The Estate of Dominique McCoy by and through its Court Appointed Administrator William McCoy v. County of San Diego, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 22-cv-1724-BTM-SBC THE ESTATE OF DOMINIQUE 12 McCOY by and through its Court ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 Appointed Administrator AND DENYING IN PART WILLIAM McCOY, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 14 Plaintiff, JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 111); (2) 15 v. GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 Defendants. (ECF NOS. 113 & 134); and (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 18 SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF 19 NO. 117)

20 Pending before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by (1) 21 Defendant County of San Deigo (ECF No. 111); (2) Defendants Crystal Reeves, 22 Deputy Daniel Cheung, Lieutenant Desan Tyson, Corporal Jacob Saelens 23 (collectively, the individual defendants) (ECF Nos. 113 & 134); and (3) Plaintiff 24 Estate of Dominique McCoy (ECF No. 117). For the reasons discussed below, the 25 County’s motion is granted in part and denied in part; the individual defendants’ 26 motion is granted in part and denied in part; and Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 27 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 This case arose from the tragic death of Dominique McCoy. On December 3 23, 2021, McCoy was pulled over for driving a car with a stolen or lost license plate. 4 McCoy was arrested on a probation warrant and, after he was searched, for 5 possession of a controlled substance. 6 McCoy’s probation warrant stemmed from his guilty plea for selling a 7 controlled substance in October 2019. He was sentenced to 180 days in jail and 8 three years of probation. The probation warrant he was arrested under was issued 9 in June 2021. Effective January 1, 2021, a California statute, AB 1950, reduced 10 many probation terms to two years. In November 2021, pursuant to AB 1950, a 11 state court judge terminated McCoy’s probation and recalled the outstanding 12 probation violation warrant against him. Thus, when McCoy was arrested on 13 December 23, 2021, the June 2021 probation warrant was recalled and should 14 have been terminated. However, due to an error by a Superior Court clerk, the 15 warrant was not terminated. 16 McCoy was nonetheless detained at the San Diego Central Jail by the 17 County of San Diego on the probation warrant. McCoy was classified as a low- 18 risk inmate, at “level 2.” The County’s security classification system, which ranges 19 from 6 (the most dangerous inmates) to 1 (the least), aims to separate violent 20 inmates from non-violent inmates. On December 29, 2021, a hearing was held 21 before a state court judge on McCoy’s charges. The judge ordered McCoy 22 released. Before releasing McCoy, however, he was placed in a cell with John 23 Medina. 24 Medina was arrested on December 26, 2021, for felony animal abuse, 25 assault with a deadly weapon, and violence against a child. Medina killed his 26 family’s dog and drugged and tried to stab his brother. Medina was a high-risk 27 inmate, at “level 4.” Placed in the same cell, within about an hour, Medina attacked 28 and killed McCoy. They were allegedly fighting over the lone mattress in the cell. 1 Medina and McCoy were placed in the same cell under the County’s COVID- 2 19 protocols. Under those protocols, newly booked inmates could be housed 3 together to be quarantined from the other inmates. Here, for example, McCoy was 4 placed in quarantine on December 24, two days after he entered the jail. Medina 5 was placed in quarantine on December 26, the day he was jailed. This quarantine 6 protocol was considered medical housing, which allowed for higher risk inmates to 7 be housed with lower risk inmates. 8 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint asserts causes of action (1) against 9 the County under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 10 (1978), for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) 11 against the individual defendants for deliberate indifference under the Eighth and 12 Fourteenth Amendments; (3) against the County for failing to properly train and 13 supervise; and (4) against all the defendants for wrongful death. Plaintiff claims 14 that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to McCoy’s constitutional rights by 15 placing McCoy in a cell with Medina. Plaintiff claims that the County’s custom or 16 practice of ignoring the security classification system—and placing violent inmates 17 with non-violent inmates—foreseeably resulted in Medina killing McCoy. 18 The parties now move for summary judgment. Plaintiff claims that the 19 County is liable as a matter of law for ignoring its own security classification 20 system. Plaintiff also argues it is entitled to judgment on liability against Deputy 21 Daniel Cheung for placing McCoy in a cell with Medina. 22 The County claims that (1) its policies did not amount to deliberate 23 indifference; (2) it was not responsible for failing to clear the warrant underlying 24 McCoy’s arrest; (3) there is no evidence that it failed to properly train its employees; 25 and (4) it is entitled to immunity on the wrongful death claim. The individual 26 defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment because (a) they 27 were not reckless, (b) McCoy’s death was not foreseeable, (c) they are entitled to 28 qualified immunity, and (d) the wrongful death claim lacks merit. Corporal Jacob 1 Saelens also raises a statute-of-limitations defense. The Court held oral argument 2 on March 30, 2026, at which Plaintiff agreed to dismiss count three (failure to train). 3 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 4 Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no 5 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 6 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; accord Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 7 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 8 dispute as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 9 of law.”). Material facts “might affect the outcome of the suit,” and a dispute is 10 genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 11 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 12 On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most 13 favorable to the opposing party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per 14 curiam). 15 16 DISCUSSION 17 A. Preliminary Matters 18 Before discussing the merits of the several motions, there are two 19 preliminary matters that the Court needs to rule on. First, this decision on the 20 pending motions may discuss certain facts that are part of sealed documents. 21 There is a public right to know what the Court has considered in deciding the 22 merits of claims, and evidence should not be sealed unless there is a compelling 23 need for confidentiality. liner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) 24 (“In keeping with the strong public policy favoring access to court records, most 25 judicial records may be sealed only if the court finds compelling reasons.” 26 (citation and quotation marks omitted)). In this case, involving a murder by an 27 inmate of another inmate who should not have been in custody on the day he 28 was killed, there is a heightened public interest in what went wrong. There is no 1 compelling interest for confidentiality that overcomes that public interest. 2 Therefore, the recitation of facts herein is an exception to any sealing orders. 3 Second, the Defendants have moved to have the expert opinions by Gary 4 Raney (Doc. 109-1) and Dr. Homer Venters (Doc. 110-1) declared inadmissible. 5 The Court will rule on the motions notwithstanding that defense counsel did not 6 comply with my Chamber’s Rule as to objections to evidence in motions for 7 summary judgment. Chamber’s Rules at 2. The Court’s ruling is limited to 8 consideration of the expert opinions on the motions for summary judgment. It 9 does not apply to what will be admissible at trial. That can be determined on a 10 motion in limine before trial. 11 As to the opinions of Mr. Raney, the Court finds him eminently qualified on 12 the subject of the opinions. The Court finds that the requirements of Federal 13 Rule of Evidence 702 have been met for all but the following opinions. Raney’s 14 opinion as to Saelens’s intent on not providing a separate mattress for Medina 15 when he placed him in the cell is not based on his expertise but rather on his 16 analysis of the evidence. As such, it would be similar to an attorney’s argument 17 and not properly considered as expertise helpful to the jury to understand the 18 evidence. The same analysis applies to Raney’s opinion that Saelens’s violation 19 of Title 15 caused McCoy’s death. Finally, Raney’s opinion that having level 2 20 and 4 inmates in the same cell violated Title 15 is his conclusion and not based 21 on any cases or administrative authorities. Therefore, it is not based on his 22 expertise and is based on mere argument. The Court will not consider those 23 three opinions when deciding the motions for summary judgment. The 24 Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions of Gary Raney is GRANTED IN 25 PART and DENIED IN PART without prejudice to reconsideration in a motion in 26 limine after the pretrial conference. 27 The Court also finds Dr. Venters eminently qualified to offer his opinions, 28 and they are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, except the 1 following two opinions. The opinion that the Defendants did not follow Title 15 2 when evaluating Medina is not based on his expertise with Title 15. The opinion 3 that Medina was not placed in COVID quarantine is speculative and not based on 4 actual facts. The Court will not consider those two opinions in deciding the 5 motions for summary judgment. The Defendants’ motion to exclude the opinions 6 of Dr. Venters is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART without prejudice to 7 reconsideration on a motion in limine after the pretrial conference. 8 B. Plaintiff’s Monell claim. 9 “A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless 10 a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force behind 11 a violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 12 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff can succeed under Monell by showing that a government 13 entity’s policy (1) “amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 14 right” and (2) was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of that right. Id. 15 (citation omitted). 16 Here, Plaintiff alleges that the County had a policy of placing violent 17 offenders in cells with nonviolent offenders, and that the policy was the moving 18 force behind the deprivation of McCoy’s constitutional right to be free from violence 19 from fellow inmates. See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 20 2016) (en banc) (recognizing the “right to be free from violence at the hands of 21 other inmates”); accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (“Being 22 violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders 23 pay for their offenses against society.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). 24 i. Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment. 25 The Court must deny Plaintiff summary judgment on the Monell claim 26 because whether the County was deliberately indifferent is a dispute of fact for 27 trial. The County allowed mixed-classification security housing because of the 28 COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 posed a great danger to inmates, and the failure 1 to protect inmates from the virus could have led to liability for the County. See 2 generally Polanco v. Diaz, 76 F.4th 918 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting how prison officials 3 were aware of COVID-19’s danger and could be found liable for transferring 4 inmates infected with the virus to another facility). 5 The County’s goal in creating the system that allowed Medina and McCoy to 6 be housed together may have been to help protect inmates. Plaintiff’s expert even 7 acknowledged that mixed-classification security housing for medical purposes is 8 essentially a common practice. A finding of deliberate indifference as a matter of 9 law would be inappropriate and unwarranted. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 10 511 U.S. 825, 844-45 (1994) (noting that the duty to ensure reasonable safety for 11 inmates must “incorporate[] due regard for prison officials’ unenviable task of 12 keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions” (quotation 13 marks and citation omitted)); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1993) 14 (noting that the inquiry into deliberate indifference of prison authorities should 15 “consider arguments regarding the realities of prison administration”). Plaintiff is 16 denied summary judgment on its Monell claim. 17 ii. The County is not entitled to summary judgment as to the housing of McCoy and Medina. 18

19 When Medina killed McCoy, Medina was facing serious charges—felony 20 animal abuse, assault with a deadly weapon, and violence against a child. McCoy 21 was awaiting his release. Allowing Medina to be placed in a cell with McCoy 22 certainly created a risk and danger to McCoy. The County’s policy allowed high- 23 risk inmates to be placed with low-risk inmates. A rational jury could find that 24 mixing high- and low-security inmates created an obvious danger to low-security 25 inmates. That of course is exactly why the County usually separates high- and 26 low-security inmates. 27 A rational jury thus could find that the County was deliberately indifferent to 28 McCoy’s constitutional right to be free from violence from other inmates. See Long 1 v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Whether a 2 local government has displayed a policy of deliberate indifference to the 3 constitutional rights of its citizens is generally a jury question.” (citation omitted)). 4 A rational jury could also find that the policy was a moving force behind McCoy’s 5 death. Medina’s ability to murder McCoy may have been “closely related” to the 6 County’s jail housing system. See id. at 1190 (explaining that causation for a 7 Monell claim is measured by whether the policy is “closely related to the ultimate 8 injury” (citation omitted)). 9 Because Plaintiff may be able to prove that the County’s policy (1) amounted 10 to deliberate indifference of McCoy’s right to be free from violence from other 11 inmates, and (2) was a moving force behind McCoy’s death, the County is not 12 entitled to summary judgment as to its jail housing policy. 13 iii. The County is entitled to summary judgment as to recalled 14 probation warrants. 15 Plaintiff claims that the County had a policy of inaction for probation warrants 16 recalled under AB 1950. In Plaintiff’s view, when a probation warrant was recalled 17 by a state court judge, the County should have confirmed that the warrant was 18 then in fact terminated in the database. Plaintiff claims that the Superior Court’s 19 failure to terminate recalled warrants was a widespread and well-known problem, 20 such that the probation department must have been aware of the problem. If the 21 County had a system in place to check whether recalled warrants were actually 22 being terminated, the theory goes, McCoy never would have been arrested, and 23 thus McCoy would not have been in custody to be placed in a cell with Medina. 24 A Monell claim can be based on a policy of inaction. Tsao v. Desert Palace, 25 Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A policy of inaction or omission may be 26 based on failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional 27 violations.”). If policy makers are aware of a widespread problem and fail to act, 28 that can constitute a policy of inaction under Monell. Id.; Fairley v. Luman, 281 1 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Here, the relevant date for the County’s 2 alleged policy of inaction is the day McCoy was arrested, that is, December 23, 3 2021. Thus, to show that the County had a policy of inaction for the failure to check 4 whether recalled warrants were being terminated, Plaintiff needs evidence 5 showing that there was a widespread issue of warrants being recalled but not 6 terminated before December 23, 2021. 7 Plaintiff, however, lacks sufficient evidence showing that—as of December 8 23, 2021—there was a widespread and well-known problem of warrants being 9 recalled but not terminated. Plaintiff’s evidence has no timeline, so a jury would 10 be forced to speculate whether the problem was in fact widespread and well-known 11 before December 23, 2021. Plaintiff’s evidence would not allow a rational jury to 12 find that the problem was widespread and well-known before the day McCoy was 13 arrested.1 Thus, the County is granted summary judgment as to the alleged policy 14 of inaction for probation warrants recalled under AB 1950. 15 For this grant of summary judgment, the Court finds that “there is no just 16 reason for delay” of Plaintiff’s ability to appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This 17 issue is distinct and separate from the gravamen of Plaintiff’s claims—that the 18 County and the individual defendants should never have allowed Medina and 19 McCoy to be placed in the same cell. Allowing Plaintiff to appeal this ruling will 20 facilitate the efficient, timely, and fair adjudication of this claim and this case. See 21 Jewel v. NSA, 810 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that Rule 54(b) is 22 meant to avoid the injustice of delaying appellate review of an issue distinct from 23 the remaining claims). The Court will thus direct entry of final judgment under Rule 24 54(b) as to this ruling. 25 26 1 Even considering the Montoya declaration, it fails to contain any evidence proving the 27 failure to terminate recalled warrants was widespread and well-known before McCoy’s arrest. Thus, the Court need not reach the County’s objection that the declaration was 28 1 C. Plaintiff’s second cause of action against the individual defendants. 2 A pretrial detainee can succeed against an individual officer on a Fourteenth 3 Amendment failure-to-protect claim by proving that (1) the defendant made an 4 intentional decision as to the conditions of his confinement; (2) those conditions 5 exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm; (3) the defendant failed to take 6 reasonable measures to prevent that risk (such that the defendant’s failure to act 7 was objectively unreasonable and created an obvious danger); and (4) the 8 defendant caused the injury at issue by not taking those reasonable measures. 9 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.2 10 The qualified immunity doctrine, however, would bar Plaintiff’s claims against 11 the individual defendants unless they violated a “clearly established” constitutional 12 right when they acted. Id. at 1066. 13 i. Crystal Reeves 14 Reeves, a mental health counselor, cleared Medina to be placed in general 15 housing. Reeves evaluated Medina on December 28 and 29. Reeves was aware 16 of the violent behavior underlying Medina’s arrest. Reeves knew that Medina 17 urinated in front of a mental health professional, Sonja Taneska, on December 26. 18 Taneska did not feel comfortable allowing Medina to be with other inmates. 19 Reeves knew that Medina, while in custody, banged his head on a wall or window 20 and yelled that he wanted to kill himself. 21 When Reeves assessed Medina on the 28th, he was having auditory 22 hallucinations. Medina thought he had voices inside his head. Medina wanted to 23 be housed alone because he thought other inmates wanted to harm him. When 24 Reeves assessed Medina again on the 29th, he was paranoid, delusional, and 25 hallucinating. Medina again thought that other inmates wanted to harm him. 26 27 28 1 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a rational jury can 2 find Reeves reckless for clearing Medina for general housing. Reeves’s decision 3 to clear Medina for general housing allowed Medina and Mccoy to be housed 4 together. A rational jury can thus find causation from Reeves’s decision to 5 McCoy’s death at Medina’s hands. 6 Reeves is neither entitled to summary judgment nor qualified immunity. See 7 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1067 (ruling that the right to be free from violence by other 8 inmates was clearly established and explaining that “[t[he contours of the right 9 required only that the individual defendants take reasonable measures to mitigate 10 the substantial risk to [the plaintiff]”); see also Sandoval v. Cty. of San Diego, 985 11 F.3d 657, 669-81 (9th Cir. 2021) (ruling that both summary judgment and qualified 12 immunity were not warranted on claims against individual nurses for reckless 13 medical treatment); Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2020) (“None of 14 the defendants can claim ignorance to a prisoner’s right to be protected from 15 violence at the hands of other inmates. That right has been clearly established 16 since the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan in 1994. We have 17 recently and explicitly held that it is clearly established that prison officials must 18 take reasonable measures to mitigate the [known] substantial risk[s] to a prisoner.” 19 (quotation marks and citations omitted)); De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 20 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We do, of course, acknowledge that Appellees have provided 21 De’lonta with some measure of treatment to alleviate her GID symptoms. But just 22 because Appellees have provided De’lonta with some treatment consistent with 23 the GID Standards of Care, it does not follow that they have necessarily provided 24 her with constitutionally adequate treatment.” (emphases omitted)); Foelker v. 25 Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that summary 26 judgment was not warranted and a deliberate indifference claim was triable where 27 a nurse and social worker did not send a prisoner to the hospital when he 28 defecated on himself and did not realize he did so). 1 ii. Deputy Daniel Cheung 2 Deputy Cheung assigned Medina to be placed in the same cell with McCoy. 3 Deputy Cheung was aware of the charges Medina was facing. Deputy Cheung 4 knew Medina was a high-risk inmate and that McCoy was a low-risk inmate. 5 Deputy Cheung thus may have created an obvious danger by housing Medina and 6 McCoy together. A rational jury could find that housing Medina and McCoy 7 together was reckless and caused McCoy’s death. Deputy Cheung is thus not 8 entitled to summary judgment on liability nor qualified immunity. See Lemire v. 9 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that 10 whether a prison official created a substantial risk of danger with no reasonable 11 justification is a fact-sensitive inquiry inappropriate for resolution on summary 12 judgment); id. at 1080 (explaining that summary judgment on causation is not 13 warranted where reasonable people could disagree on the question); Fargo v. San 14 Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (“When reasonable persons may 15 disagree as to whether particular conduct constitutes negligence, gross negligence 16 or recklessness, the question is one of fact to be decided by a jury.”). 17 Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment against Deputy Cheung 18 because the claim is fact sensitive and inappropriate for resolution before trial. See 19 Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078, 1080; Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641. 20 iii. Lieutenant Desan Tyson 21 Plaintiff claims that Lieutenant Tyson was part of the committee that allowed 22 the adoption of the County’s COVID-19 mixed-security level inmate housing policy. 23 Plaintiff contends that Lieutenant Tyson should have objected to mixed-security 24 inmate housing for COVID-19 quarantining. 25 These allegations are insufficient for a reasonable jury to hold Lieutenant 26 Tyson liable under Plaintiff’s second cause of action. In allegedly not voicing an 27 objection to the committee, Lieutenant Tyson did not make a decision as to 28 McCoy’s conditions of confinement. Nor can Plaintiff prove causation from 1 Lieutenant Tyson’s alleged failure to raise the issue of the dangerousness of the 2 policy with the committee. Plaintiff has not raised a triable question over whether 3 the committee would have acted differently if Lieutenant Tyson voiced an 4 objection. 5 Indeed, Plaintiff’s theory does not even fit the test for a Fourteenth 6 Amendment failure-to-protect claim. In other words, whether a committee member 7 objects to a proposed inmate housing plan or not does not state a Fourteenth 8 Amendment failure-to-protect claim. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (setting forth 9 standard for Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claim). Lieutenant Tyson is 10 entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s second cause of action. Lieutenant 11 Tyson is also entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because no case put him 12 on notice that his alleged inaction was contrary to a “clearly established 13 constitutional right.” Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 14 785, 792 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Without a constitutional violation, there can be no 15 violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”); accord Zorn v. Linton, 607 16 U.S. ___, slip op. at 4 (2026) (per curiam) (“[O]fficers receive qualified immunity 17 unless they could have read the relevant precedent beforehand and known that it 18 proscribed their specific conduct.” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 19 iv. Corporal Jacob Saelens 20 Corporal Saelens escorted Medina to the cell. Plaintiff contends that 21 Corporal Saelens was reckless for failing to provide a mattress for Medina. 22 Corporal Saelens created a risk of a fight between Medina and McCoy, Plaintiff 23 argues, by not providing Medina a mattress. And because they fought over the 24 sole mattress, Plaintiff contends, a reasonable jury could find causation from the 25 failure to provide Medina a mattress to McCoy’s death. 26 The Court agrees that a rational jury could find Corporal Saelens reckless 27 for failing to provide Medina a mattress. A reasonable jury could find it reasonably 28 foreseeable that two inmates would fight over the sole mattress and thus could 1 also find causation from Corporal Saelens’s failure to provide a mattress to 2 McCoy’s death. See Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1078, 1080; Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641. 3 However, Corporal Saelens is entitled to qualified immunity. No case put 4 Corporal Saelens on notice that he would be violating the Constitution by failing to 5 provide Medina a mattress. Because “officers receive qualified immunity unless 6 they could have read the relevant precedent beforehand and known that it 7 proscribed their specific conduct,” Corporal Saelens must receive qualified 8 immunity here. See Zorn, 607 U.S. at ___, slip op. at 4; accord Waid v. Cnty. of 9 Lyon, 87 F.4th 383, 387 (9th Cir. 2023) (“A right is clearly established when it is 10 ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what 11 he is doing violates that right.’ (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 12 (2012))). 13 Summary judgment is denied on Corporal Saelens’s statute-of-limitations 14 defense. Corporal Saelens claims Plaintiff had notice—from a March 2023 15 preliminary hearing in Medina’s criminal case—of a claim against Corporal 16 Saelens. The hearing transcript Corporal Saelens relies on (ECF No. 67-2) does 17 not as a matter of law give notice of a claim against Corporal Saelens. There is a 18 genuine dispute of material fact over when Plaintiff should have had notice of a 19 claim against Corporal Saelens. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 20 522 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2008) (showing that under California law a claim’s 21 accrual date is extended if the plaintiff does not have reason to know of the claim 22 after a reasonable investigation); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1368 23 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasizing for statute of limitations “that what [the plaintiff] knew 24 and when she knew it are questions of fact”). 25 D. Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim. 26 The Court agrees that the County is entitled to immunity on Plaintiff’s 27 wrongful death claim. California generally grants, unless an exception applies, 28 public entities immunity for claims by prisoners for their injuries. Cal. Gov. Code § 1 844.6. No exception applies here. The County is thus entitled to immunity on 2 Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim. 3 Crystal Reeves’s immunity claim is denied as moot. The Court already 4 granted the defendants immunity as to medical care. (ECF No. 99). 5 Under California law, “[t]he elements of the cause of action for wrongful death 6 are the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the 7 damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs.” Lilly v. Univ. of 8 Cal.-San Diego, 751 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1081 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (citation omitted). 9 Lieutenant Tyson is granted judgment on this claim for the reasons set forth above. 10 No rational jury could find Lieutenant Tyson liable for McCoy’s death. The sole 11 allegation against him is that he should have objected as a committee member to 12 the adoption of mixed-security level inmate housing for COVID-19 quarantining. 13 As explained above, that alleged failure to object is not a tort nor a cause of 14 McCoy’s death. 15 Deputy Cheung and Corporal Saelens are denied judgment on this claim for 16 the reasons set forth above. A rational jury could find that they committed torts 17 resulting in McCoy’s death. Deputy Cheung allegedly allowed Medina and McCoy 18 to be placed in the same cell. A jury could thus find him liable for McCoy’s death 19 because Medina murdered McCoy shortly after they were placed together. 20 Corporal Saelens allegedly caused Medina and McCoy to only have one mattress, 21 and a jury could find that Medina murdered McCoy based on a fight over the sole 22 mattress in the cell. A jury could thus rationally hold Corporal Saelens liable for 23 McCoy’s death. 24 E. Severance 25 The Court invited the parties to address a severance given the likelihood that 26 Reeves and Cheung would take an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified 27 immunity. However, since the Court has certified the grant of partial summary 28 judgment for the County, the grant of summary judgment for Tyson and the partial 1 summary judgment for Saelens under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), it 2 would create a great inefficiency to try the case in several parts. It makes more 3 sense to see how the Court of Appeals rules and see what defendants and claims 4 are going to trial. Therefore, although the Court is very concerned with the delay 5 involved in interlocutory appeals, severance is DENIED without prejudice at this 6 time. 7 CONCLUSION 8 (1) The Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert opinion of Gary Raney 9 (109-1) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, without 10 prejudice. 11 (2) The Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert opinion of Dr. Homer 12 Venters (110-1) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, without 13 prejudice. 14 (3) The Defendant County’s motion for partial summary judgment as to 15 Plaintiff’s Monell claim for a policy of inaction as to checking whether 16 recalled probation violation warrants were actually cancelled in law 17 enforcement data bases is GRANTED. The Court certifies that there is 18 no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment as to this claim. The 19 Clerk shall enter final judgment as to this claim. The County’s motion for 20 summary judgment on Count Four (wrongful death) is GRANTED. The 21 County’s motion for summary judgment is otherwise DENIED. 22 (4) Summary judgment is entered for Desan Tyson on both Counts Two 23 (42 U.S.C. 1983) and Four (wrongful death). The Court certifies that 24 there is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment as to those 25 claims and defendant. The Clerk shall enter final judgment as to those 26 claims and defendant. 27 (5) Jacob Saelens’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART 28 1 as to Count Two (42 U.S.C. 1983) because he is granted qualified 2 immunity and DENIED as to Count Four (wrongful death). The Court 3 certifies that there is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment 4 as to Count Two. The Clerk shall enter final judgment for Defendant 5 Saelens as to Count Two. 6 (6) Defendants Reeves and Cheung’s motions for summary judgment are 7 DENIED. 8 (7) The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 9 (8) Per Plaintiff's agreement at oral argument, Count Three is DISMISSED. 10 (9) The grant of immunity to Defendant Reeves on Count Four as to 11 medical care shall be certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). 12 There is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment. 13 (10) Any motion for reconsideration must be made within twenty-one days of 14 the entry of this order and shall not exceed ten pages. Any opposition 15 shall be filed within fourteen days of the filing of the motion and shall not 16 exceed ten pages. No replies. 17 || IT 1S SO ORDERED. 18 ||Dated: April 27, 2026 Til , 19 Guy Fit Mgehincl Honorable Barry Ted Moskowit 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28