The Florida Bar v. Jeffrey Alan Norkin

• Court: Supreme Court of Florida
• Decided: September 19, 2024
• Docket: SC2021-1025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________

No. SC2021-1025 ____________

THE FLORIDA BAR, Petitioner,

vs.

JEFFREY ALAN NORKIN, Respondent.

September 19, 2024

PER CURIAM.

We have for review a referee’s report recommending that

Respondent, Jeffrey Alan Norkin, be found in indirect criminal

contempt of our October 8, 2015, order permanently disbarring him

from the practice of law in Florida, and that he be incarcerated for a

period of 10 days, among other sanctions. 1 As discussed below, we

approve the referee’s findings of fact and the recommendation that

Norkin be held in contempt. However, we disapprove the referee’s

recommended sanction, and we instead sentence Norkin to 60 days

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. in the Broward County Jail, with 50 days of the sentence

suspended contingent upon Norkin completing five months of

probation. As a condition of his probation, Norkin must obtain a

psychological evaluation within 30 days of his release from jail and

begin any recommended treatment thereafter.

BACKGROUND

In October 2013, we suspended Norkin from the practice of

law for two years for acting in an “unprofessional and antagonistic

manner during the course of litigating a civil case” and ordered him

to appear before this Court for a public reprimand. Fla. Bar v.

Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77, 79 (Fla. 2013). The misconduct occurred

while Norkin was representing Mr. David Beem in a civil lawsuit

against Beem’s business partner. See id. During the course of the

litigation, Norkin engaged in combative, “unprofessional behavior

towards the presiding judges, a senior judge who was appointed to

serve as a court-appointed provisional director of the corporation,

and opposing counsel.” Id. On numerous occasions while in court,

Norkin “would raise his voice and behave in an angry, disrespectful

manner,” and he “persisted until the proceedings were disrupted.”

Id. at 84. Norkin made it impossible for the court to conduct

-2- hearings, and the judge “was forced to terminate proceedings and

refer all discovery matters to a general magistrate.” Id. Norkin also

sent insulting and disparaging letters and e-mails to his opposing

counsel and made insulting statements regarding opposing counsel

in public. Id. at 85-86.

The order suspending Norkin required him to comply with

Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3–5.1(h) by giving “notice of the

suspension to all clients, opposing counsel or co-counsel, and all

courts, tribunals, or adjudicative agencies before which the attorney

is counsel of record by furnishing them with a copy of the

suspension order.” Fla. Bar v. Norkin, 183 So. 3d 1018, 1019-20

(Fla. 2015). However, despite several notifications of his

noncompliance, Norkin failed to submit the required affidavit to Bar

counsel. He instead “sent bar counsel three offensive and

threatening e-mails evidencing ‘complete disregard for the contents

of the Court’s opinion, as well as the reprimand administered by

Justice Polston.’ ” Id. at 1020.

Moreover, Norkin engaged in the practice of law while

suspended by e-mailing opposing counsel regarding a case, drafting

motions for a client, and having multiple telephone conversations

-3- with a client regarding the client’s case. Id. at 1022. In imposing a

sanction, we noted that we do not hesitate “to disbar attorneys who

continue to practice law after being suspended.” Id. at 1023. We

also considered Norkin’s “continuation of his egregious behavior

following his suspension and during the administration of the

public reprimand” and that he has “continue[d] to demonstrate his

disregard for this Court, his unrepentant attitude, and his intent to

continue his defiant and contemptuous conduct.” Id. Thus, we

concluded that permanent disbarment was warranted, and on

October 8, 2015, we permanently disbarred Norkin from the

practice of law in Florida. Id.

Nevertheless, after being permanently disbarred, Norkin

continued to represent Beem in the civil matter. Norkin filed

pleadings attempting to attain party status in Beem’s lawsuit,

which at the time still had a number of post-trial matters pending.

The circuit court rejected Norkin’s request for party status. Yet,

Norkin appeared in court proceedings and filed motions, responses,

and memoranda of law in the matter on behalf of Beem. Norkin

also used the e-mail domain associated with his prior law practice—

i.e., norkinlaw.com—in his signature blocks in the pleadings.

-4- Because he continued to engage in the practice of law after

being permanently disbarred, Norkin was charged in September

2016 in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit with one count of practicing

law while disbarred or suspended in violation of section 454.31,

Florida Statutes (2016). The charging information accused Norkin

of filing a series of motions authored by himself and signed by

himself and Beem after the court denied his motion to be added as

a party, communicating with opposing counsel, filing a brief in

bankruptcy court, and attempting to make himself a party to the

plaintiff’s bankruptcy case. In August 2022, Norkin pled no contest

to one count of unlicensed practice of law. He was sentenced to one

year of administrative probation, with the special conditions that he

stay away from the plaintiff in Beem’s case and cease all use of his

norkinlaw.com e-mail address.

Even when Norkin’s criminal case was ongoing, Norkin

continued to act as legal counsel for Beem from 2018 to 2021. He

continued to insist on his right to proceed as a party in Beem’s civil

case, even though the circuit court had rejected his position.

Furthermore, Norkin moved the Third District Court of Appeal to

add him as a co-appellant on all issues in the appeal of Beem’s civil

-5- case, but the district court denied his request on April 22, 2019.

Nevertheless, Norkin proceeded to file over 20 documents in the

Third District.

In July 2020, he even filed a notice to invoke this Court’s

discretionary jurisdiction to review the Third District’s decision in

Beem’s appeal, as well as a motion to disqualify certain justices.

And despite the clear terms of his criminal probation, Norkin again

used his norkinlaw.com e-mail address in the signature block of the

motion.

On March 4, 2020, Norkin sent a settlement letter demanding

that the plaintiffs settle with Beem and himself. In the letter,

Norkin used the terms “we” and “us,” clearly indicating that he was

attempting to negotiate on behalf of Beem and that he had the

authority to reach a settlement.

In the instant Bar discipline proceedings, the referee found

that by filing joint motions on behalf of Beem, advocating and

negotiating on Beem’s behalf, and using his norkinlaw.com e-mail

address in pleadings, Norkin intentionally engaged in the

unlicensed practice of law in violation of this Court’s disbarment

order. He found that Norkin continued these actions even though

-6- he was criminally charged, which had put him on notice that his

continued filings constituted the unlicensed practice of law in

contravention of this Court’s disbarment order. The circuit court’s

denial of his motion to be added as a party, the Third District’s

denial of his motion to be added as a co-appellant, the bankruptcy

court’s striking of his brief, the information, and the affidavit for

arrest warrant gave Norkin ample notice that his financial interest

alone did not give him permission to file pleadings when he was not

a named party.

The referee found that Norkin used his defunct Bar credentials

to e-file pleadings after he was disbarred. Upon review of Norkin’s

e-portal profile, it was discovered that Norkin had an “active” profile

with the role designated as an “attorney.” Also, the profile was

linked to Norkin’s norkinlaw.com e-mail address and his now

defunct Bar number. Norkin stipulated that he used his e-portal

account to file documents on more than 200 occasions since he was

disbarred.

Also, Norkin operated a website for his company Assurance

Client Support (ACS). The website was misleading as to his true

status with The Florida Bar in that he held himself out as a

-7- practicing attorney and did not clarify that he was in fact disbarred.

Also, Norkin’s Facebook page, which contained a segment on his

employment history, gave viewers the impression that ACS was a

law firm consisting at least in part of attorneys who work as “in-

house counsel,” a position which is ordinarily understood to be

occupied by attorneys. Thus, Norkin held himself out as a

practicing attorney on his Facebook page after being disbarred.

Additionally, while the case was pending before the referee,

Norkin engaged in inappropriate behavior. He accused Bar counsel

of being unethical, committing fraud upon the court, and engaging

in criminal activity. He claimed the referee was being influenced by

outside entities. And he insinuated he would harm himself if he

received an unfavorable outcome in this case.

The referee recommends that Norkin be adjudicated guilty of

indirect criminal contempt for intentionally violating this Court’s

October 8, 2015, order permanently disbarring Norkin from the

practice of law. As to the sanction, the referee recommends that

Norkin be sentenced to 10 days in the Broward County Jail followed

by five months of probation. As a special condition of that

probation, the referee recommends that Norkin must obtain a

-8- psychological evaluation within 30 days of his release from jail and

begin any recommended treatment thereafter. Further, the referee

recommends that Norkin be ordered to pay the Bar’s costs and

enjoined from practicing law.

The Bar challenges the referee’s recommended sanction,

contending that Norkin should be sentenced to 60 days

incarceration in the Broward County Jail. 2 After the Bar filed its

initial brief, Norkin proceeded to file numerous motions, tolling the

time for filing his answer brief. The Court ruled on the motions and

ordered that Norkin file his answer brief within 14 days of the Bar

filing the transcripts, warning Norkin that filing additional motions

would not toll the time for the deadline of his answer brief. After

the Bar filed the required transcripts, Norkin failed to file his

answer brief within the 14 days. Approximately six weeks after it

was due, he filed his answer, which was stricken as untimely.

2. Norkin’s notice of intent to seek review in this case was stricken because despite the Court giving him additional time to file the necessary documents, he failed to file an initial brief and transcripts in accordance with Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.7(c)(2)-(3) and this Court’s order dated March 10, 2023. Fla. Bar v. Norkin, No. SC2021–1025 (Fla. order entered May 19, 2023).

-9- ANALYSIS

To begin, the referee’s factual findings and recommendation

that Norkin be held in contempt are not in dispute. As we find

ample support for both in the record, we approve the referee’s

factual findings and recommendation that Norkin be held in

contempt without further comment.

That leaves the referee’s recommended sanction of 10 days in

jail and the Bar’s request for a 60-day sentence. Our review of a

referee’s recommended sanction is broader than that afforded to the

referee’s findings of fact because, ultimately, it is our responsibility

to order the appropriate sanction. Fla. Bar v. Picon, 205 So. 3d 759,

765 (Fla. 2016) (citing Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854

(Fla. 1989)); see also art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. Further, we have

broad discretion to impose any sanction here that might otherwise

be imposed for contempt. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.11(f)(1)(F)

(providing that this Court may issue “an appropriate judgment” and

that the judgment may include “any sanction that a court may

impose for contempt”); see also Fla. Bar v. Palmer, 149 So. 3d 1118,

1120 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]his Court has inherent authority to enforce its

orders to ensure compliance with those orders.”); Parisi v. Broward

- 10 - County, 769 So. 2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2000) (“It has long been

recognized that courts have the authority to enforce a judgment by

the exercise of their contempt powers.”).

In recommending an appropriate sanction, the referee

considered evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The referee

found the following aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary

offenses; (2) a pattern of misconduct; and (3) refusal to acknowledge

the wrongful nature of conduct. See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs.

3.2. The referee also considered Norkin’s inappropriate behavior

during the disciplinary process, which included him (1) accusing

Bar counsel of being unethical, committing a fraud upon the court,

and engaging in criminal activity; (2) accusing the referee of being

influenced or coerced by outside entities; and (3) insinuating that

he would harm himself if the referee assessed costs in favor of the

Bar or recommended a sentence of incarceration.

Additionally, the referee considered the following mitigating

factors: (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) personal or

emotional problems; (3) character or reputation; (4) mental

disability or impairment; (5) employment; and (6) absence of harm

to a client. See Fla. Std. Imposing Law. Sancs. 3.3.

- 11 - While the referee found several mitigating factors, they are not

sufficient to outweigh the egregious nature of Norkin’s misconduct

coupled with the significant aggravating factors. Norkin has

continued to engage in the practice of law despite being

permanently disbarred and despite being prosecuted criminally for

the unlicensed practice of law. Although the circuit court denied

his motion to be added as a party and the Third District denied his

motion to be added as a co-appellant, Norkin disregarded the

courts’ rulings and continued to insist on his right to appear in the

Beem litigation. He filed over 20 documents in the Third District

and then even filed a notice to invoke discretionary review in this

Court.

Norkin has shown a blatant disregard for the authority of the

courts, including this Court, by his refusal to abide by their and our

orders. This is part of a larger pattern of disrespect for the courts,

opposing counsel, and the judicial system as a whole that relates

back to the initial misconduct that resulted in his suspension.

Given Norkin’s staunch refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing and

his vow to “never stop,” the only means of compelling his future

- 12 - compliance with this Court’s disbarment order is with a meaningful

sanction.

This Court has exhausted all sanction options other than

ordering a period of incarceration. Although the referee

recommended a 10-day sentence, the Bar argues that it is too

lenient given the circumstances of this case and asks for a 60-day

sentence without probation. Considering Norkin’s pattern of

misconduct we believe a period of incarceration followed by

probation during which Norkin is required to undergo a

psychological evaluation would be appropriate. We therefore

sentence Norkin to 60 days in the Broward County Jail with 50

days of the sentence suspended, contingent upon him completing

probation with special conditions. See Palmer, 149 So. 3d at 1119

(holding disbarred attorney in indirect criminal contempt and

sentencing him to a period of 60 days’ incarceration but suspending

his jail sentence on rehearing); cf. Fla. Bar v. Schramek, 670 So. 2d

59 (Fla. 1996) (sentencing a nonlawyer to 90 days’ incarceration,

with 60 days suspended, for entering a notice of appearance on

behalf of a client and corresponding with the court as the legal

representative of the client).

- 13 - CONCLUSION

The referee’s findings of fact and recommendation that Norkin

be held in contempt are approved. The referee’s recommended

sanction is disapproved, and Jeffrey Alan Norkin is hereby

sentenced to 60 days in the Broward County Jail, with 50 days

suspended contingent upon his successful completion of five

months of probation with the special condition that Norkin must

obtain a psychological evaluation within 30 days of his release from

jail and begin any recommended treatment thereafter. Norkin shall

surrender to the Broward County Sheriff within five days after

service of this opinion on Norkin. In the event Norkin does not

surrender, the Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, is authorized and

directed to take Norkin into custody and imprison him for 60 days.

All pending motions are hereby denied.

Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399–2300, for recovery of costs from

Jeffrey Alan Norkin in the amount of $23,915.39, for which sum let

execution issue.

It is so ordered.

- 14 - MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Complainant

Jeffrey A. Norkin, pro se, Pompano Beach, Florida,

for Respondent

- 15 -