The Estate of Christopher Nash v. County of Los Angeles

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 21, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-05012
StatusUnknown

This text of The Estate of Christopher Nash v. County of Los Angeles (The Estate of Christopher Nash v. County of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Estate of Christopher Nash v. County of Los Angeles, (C.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 THE ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER ) Case No.: 2:20-cv-05012-MWF-GJS NASH, by and through his successor-in-) 12 interest ANTHONY NASH an ) individual; and ANTHONY NASH, an ) ** DISCOVERY MATTER ** 13 individual, ) ) 14 Plaintiffs, ) [PROPOSED] STIPULATED ) PROTECTIVE ORDER 15 v. ) ) COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and 16 DOES 1-50, inclusive, ) ) Hon. Gail J. Standish 17 Defendants. ) U.S. Magistrate Judge ) 18 )

19 20 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and among the parties hereto, through 21 their respective counsel of record as follows: 22 I. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 23 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential and 24 private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from 25 use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. 26 Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the 27 following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order 28 does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and 1 that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the 2 limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the 3 applicable legal principles. 4 II. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 5 This action is likely to involve confidential and private information for 6 which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other 7 than prosecution of this action is warranted. Such information may implicate the 8 privacy interests of the parties and are properly protected through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 26(c) protective order. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 10 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a ‘party 11 or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or 12 expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other 13 rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad 14 purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 15 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully 16 crafted protective order.”). 17 Such confidential materials and information consist of, among other things, 18 Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department investigations, coroner’s reports, 19 medical records, information implicating privacy rights of third parties, and 20 information otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which may be 21 privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under state or federal statutes, 22 court rules, case decisions, or common law. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of 23 information, to facilitate the prompt resolution of disputes over confidentiality of 24 discovery materials, to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to 25 keep confidential, to ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses 26 of such material in preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their 27 handling at the end of the litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective 28 order for such information is justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties 1 that information will not be designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that 2 nothing be so designated without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in 3 a confidential, non-public manner, and there is good cause why it should not be 4 part of the public record of this case. 5 III. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING UNDER 6 SEAL 7 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section XIV(C), below, that 8 this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential 9 information under seal; Local Civil Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must 10 be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission 11 from the court to file material under seal. 12 There is a strong presumption that the public has a right of access to judicial 13 proceedings and records in civil cases. In connection with non-dispositive 14 motions, good cause must be shown to support a filing under seal. See Kamakana 15 v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006), Phillips v. 16 Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002), Makar-Welbon v. 17 Sony Electrics, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (even stipulated 18 protective orders require good cause showing), and a specific showing of good 19 cause or compelling reasons with proper evidentiary support and legal justification, 20 must be made with respect to Protected Material that a party seeks to file under 21 seal. The parties’ mere designation of Disclosure or Discovery Material as 22 CONFIDENTIAL does not—without the submission of competent evidence by 23 declaration, establishing that the material sought to be filed under seal qualifies as 24 confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable—constitute good cause. 25 Further, if a party requests sealing related to a dispositive motion or trial, then 26 compelling reasons, not only good cause, for the sealing must be shown, and the 27 relief sought shall be narrowly tailored to serve the specific interest to be protected. 28 See Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir. 2010). For 1 each item or type of information, document, or thing sought to be filed or 2 introduced under seal in connection with a dispositive motion or trial, the party 3 seeking protection must articulate compelling reasons, supported by specific facts 4 and legal justification, for the requested sealing order. Again, competent evidence 5 supporting the application to file documents under seal must be provided by 6 declaration. 7 Any document that is not confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable 8 in its entirety will not be filed under seal if the confidential portions can be 9 redacted. If documents can be redacted, then a redacted version for public 10 viewing, omitting only the confidential, privileged, or otherwise protectable 11 portions of the document, shall be filed. Any application that seeks to file 12 documents under seal in their entirety should include an explanation of why 13 redaction is not feasible. 14 IV. DEFINITIONS 15 A. Action: This pending federal lawsuit, Case No. 2:20-cv-05012-MWF- 16 GJS. 17 B. Challenging Party: A Party or Non-Party that challenges the 18 designation of information or items under this Order. 19 C. “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: Information (regardless of 20 how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for 21 protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and as specified above in 22 the Good Cause Statement. 23 D. Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as 24 their support staff). 25 E. Designating Party: A Party or Non-Party that designates information 26 or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as 27 “CONFIDENTIAL.” 28 F. Disclosure or Discovery Material: All items or information, regardless 1 of the medium or manner in which it is generated, stored, or maintained (including, 2 among other things, testimony, transcripts, and tangible things), that are produced 3 or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 4 G.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
467 U.S. 20 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Pintos v. PACIFIC CREDITORS ASS'N
605 F.3d 665 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu
447 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Warren v. Steer
5 A. 4 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1886)
Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Electronics, Inc.
187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1999)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
The Estate of Christopher Nash v. County of Los Angeles, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-estate-of-christopher-nash-v-county-of-los-angeles-cacd-2020.