The Firm Law Group, Inc. v. Mireya Cordero

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: January 21, 2026
• Docket: 3D2025-0292
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed January 21, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0292 Lower Tribunal No. 24-125230-CC-23 ________________

The Firm Law Group, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

Mireya Cordero, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Gloria Gonzalez-Meyer, Judge.

DASA Law, and Elee Dammous and Jesus Santiago, for appellant.

Costa Law, PL, and Virginia M. Costa, for appellees.

Before SCALES, C.J., and GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

SCALES, C.J. In this interpleader action involving a failed residential real estate

transaction, appellant The Firm Law Group, Inc. (“Escrow Agent”) challenges

the trial court’s final summary judgment directing Escrow Agent to deliver to

appellees Mireya Cordero and Yasmin Suarez (together “Buyers”) their

$15,000 escrow deposit, without payment of Escrow Agent’s attorney’s fees

from the deposit amount. Because our de novo review of the summary

judgment record1 supports the trial court’s determination that Buyers were

entitled to summary judgment, we affirm.

The standard purchase and sale contract2 between Buyers and Larry

Rodriguez (“Seller”) provided that the contract was contingent upon Buyers

obtaining financing within thirty days of the agreement’s effective date. The

contract further required Escrow Agent to refund the escrow deposit to

Buyers if, prior to the expiration of this thirty-day period, (1) Buyers were

unable to obtain financing after the exercise of diligent effort, and (2) Buyers

timely provided written notice to Seller of their inability to obtain financing

1 See Fernandez v. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 406 So. 3d 299, 303 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (recognizing that orders granting summary judgment are subject to de novo review); Point E. Four Condo. Corp. v. Zevuloni & Assocs., Inc., 50 So. 3d 687, 688 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“We review the interpretation of contractual provisions de novo as a pure matter of law.”). 2 The parties used an “As Is” Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase approved by the Florida Association of Realtors and the Florida Bar.

2 and their election to terminate the contract. The summary judgment record

reflects that Buyers were unable to obtain financing within the thirty-day

period and that Buyers timely provided the required written notice to Seller.

Buyers, therefore, were entitled to the return of their $15,000 escrow deposit.

Nonetheless, Escrow Agent claims that it is still entitled to be paid its

attorney’s fees from the escrow deposit. On the particular facts and

circumstances of this case, we disagree.

The contract authorized Escrow Agent to interplead funds, and have

its attorney’s fees paid from the escrow deposit, but only if there were

competing demands for the deposit or Escrow Agent had a “good faith doubt”

as to entitlement to the deposit. In response to Buyers’ summary judgment

motion and evidence, Escrow Agent’s corporate representative filed an

affidavit asserting, in a conclusory manner, that there was a “bonafide [sic]

dispute” as to entitlement to the escrow deposit and that he had “received

numerous emails, call and texts from the Seller, Buyer, Buyers’ attorneys,

and real estate agents involved in the transaction.” Yet, Escrow Agent

submitted no affidavits from Seller or the real estate agents involved in the

transactions, no copies of any communications evidencing competing

demands, and no other evidence that supported Escrow Agent’s alleged

3 “good faith” in not honoring the contract’s plain and unambiguous provisions

governing return of the escrow deposit.

Escrow Agent’s summary judgment evidence simply was not of

sufficient weight and quality so as to create a genuine dispute as to any

material fact. See Rich v. Narog, 366 So. 3d 1111, 1119-20 (Fla. 3d DCA

2022) (finding the non-moving party’s conclusory, self-serving affidavit was

legally insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact where (1)

documents substantiating the affidavit’s assertions were not appended to the

affidavit, and (2) the affidavit failed to set forth the “‘specific, discrete facts of

the who, what, when, and where variety’ that give the . . . affidavit the type

of probative value necessary to defeat [the moving party’s] motion for

summary judgment” (quoting Rhiner v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 817 Fed.

Appx. 769, 774 (11th Cir. 2020))). We, therefore, affirm the final summary

judgment.

Affirmed.