The Estate of Joseph Williams and Gary Williams v. Glenn Leo Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: July 23, 2024
• Docket: 0708232
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and Lorish UNPUBLISHED

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH WILLIAMS AND GARY WILLIAMS MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0708-23-2 JUDGE LISA M. LORISH JULY 23, 2024 GLENN LEO WILLIAMS

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Claire G. Cardwell, Judge

Joshua Akil (The Barber Law Firm, PLLC, on brief), for appellants.

Alan F. Duckworth (Brenda L. Page; Page Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

Gary Williams, acting on his own behalf and on behalf of the estate of Joseph Williams,

filed a warrant in detinue action against his brother, Glenn Williams. A warrant in detinue is an

action to recover specific personal property that has been wrongfully detained by another. The

target of Gary’s warrant in detinue was money in the amount of $114,873.63 that Glenn

transferred from the bank accounts of the brothers’ elderly father, Joseph Williams, before

Joseph’s death. We agree with the circuit court that a warrant in detinue is an improper action to

recover an amount of money an aggrieved party argues he is owed.

BACKGROUND

Gary Williams and Glenn Williams are brothers. Their father, Joseph Williams, died in

2018. In June 2022, Gary filed a warrant in detinue action against Glenn. The warrant in detinue

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). alleged that Glenn “transferred at least $114,873.63” of Joseph’s money to Glenn’s bank accounts

in 2015, “allegedly at the direction” of Joseph and under power of attorney. Gary alleged that he

only “became constructively aware of this transfer” in June 2020, that “[t]hese funds remain in the

possession of” Glenn, and that Glenn “manifested an intent to convert this Personal Property.” The

warrant in detinue asked the circuit court to order Glenn to “return these [f]unds to the Estate.”

Glenn raised a statute of limitations defense in his answer, and also demurred because a warrant in

detinue was an improper action for the relief requested. The circuit court granted the demurrer and

allowed Gary to file an amended pleading within 21 days.

Gary then filed a nearly-identical warrant in detinue. While his first warrant alleged that

Joseph “transferred at least $114,873.63,” (emphasis added), the amended warrant in detinue

alleged that Joseph “transferred 114,873.63” to Glenn. Glenn filed a plea in bar asserting a statute

of limitations defense and again demurred on the grounds that a detinue action was improper

because Gary was not seeking specific property.

The circuit court held that a detinue action was improper because Gary sought deposited

money and that, even if it were a proper action, the statute of limitations began to run on the date the

property was transferred in 2015. Thus, any relevant statute of limitations would have run by the

time of filing in 2022. As a result, the circuit court sustained the demurrer and granted the plea in

bar.

ANALYSIS

Gary argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in holding that his detinue action was

improper because money is personal property subject to a detinue action. He also argues that the

statute of limitations was triggered only when he found out about the transfer of funds, and not

when the transfer actually occurred.

-2- This Court reviews a circuit court’s decision to sustain a demurrer de novo.” Givago

Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, 300 Va. 260, 264 (2021). “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of

the facts alleged in a complaint assuming that all facts alleged therein and all inferences fairly

drawn from those facts are true.” Id. We further “interpret those allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Taylor v. Aids-Hilfe Koln e.V., 301 Va. 352, 357 (2022) (quoting

Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys., 295 Va. 351, 358 (2018)).

The purpose of filing a warrant in detinue is “to recover personal property unlawfully

withheld from the plaintiff.” Code § 8.01-114. In 1842, our Supreme Court explained that

actions for detinue had fallen out of use in England and had “seldom been resorted to in modern

times.” Martin v. Martin, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 495, 499-500 (1842). But the action was revived

because of “[t]he importance of slave property” and the unique “attachment springing up

between master and slave,” where “no damages would compensate for the loss.” Id. at 500.

Despite the abhorrent origins of this revival, actions in detinue are now regularly used in the

Commonwealth to recover specific personal property, and a series of statutes govern the process

for proceeding in detinue. See Code §§ 8.01-114 to -123.

Our caselaw makes plain that detinue is about specific items of property, not money

damages. It is “a possessory action by which a party seeks recovery of a specific item of

personal property and any damages occasioned by the wrongful detainer of the property.” Gwin

v. Graves, 230 Va. 34, 37 (1985). “The gist of an action of detinue is unlawful detainer of the

specific property sued for—not any other property, and not a money obligation due from the

defendant to the plaintiff.” MacPherson v. Green, 197 Va. 27, 33 (1955) (quoting Va. Land

Immigr. Bureau v. Perrow, 119 Va. 831, 836 (1916)). “The goods which it is sought to recover

[] must be capable of being distinguished from all others, as a particular horse [or] a cow . . . but

not for a bushel of grain.” Detinue, Bouvier Law Dictionary (2012 ed.).

-3- Gary’s amended warrant did not seek a “specific item.” Instead, Gary sought a specific

amount of money that Glenn, acting under power of attorney before Joseph died, transferred out

of Joseph’s bank accounts. Rather than making a claim for a specific chattel, Gary sought a

general amount of money for which he argues Glenn failed to sufficiently account.1 What is

more, the amended warrant did not identify any specific property to which Gary, as distinct from

Joseph’s estate, had any immediate claim, or even any specific property to which Gary would

eventually be entitled once Joseph’s estate was distributed.2 Indeed, the amended warrant did

not even specify how much money Gary would receive from the estate if the funds at issue were

returned to it. It likewise failed to allege that Glenn had wrongfully withheld any money from

Gary, but only that Glenn had failed to sufficiently prove that Joseph intended to give Glenn the

funds. Whatever concerns Gary may have about the transaction that occurred in 2015 cannot fit

within the shape of a warrant in detinue.3 Thus, the circuit court did not err in sustaining the

demurrer.4

1 In reaching this conclusion, we do not reach the question of whether a warrant in detinue may be used to obtain a specific and identifiable pool of funds.

While Gary named both himself and “The Estate of Joseph Williams” as petitioners, the 2

amended warrant does not identify a basis from which Gary allegedly represents the estate. 3 Where an heir suspects the mismanagement of funds, an action for a statutory accounting under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act or for an equitable accounting may be viable. See, e.g., Phillips v. Rohrbaugh, 300 Va. 289, 305 (2021); Code § 64.2-1614(A)(5). 4 Gary also argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the statute of limitations barred his claim. Because we affirm the circuit court’s decision on the demurrer, we need not address the circuit court’s alternative ground to dismiss Gary’s suit, and we decline to consider the statute of limitations issue raised in this case. Abdo v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468, 473 n.1 (2015) (“Our jurisprudence requires us to seek ‘the best and narrowest ground available’ for our decision.” (quoting Armstead v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 569, 576 (2010))). -4- CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

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