes 237, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 3, 1881
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 8 F. 833 (The Graf Klot Trautvetter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Graf Klot Trautvetter, 8 F. 833, 5 Hughes 237, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162 (D.S.C. 1881).

Opinion

SeabbooK, Commissioner.

In pursuance of a decretal order in the above-entitled cause on the thirtieth of November, 1880, by which it was referred to the undersigned, one of the commissioners of this court, “to ascertain the respective amounts due to the petitioners and the priorities of their respective liens on said barkcntine, and to report the same, with leave to report any special matter,” to this court, I, E. M. Seabrook, the commissioner to whom the matter was referred, do report that I was attended by C. Inglesbv, Esq., of Messrs. Lord & Inglosby, proctors for the intervening libellants, the petitioners in this cause, and by Isaac Hayne, Esq., of Messrs. Ilayne & Eicken, I. P. K. Bryan, Esq., of Messrs. Bryan & Bryan, I. N. Nathans, Esq., and James P. Lesesne, Esq., of Messrs. Lesesne & Lesesne, proctdrs for the different original libellants against the barkentine Graf Klot Trautvetter, and have taken and examined the testimony offered in support of the claims of the said intervening libellants, and as to the priorities of the same, and beg to submit the following

[834]*834REPORT *

It is proper, in the first place, to state that libels were filed against the barkentine Graf Klot Trautvetter in this honorable court on the sixth, eighth, and sixteenth days of November last, and that the claims of said libellants were adjudicated by it, and said vessel sold, by its decree of November 20, 1880, to satisfy the same.

The claims of the intervening libellants are reported upon in the order in which they are set forth in their petitions.

1. The claim of H. W. Frundt, master of the barkentine Graf Klot Trautvetter. This claim is as follows:

21 months’ and 15 days’ wages, as master, from-
17th February, 1879, to December 2,1880, at . 120 marks per month, - marks 2,580
5 per. cent, commission on £1,498 freight, - 1,517
Passage money to Antwerp, - 300
Marks, reduced to U. S. currency, - - marks 4,397 = $1,054 71
Expenses on shore in Charleston while bark was repairing, - - 150 00
Amount advanced for vessel, ~ - - - - 48 00
$1,252 71

This claim of the master is based upon the assumption that the Graf Klot Trautvetter, being a German vessel, the said claim must be decided by German maritime law, and that according to that law the master of a German vessel has a prior lien on the vessel, equally with'the seamen, for his wages. The maritime law of the United States, as administered in'its courts of admiralty, on the other hand, while it regards the claims of seamen for wages as a sacred lien, and gives them priority over all other claims on the vessel, does not extend this privilege to the claims of a master of a vessel for wages. It gives the master of a vessel no lien on the vessel for his wages, or for advances and disbursements made by him abroad. The decisions in support of this position are to be found quoted at length in Desty, Ship. & Adm. 117, 118.

As this honorable court, as stated in the beginning of this report, has decreed that the claims of the original libellants in this case were liens upon the vessel, the issue is raised between the aforesaid claims and that of the master of the aforesaid vessel, and this issue involves the question whether the German maritime law or the maritime law Of the United States should govern in the decision of the conflicting claims of the respective libellants.

I hold that the maritime law of the United States must govern, [835]*835and tliat the master of said vessel has no lien on the vessel for his wages and advances, as set forth in his petition. In support of this view the following distinguished authority is referred to. Chief Justice Story, in his Conflict of Laws, § 328, pp. 394-95, says:

“But the recognition of the existence and validity of siich liens, by foreign countries, is not to be confounded with the giving them a superiority, or priority, over all other liens and rights justly acquired in such foreign countries, under their own laws, merely because the former liens in the countries where they first attached had there by law, or by custom, such a superiority or priority. Such a case would present a very different question arising from a conflict of rights, equally well founded, in the respective countries.
“ This very distinction was pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in delivering the opinion of the court in an important case. Ilis language was: ‘The law of the place where the contract is made is, generally speaking, the law of the contract; i. e., it is the law by which the contract is expounded. But the right of priority forms no part of the contract. It is extrinsic, and rather a personal privilege, dependent on the place where the property lies, and where the court sits which is to decide the cause.’ And the doctrine was, on that occasion, expressly applied to the case of a contract made in a foreign country with a person resident abroad.”
Section 324: “Huberus has also laid down the qualifying doctrine: foreign contracts are to have their full effect here, provided they do not prejudice the rights of our own country, or its citizens.”
“ Hence,” he adds, that “ the general rule should be thus far enlarged, if the law of another country is in conflict with that of our own state, in which also a contract is made, conflicting with a contract made elsewhere, we should in such a case rather observe our own law than the foreign law.”
Section 326, p. 410: “Lord Ellenborough has laid down a doctrine essentially agreeing with that of Huberus. ‘ We always import,’ says he, ‘together with their persons, the existing relation of foreigners, as between themselves, according to the laws of their own countries; except, indeed, where those laws clash with the rights of our own subjects hero, and one or other of the laws must necessarily give way; in which case our own is entitled to the preference. This having been long settled in principle, and laid up among our acknowledged rules of jurisprudence, it is needless to discuss it further.’ The supreme court of Louisiana has adopted a little more modified doctrine, coinciding exactly with that of Huberus, ‘that in a conflict of laws it must often be a matter of doubt which should prevail, and that whenever that doubt does exist the court which decides will prefer the law of its own country to that of a stranger; and if the positive laws of a state prohibit particular contracts from having effect according to the rules of the country where they are made, the former must prevail.’ ”
Section 327, pp. 410,411: “ Mr. Chancellor Kent has laid down the same rule in his commentaries, as stated by Huberus and Lord Ellenborough, and said: ‘ But on this subject of conflicting laws it may generally be observed that there is a stubborn principle of jurisprudence that will often intervene and [836]*836act with controlling efficacy. This principle is that where the lex loei con-tractus and. the lex fori, as to conflicting rights acquired in each, come in direct collision, the comity of nations must yield to the positive law of the land.’ Mr.

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8 F. 833, 5 Hughes 237, 1881 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-graf-klot-trautvetter-scd-1881.