NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0141n.06
Case No. 25-5662
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
) FILED THE ESTATE OF JEREMY MARR, by and Mar 16, 2026 ) through JOANNA MARR, its Administrator, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) and JOANNA MARR, individually and on ) behalf of E.J.M., a minor, ) Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CITY OF GLASGOW, KENTUCKY, CITY ) OF GLASGOW POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) GUY JOSEPH TURCOTTE, individually and OPINION ) in his official capacity as a Glasgow Police ) Officer, HAYDEN PHILLIPS, individually ) and in his official capacity as a Glasgow Police ) Officer, and CAMERON MURRELL, ) individually and in his official capacity as a ) Glasgow Police Officer, ) Defendants-Appellees. ) )
Before: GILMAN, KETHELEDGE, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeremy Marr tragically died in April 2020
following a struggle with officers from the Glasgow Police Department. Marr was tased and kneed
multiple times when he resisted arrest, with the arrest being prompted by Marr’s reported break-
in to an elderly woman’s home and his erratic, likely drug-induced, behavior.
Joanna Marr, as the administrator of Marr’s estate, as an individual, and on behalf of their
minor child E.J.M. (Plaintiffs), sued the City of Glasgow (the City), its Police Department, and the
three individual officers involved (collectively, Defendants), alleging that the officers had used No. 25-5662, Estate of Marr v. City of Glasgow
excessive force against Marr. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on the federal claims based on its determination that the officers’ actions were shielded by qualified
immunity and that the derivative claims against the City were therefore without merit. It also
rejected all of Marr’s state-law claims arising from the same incident. For the following reasons,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
On the morning of April 14, 2020, an elderly woman called the police to report that a man
had broken into her home in Glasgow, Kentucky. Officer Joseph Turcotte of the Glasgow Police
Department responded to the call and arrived to find Marr exiting the house wearing only socks
on his feet and holding a pair of sandals.
Marr appeared distressed, and he exhibited symptoms consistent with methamphetamine
intoxication. Upon seeing Officer Turcotte, Marr stated that people were out to get him and that
he did not want to be hurt. Officer Turcotte then asked Marr whether he had any weapons on his
person. Marr initially said no, before responding that he had a knife. When Marr began to reach
into his pocket to surrender the knife, Officer Turcotte ordered him not to take it out.
Marr then allowed Officer Turcotte to lead him toward the patrol car so that Officer
Turcotte could conduct a pat-down search of his person. At this point, Officers Cameron Murrell
and Hayden Phillips arrived at the scene. During the pat-down, Officer Turcotte told Marr that he
was acting “squirrelly” and was “freaking us out.” The officers then placed Marr’s hands behind
his back and began to handcuff him.
Marr’s left hand was cuffed before he began repeatedly shouting: “Please don’t kill me!”
He then attempted to pull away from the officers. In response, the officers wrestled Marr to the
ground, with one officer straddling him and the other two restraining his arms and legs. A struggle
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ensued, during which the officers repeatedly ordered Marr to stop moving and to place his hands
behind his back. But Marr did not comply and instead thrashed about.
After about a minute, Officer Turcotte tased Marr. Marr nevertheless continued to struggle.
Only after another three minutes of wrestling were the officers finally able to handcuff Marr and
shackle his ankles. During that time, Officer Turcotte tased Marr approximately 8 to 11 times, and
Officer Phillips delivered multiple knee strikes to Marr’s body.
The officers rolled Marr onto his back once he was subdued. At this point, they noticed
that Marr’s breathing had become shallow, so they called for emergency medical services. Marr
was immediately transported to a hospital, but he was pronounced dead on arrival. Kentucky’s
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner determined that the cause of Marr’s death was
“agitated/excited delirium complicating acute methamphetamine intoxication during process of
law enforcement subdual/arrest.”
The entirety of the encounter was captured on Officer Turcotte’s bodycam, aside from
several brief moments when his camera was obscured while the officers wrestled with Marr on the
ground. Officer Phillips’s bodycam, on the other hand, recorded only the beginning of the incident
before it became dislodged during the struggle. And Officer Murrell’s bodycam was not activated
until after Marr was subdued. In addition to the officers’ bodycams, a bystander recorded a nine-
second video of the encounter.
Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendants in March 2021. The district court subsequently
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for cruel and unusual punishment, as well
as all claims against the Glasgow Police Department and the three officers in their official
capacities. This left Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, and their Kentucky state-law claims for battery, negligence, wrongful
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death, loss of consortium, as well as negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training. In
January 2025, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’
remaining claims. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary-
judgment order, which the court denied in June 2025. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
“The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008). “Summary judgment is proper when,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Helphenstine v. Lewis County, 60 F.4th 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wilmington Tr. Co. v.
AEP Generating Co., 859 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2017)). “The party moving for summary
judgment carries the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact; if
it satisfies that burden, the nonmoving party must show ‘specific facts that reveal a genuine issue
for trial.’” Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 381 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laster
v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014)).
“‘There is, however, an added wrinkle’ where the record contains ‘a videotape capturing
the events in question.’” LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). “Because facts ‘must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts,’ we
may not adopt a version of the facts that is ‘blatantly contradicted’ by video footage that is not
‘doctored or altered in any way’ and which clearly ‘depicts . . . [the events that] actually
happened.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–80). We must nevertheless
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“view any relevant gaps or uncertainties left by the videos in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff.” Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2017).
B. Officers Murrell, Phillips, and Turcotte are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive-force claim
We begin with Plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive-force claim against the individual officers
involved in Marr’s arrest. The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures bars law-enforcement officers from using excessive force against individuals. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). “To hold an officer liable for the use of excessive force, a
plaintiff must prove that the officer ‘(1) actively participated in the use of excessive force,
(2) supervised the officer who used excessive force, or (3) owed the victim a duty of protection
against the use of excessive force.’” Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997)).
The three officers in this case raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. This
defense “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because the officers have invoked qualified immunity,
Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate.” See Quigley v.
Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013).
“We ask two questions in evaluating whether a law-enforcement officer is entitled to
qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim: ‘(1) whether the officer violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether that constitutional right was -5- No. 25-5662, Estate of Marr v. City of Glasgow
clearly established at the time of the incident.’” Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 480 (6th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Est. of Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 2017)). “These questions
can be answered in any order,” and a finding that either produces a negative answer is sufficient
to defeat the excessive-force claim. Id. Furthermore, “[e]ach officer can be held liable only for
his own wrongdoing, and so we review the actions of each officer separately.” Reed v. Campbell
County, 80 F.4th 734, 748 (6th Cir. 2023). “We also review separately each use of force by the
same officer.” Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, we conclude that Officers
Murrell, Phillips, and Turcotte are each entitled to qualified immunity. We initially note that
resolving the first qualified-immunity question in this case is not free from doubt. In evaluating
whether an officer has violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts must consider
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
The district court, in assessing these factors as they applied to Marr, found that no
constitutional violation had occurred because Marr’s break-in was a “significant crime,” his
agitated and “squirrelly” state posed a threat to the officers, and his struggle with the officers
constituted active resistance to arrest. Yet Plaintiffs present some troubling evidence that arguably
could raise a genuine factual dispute on this issue, including the somewhat incomplete video
footage, the disputed circumstances surrounding the initial break-in, and evidence that the officers
did not adhere to their training regarding the use of force on individuals with diminished capacity.
We ultimately need not resolve this first prong of qualified immunity, however, because
we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden as to the second prong—that is, to
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identify a clearly established constitutional right that the officers violated. See Hagans v. Franklin
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We opt to answer the easier of the two
[qualified-immunity] questions, saving the harder one for another day.”). “In order for a right to
be clearly established for the purposes of qualified immunity, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.’” Est. of Hill, 853 F.3d at 316 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
The relevant inquiry is “whether the state of the law [at the time of the action giving rise to the
claim] gave [the defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was
unconstitutional.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
“In deciding whether a right has been clearly established, the Supreme Court has
‘repeatedly’ warned lower courts not to define the right at ‘a high level of generality.’” Hagans,
695 F.3d at 508 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). “[S]pecificity is
especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the [Supreme] Court has recognized
that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here
excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584
U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). For this reason, “police
officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific
facts at issue.” Id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that the officers violated Marr’s clearly established “right to be free
from use of force disproportionate to the particular circumstances.” This court has indeed
acknowledged that “the right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth
Amendment right” in the abstract sense. See Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 2001).
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But this court has also repeatedly cautioned that such a right is not sufficiently specific for
qualified-immunity purposes. Hagans, 695 F.3d at 508 (noting that the “lofty definition” of a
“‘right to be free from excessive force’ . . . do[es] little to answer the [qualified-immunity]
question”); Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427, 449 (6th Cir. 2022) (explaining that although
“this general right is well known, the right at issue [for qualified immunity] is not defined at such
‘a high level of generality’” (quoting Palma v. Johns, 27 F.4th 419, 442 (6th Cir. 2022), abrogated
on other grounds by Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025))). Instead, Plaintiffs must demonstrate
“the prior articulation of a prohibition against the type of [allegedly] excess force exerted here.”
See Champion v. Outlook Nash., Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 2004).
We accordingly must examine the specific actions by the officers that Plaintiffs claim were
excessive; i.e., the repeated tasing and knee strikes. With respect to tasing, “[w]e have often
found” that whether an individual’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights are violated by
“an officer’s use of a taser turns on active resistance.” Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384,
392, 396 (6th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Although “there is a clearly established right not to be
tased when the suspect is not actively resisting arrest,” the same does not hold true “when a suspect
is actively resisting arrest.” Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 870 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting
cases). A similar dichotomy applies to knee strikes: “When a suspect actively resists arrest, the
police can use . . . knee strike[s] to subdue him; but when a suspect does not resist, or has stopped
resisting, they cannot.” Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2015).
The question we must therefore answer is whether Plaintiffs have presented sufficient
evidence to show a genuine dispute that Marr was not actively resisting arrest, such that the
repeated use of a taser and knee strikes against him violated clearly established law. We conclude
that they have not. “Active resistance includes ‘physically struggling with, threatening, or
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disobeying officers.’” Kent, 810 F.3d at 392 (quoting Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 641). “It also includes
‘refusing to move your hands for the police to handcuff you.’” Id. (quoting Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at
641). “If an arrestee ‘kick[s], flail[s], and wriggl[es] away’ from an arresting officer’s grasp or
‘repeatedly pull[s] his left arm away’ from an officer’s handcuffs,” the officer may use force to
restrain him. Moore v. Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1168 (6th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).
But, of course, such force must cease once the arrestee has become “compliant” or has “stopped
resisting.” Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 641 (citations omitted).
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that Marr actively resisted arrest. When the
officers first attempted to handcuff him, he prevented them from cuffing his right hand by pulling
it away from their grasp. Then, after the officers wrestled him to the ground, he did not comply
with their commands to stop moving and instead struggled and thrashed about. Such actions, this
court has repeatedly held, permit officers to use force without violating clearly established law.
See, e.g., Hagans, 695 F.3d at 510 (holding that an officer did not “violate clearly established law
[in] tas[ing] an out-of-control, shirtless man strung-out on drugs who was thrashing about with
two officers on the ground”); Siders v. City of Eastpointe, 819 F. App’x 381, 390 (6th Cir. 2020)
(holding that an officer did not violate clearly established law when he tased the plaintiff “while
she thrashed on the street[,] refusing to comply with his repeated orders to put her hands behind
her back for cuffing”); Roell, 870 F.3d at 482, 486–87 (holding that deputies did not violate clearly
established law when they tased an arrestee who “resisted the deputies’ attempts to restrain and
handcuff him by kicking, flailing, and wriggling away from their grasp”). Moreover, the officers
used force against Marr only while he continued resisting. Plaintiffs do not dispute that all such
force ceased once Marr was restrained.
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Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that whether Marr intended to resist arrest is debatable from
his actions, and thus they should prevail on summary judgment because material factual disputes
must be resolved in their favor. But there are two problems with this argument. First, Plaintiffs
themselves concede that “Marr continued to thrash” when struggling with the officers on the
ground. Thrashing and flailing, as explained above, constitutes active resistance. Hagans, 695
F.3d at 510; see also Siders, 819 F. App’x at 390; Roell, 870 F.3d at 482, 486–87. And although
Marr’s resistance might not have been as egregious as some other examples from our caselaw, this
court has “emphasiz[ed] that minimal resistance still constitutes resistance.” King v. City of
Rockford, 97 F.4th 379, 397 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Rudlaff, 791 F.3d at 643–44).
Second, even if Marr did not in fact mean to resist arrest, what matters is that the officers
reasonably believed that he did. “[A] court should grant the officer qualified immunity if, viewing
the facts favorably to the plaintiff, an officer reasonably could have believed that the arrest was
lawful.” Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 950 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kennedy v. City of Villa
Hills, 635 F.3d 210, 214 (6th Cir. 2011)). And the qualified-immunity defense applies even if that
reasonable belief was erroneous. Id.; Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 907 (6th Cir.
2009) (“Qualified immunity gives ample room for mistaken judgments . . . irrespective of whether
the official’s error was a mistake of law or a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions
of law and fact.” (cleaned up)).
Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Marr’s actions “could have signaled resistance as
automatically assumed by Turcotte, Phillips, and Murrell.” This statement essentially concedes
that the officers’ belief was reasonable, even if mistaken. See Meadows v. City of Walker, 46 F.4th
416, 424 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[I]f from the officers’ perspective [the suspect] could be seen as possibly
engaged in active resistance, then qualified immunity would presumably be warranted, and this
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would be true even if the officer was not entirely sure.”). Moreover, “[t]he essence of qualified
immunity . . . is to give government officials cover when they resolve close calls.” Hagans, 695
F.3d at 511. This counsels in favor of applying the defense even if, as Plaintiffs assert, Marr’s
actions did not present a “clear-cut” case of resistance.
Plaintiffs next contend that even if the officers were permitted to tase Marr because he
resisted arrest, they violated his clearly established rights by doing so too many times. We agree
that “the gratuitous or excessive use of a taser violates a clearly established constitutional right.”
Chrestman ex rel. Wooden v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 156 F.4th 694, 706
(6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 327 (6th Cir. 2015)). But
Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing that Officer Turcotte’s tasing of Marr 8 to
11 times was gratuitous or excessive. Rather, our precedents—which Plaintiffs make no attempt
to distinguish—have applied qualified immunity in situations involving a similar or greater
number of taser discharges. See, e.g., Hagans, 695 F.3d at 507, 511 (granting qualified immunity
where an officer tased a suspect four to six times); Sheffey v. City of Covington, 564 F. App’x 783,
785, 787 (6th Cir. 2014) (granting qualified immunity where officers tased a suspect 12 times);
Williams v. Sandel, 433 F. App’x 353, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2011) (granting qualified immunity where
officers tased the plaintiff 37 times).
Plaintiffs also argue that the officers violated clearly established law by failing to take into
account Marr’s diminished capacity that was caused by his methamphetamine intoxication,
allegedly in contravention of “[Glasgow Police] Department policy and procedure.” We note,
however, that although an officer’s adherence to “‘police procedures is certainly relevant to the
question of reasonableness in excessive force cases’ . . . [,] a violation of department policy is not
per se evidence of a constitutional violation.” Guptill v. City of Chattanooga, 160 F.4th 768, 780
- 11 - No. 25-5662, Estate of Marr v. City of Glasgow
(6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiffs are
nevertheless correct that “clearly established law” requires officers “to take into account ‘the
diminished capacity of an unarmed detainee . . . when assessing the amount of force exerted.’”
Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Champion, 380
F.3d at 904).
But the extent to which that principle applies here is questionable, given that Marr himself
informed the officers that he was in possession of a knife. More importantly, a suspect’s
diminished capacity “d[oes] not bar [officers] from using the force required to get control of him
and end his resistance—even if that resistance sprang from his delusions.” Helms ex rel. Helms v.
Boyd Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 24-5853, 2025 WL 1693827, at *6 (6th Cir. June 17, 2025). Our
caselaw—which Plaintiffs again fail to counter—has thus routinely granted qualified immunity
when officers use similar force as here to subdue diminished-capacity individuals who resist arrest.
See, e.g., Hagans, 695 F.3d at 510 (granting qualified immunity where officers tased a man
“strung-out on drugs who was thrashing about”); Caie v. W. Bloomfield Twp., 485 F. App’x 92,
94, 96–97 (6th Cir. 2012) (granting qualified immunity where officers tased an “intoxicated and
suicidal” man after he “flail[ed] his arms violently” and “actively resist[ed their] attempts to secure
his arms behind his back”); Roell, 870 F.3d at 482–83 (granting qualified immunity where officers
used force against a man who “was suffering from some sort of mental illness” by “physically
restraining his limbs, wrestling with him, attempting to tase him, and shackling his arms and legs”
after he “actively resist[ed] arrest”); Sheffey, 564 F. App’x at 795–96 (granting qualified immunity
where officers tased a mentally ill man 12 times because he was armed and “violently physically
resisted arrest”).
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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that, in any event, “gaps or uncertainties” in the officers’ bodycam
footage raise material factual disputes that preclude applying qualified immunity at the summary-
judgment stage. They specifically point to a “brief period” during which the only camera recording
the incident—Officer Turcotte’s bodycam—was obscured or unclear. Because limited video was
recorded during this interval, and because “any relevant gaps or uncertainties left by the videos”
must be viewed “in the light most favorable to” Plaintiffs, LaPlante, 30 F.4th at 578 (quoting
Latits, 878 F.3d at 544), they assert that there is a “contested issue of fact” regarding “whether
Defendants took some action that exacerbated Mr. Marr’s mental health crisis and/or his ability to
breathe.”
This argument fundamentally misunderstands Plaintiffs’ burden. As the nonmovant on
summary judgment, Plaintiffs bear the burden of identifying “specific facts” that defeat
Defendants’ motion. See Marshall, 854 F.3d at 381 (quoting Laster, 746 F.3d at 726). Plaintiffs
likewise bear the burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See Quigley,
707 F.3d at 681. This means that they must present evidence that “would reasonably support a
jury’s finding” that the officers took some action during those moments without video footage that
would prevent us from applying qualified immunity. See DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville, 796 F.3d
604, 609 (6th Cir. 2015). Yet Plaintiffs make no attempt to cite any evidence supporting this
proposition; they instead simply speculate that something “could” or “might” have happened. Our
caselaw makes clear, however, that “a party may not avoid summary judgment by resorting to
‘speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’” K.V.G. Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 900 F.3d 818, 823
(6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir. 2004)).
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In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any clearly established right that Officers Murrell,
Phillips, or Turcotte violated when they detained Marr on April 14, 2020. These officers are
therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive-force claim.
C. The City is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
Having determined that the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we turn
next to the question of whether Plaintiffs can hold the City liable under § 1983. The City is a
municipal entity located in Kentucky. “A plaintiff raising a municipal liability claim
under § 1983 must demonstrate that the alleged federal violation occurred because of a municipal
policy or custom.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). This can be done “by demonstrating one of the
following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official
with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of
inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence
of federal rights violations.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against the City is based on its alleged failure to “adequately
hire, train, and supervise the individual officers.” For “the inadequacy of police training [to] serve
as the basis for § 1983 liability,” Plaintiffs must show that “the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). But “a municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the
level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly
established.” Chrestman, 156 F.4th at 708 (emphasis in original) (quoting Arrington-Bey v. City
of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 2017)).
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Because we have determined that the officers did not violate Marr’s clearly established
rights, it follows that the City’s alleged failure to train them could not have constituted “deliberate
indifference” sufficient to sustain municipal liability. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim
against the City also fails.
D. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining Kentucky state-law claims
This leaves Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. As an initial matter, although Plaintiffs’ opening
brief makes passing reference to their claims against the officers for battery, negligence, wrongful
death, and loss of consortium, they present no specific arguments as to any of these claims. Any
challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on these claims is therefore waived.
See United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215, 234 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Issues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed
waived.” (quoting United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1035–36 (6th Cir. 2004)).
The only state-law claims that Plaintiffs specifically discuss are their claims against the
City for vicarious liability and for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training. With
respect to vicarious liability, which is “sometimes referred to as the doctrine of respondeat
superior,” liability “is not predicated upon a tortious act of the employer but upon the imputation
to the employer of a tortious act of the employee.” Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74
S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky. 2002). An employer cannot be vicariously liable, however, if its employees
commit no tortious acts because “vicarious liability is not possible without primary liability.”
Haugh v. City of Louisville, 242 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (citing City of Louisville v.
Bergel, 610 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Ky. 1980)). Here, Plaintiffs have waived all their state-law tort
claims against the individual officers, so no tort claims remain against any City employee.
Plaintiffs thus have no claim against the City based on vicarious liability. - 15 - No. 25-5662, Estate of Marr v. City of Glasgow
As for Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, “the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant knew or had reason to know of the employee’s harmful
propensities; that the employee injured the plaintiff; and that the hiring, supervision, or retention
of such an employee proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Ord. of
Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005) (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment
Relationship § 401 (2004)). Again, however, Plaintiffs have waived their state-law tort claims
against the individual officers, which insulates the City from this particular claim. See Ten Broeck
Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 727 (Ky. 2009) (“In order for [an] employer to be held
liable for negligent hiring [or] retention . . . [,] the employee must have committed a tort.” (quoting
Mulhern v. City of Scottsdale, 165 Ariz. 395, 398 (Ct. App. 1990))). And even if these state-law
tort claims were not waived, Plaintiffs have made no attempt to satisfy another key element of
their negligent-supervision claim—namely, to show that the City knew or should have known that
the specific officers involved in Marr’s arrest would cause him harm. The City is therefore entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligent-supervision claim as well.
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary-judgment decision
Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the summary-judgment decision under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
“In this circuit, a district court may alter a judgment under Rule 59 based on (1) a clear error of
law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to
prevent manifest injustice.” Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 551–52 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir.
2010)). District courts have “considerable discretion” in deciding whether to grant Rule 59(e)
- 16 - No. 25-5662, Estate of Marr v. City of Glasgow
motions, and we review such decisions under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Leisure Caviar,
616 F.3d at 615.
Plaintiffs’ sole Rule 59(e) argument is that the district court failed to consider that manifest
injustice would result from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Yet Plaintiffs
fail to establish that manifest injustice has occurred in this case. They contend that the summary-
judgment decision is unjust because it relies primarily on the officers’ incomplete bodycam
footage. But this contention merely echoes Plaintiffs’ original argument in opposition to
Defendants’ summary-judgment motion, which we have already rejected. See Mich. Flyer LLC v.
Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth., 860 F.3d 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2017) (“A motion under Rule 59(e) is not
an opportunity to re-argue a case.” (quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998))). Because Plaintiffs fail to show that the grant of summary
judgment in Defendants’ favor was manifestly unjust, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion.
III. CONCLUSION
The death of Jeremy Marr, who leaves behind a devoted wife and daughter, is an immense
tragedy. But Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants should be held liable for his death
under either federal or state law. For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment
of the district court.
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