The General Chamberlain

10 F. Cas. 174, 1 Hask. 432
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedAugust 15, 1872
StatusPublished

This text of 10 F. Cas. 174 (The General Chamberlain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The General Chamberlain, 10 F. Cas. 174, 1 Hask. 432 (D. Me. 1872).

Opinion

FOX, District Judge.

The shipping articles signed by the libellants at New York, describe 'the voyage as from New York to Callao and Etan and from thence on a general freighting voyage to such ports or places as the master may direct for a term of twenty-four calendar months, ending in the United States. The ship with the libellants as her crew went to Callao and Etan, there discharged her outward cargo and made freight, then returned’to Callao, and thence sailed to Guanape where she took on board a cargo of guano under a charier party which required her to proceed “to Falmouth, Eng. for orders to any safe port in Great Britain or the continent between Hamburg and Nantes inclusive.” She arrived at Fal-mouth Nov. 27, 1S71, remained there till the 5th of December, and having been ordered to Hamburg, arrived off the mouth of the Elbe Dec. 11; not . being able to go up the river on account of ice, she turned back for New Dieppe, and on the night of Dec. 17th was wrecked on the Hague Sands. The pilot and four of her crew perished and everything on board was lost including books and ship’s papers. The crew have instituted this libel against the owners, claiming to be paid full wages to the time of the ship’s arrival at Falmouth and for half the time she was detained at that port. The respondents offer to pay their wages up to the time their ship’s sailing from Guanape, but deny their liability beyond that date, as they claim that no freight was carried on the voyage from Guanape, the ship, as they say, having been lost before completing that voyage and delivering her cargo; and that under the circumstances of this .case, Fal-mouth cannot be deemed a port of destination an arrival at which would entitle the crew to their wages.

The maxim that freight is the mother of wages may be true to this extent, that in all cases where freight is earned and received by the ship-owner, the crew are entitled to their wages for the voyage; but at the present day, the converse of the maxim, that if no freight is earned the crew are not entitled to their wages, does not invariably hold good, as in many instances seamen are entitled to their wages when the ship-owner has no valid claim for freight If the voyage or freight be lost by the negligence, fraud or misconduct of the owner or master, dr voluntarily abandoned by them, if the owner has contracted for freight upon terms or contingencies differing from the general rules of the maritime law, or if he has chartered his ship to receive a freight at. a foreign port and none is to be carried on the outward voyage, in all these cases the mariner is entitled to wages, notwithstanding no freight has accrued. Curt. Kerch. Seam. 272.

In Pitnam v. Hooper [Case No. 11,186], Judge Story says, “It would be more correct to say that the general rule, though not the universal rule, is that the seamen are entitled to wages for the full period of their [175]*175employment in tlie ship.’s service for any particular voyage- in which freight is or might be earned by the. owner, * * * and that no private contract between the owner and shipper can affect the right to wages.”

The courts were formerly in the habit of dividing the round voyage into an outward and homeward voyage, and if the ship was lost on the homeward voyage of allowing the seamen their wages for the. time employed in the outward voyage, and for half the time of the ship’s stay at the foreign port; but the question soon arose as to the right of the crew to their wages where the vessel made an intermediate voyage in ballast without carrying any freight, and in such a case the rule, that the carrying of freight was necessary to entitle the seamen to their wages, was so far departed from as to allow the crew their wages for such intermediate voyage, and to determine that the return voyage commenced at the port of departure where her return cargo was received. In the case of The Two Catherines [Id. 14,288], Judge Story sustained this construction of the law, and when a ship sailed from Newport to Gibraltar with a cargo, and -went from Gibraltar to Ivica in ballast, and there received on board a return cargo of salt for Providence, and was lost in Narragansett Bay, he allowed the crew their wages up to half the time the ship was detained at Ivica.

If the ship-owner, instead of letting his ship to hire, sees 'fit to take on board and transport cargo belonging to himself, and the adventure should prove unprofitable, and the owner should not realize its original invoice ■cost, he would still be liable to the crew for their wages on the voyage, and his liability would in no way be diminished by the un-profitableness of the enterprise.

So if a ship sails on a “seeking voyage,” as- it is sometimes termed, visiting different ports in search of business and finding none, at length returns to her original port of departure not having earned a dollar for her owners, having gone in ballast to the differ•ent ports, the owners are notwithstanding their ill success still, liable to the crew for their wages during the whole time they have remained on board, and for the reason that they have performed .their part of the contract and safely navigated the ship for the •contemplated voyage, and it is wholly immaterial as respects the validity of their claim for wages whether the-voyage in its result has or not .proved profitable to- their employers, the ship-owners. '

In the present instance, when this ship sailed from Guanape, her port of destination was Falmouth, and no one on board was certainly aware whether she would discharge her cargo at that port, or would sail from thence to some other port to be determined by the charterers after the ship’s arrival at Falmouth without consultation with the master or ship-owner, and in respect to which they had no control or authority. Under this charter party it is quite certain that the voyage might possibly terminate at Falmouth by the charterers there receiving their cargo, as they had a right to require its delivery to them at that port if they saw fit to receive it, and although it is quite unusual to land a large cargo of guano at Falmouth, yet it was not impossible, and circumstances might have arisen in the prosecution of the voyage which would have rendered it advisable for the owners of the cargo to have actually received it at that port, and if it had been thus delivered to them, the seamen would of course have been entitled to their wages.

Many cases are to be found in the reports which hold if the vessel is lost on her return voyage, the seamen are not entitled to their wages for that voyage; and recognizing this as the law of the case, the question arises what was the voyage on which the ship and cargo were lost? Was she lost on a voyage from Guanape, or on one from Falmouth? I am inclined to hold that when the ship sailed from Guanape she was on a voyage to Falmouth, and on her arrival at that port she had completed that voyage, and after-wards in pursuance of the orders given to her at that port, and which she was not to receive before her arrival at that port, she sailed from thence on a new voyage to Hamburg, and was lost in prosecuting her voyage from Falmouth to Hamburg, and not on a voyage from Guanape to Falmouth.

Throughout: the voyage from Guanape, what other destination had the ship than Falmouth? None certainly known to any one on board.

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Bluebook (online)
10 F. Cas. 174, 1 Hask. 432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-general-chamberlain-med-1872.